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Abstract 
 
AN IMPACT EVALUATION OF A LARGE-SCALE CASH TRANSGER PROGRAM 
ON HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE OF THE CHILD SUPPORT 
GRANT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
By 
 
Vengesai Magadzire 
 
 
 Poverty alleviation is a preoccupation of many governments and development 
practitioners the world over. There is renewed interest in understanding the impact of cash 
transfers on human capital development particularly in Africa as an option to break the 
intergeneration transmission of poverty. This study empirically examines the impact of the 
Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary school aged children in South Africa as 
well as the impact of this large scale cash transfer program on the health of children living in 
South Africa. Given the challenges that South Africa is experiencing as far as secondary 
school education is concerned where dropout rates are as high as 40 percent, the study finds 
that the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of secondary school 
aged children and particularly boys. The study discovered that the program is also 
comparatively cost-effective when compared to unconditional cash transfers in the region. 
Furthermore, the study also finds that the program has a significant impact on height-for-age 
and a positive impact on weight-for-age for children living in South Africa. South Africa is 
country with a complex mix of under- and over nutrition. Importantly, the study discovers 
that the Child Support Grant reduces thinness and does not increase the chances of obesity 
among children; an important conclusion given that 25 percent of all girls and 20 percent of 
all boys in South Africa are obese. Overall, the Child Support Grant has a significant impact 
on human capital development in South Africa. 
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Summary 
 
There is renewed interest in understanding programs with a potential to break 
intergenerational poverty in developing countries in general and in Africa in particular. Cash 
transfer programs are one such development tool that is widely believed to have such 
potential. Much of the work on the impact of cash transfers on human capital development is 
from conditional cash transfer experiences in Latin America. However, there is a renewed 
interest in Africa where a few programs are in their pilot stages and are mostly unconditional. 
 The Child Support Grant in South Africa is an interesting case study in many 
respects. It is the largest cash transfer program for children in Africa, which has largely been 
unconditional since its inception in 1998. The program has been growing over the years 
reaching almost 11 million children by 2012 in a country with 18.6 million children. This 
goes to show how important the Child Support Grant is in terms of coverage. It now caters 
for all children under the age of 18 years whose primary caregiver meets the means-test 
threshold; giving each child, and up to six children per caregiver, a monthly grant of R 320 in 
a country where poverty line is put at R 515 per month per person and where 50 percent of 
the population lives below the poverty line. This goes to show how important the Child 
Support Grant is in terms of fighting poverty. 
 In this dissertation, therefore, I assessed the impact of the Child Support Grant on 
human capital development. I took advantage of a sudden change in government policy 
affecting means-test eligibility for those in spousal relationships as a natural experiment as 
well as the existence of a first nationally representative panel data in the history of South 
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Africa, which came into being through a Presidential Decree; to rigorously and empirically 
assess the impact of the Child Support Grant on human capital development in South Africa. 
 Firstly, the dissertation assessed the impact of the Child Support Grant on the 
enrolment of secondary school aged children. South Africa has a serious challenge as far as 
secondary school education is concerned with dropout rates reaching almost 50 percent by 
the time children sit for matric examination, which is taken in grade 12. The most cited 
reason for dropping out of school is financial constraints. Now that the age eligibility has 
been extended to include virtually all children under the age of 18 years, I was particularly 
interested in assessing the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary 
school aged children given the challenges that South Africa experiences as far as secondary 
school education is concerned and given that all children from this age cohort are now age-
eligible for the grant. 
 Secondly, the dissertation assessed the impact of the Child Support Grant on health 
for children living in South Africa. When we talk of child poverty and human capital 
development, it is important to talk about education but it is equally important too to talk 
about health for the obvious reasons (known in literature) that a healthier child is more likely 
to do well in school; and a healthier child is more likely to be a healthier adult and contribute 
to the development of a country. I was particularly interested in seeing the impact of the 
Child Support Grant on height-for-age, weight-for-age and body mass index for children 
living in South Africa. South Africa is a country with a complex mix of under- and over-
nutrition. Many countries grapple with a challenge of obesity. This is particularly so in South 
Africa given that 70 percent of all adult females and 40 percent of all male adults are obese. 
The problem is unfortunately also very prevalent among children, where 25 percent of all 
girls and 20 percent of all boys are obese. Obesity exposes children to serious problems such 
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as diabetes and heart diseases. As a result, motivated by this background, I assessed whether 
the Child Support Grant increases the chances of obesity among children in South Africa. 
 Based on the rigorous empirical analysis in this dissertation, the study found out that 
in general the Child Support Grant has a positive and significant impact on the enrolment of 
secondary school aged children. This is an important conclusion given the challenges that 
South Africa is experiencing as far as secondary school education is concerned. The Child 
Support Grant has a positive and significant impact on the enrolment of secondary school 
aged boys. This is an important conclusion too, considering that dropout rates for boys are 
much higher than dropout rates for girls throughout secondary school life of children in South 
Africa and also considering that the opportunity cost of attending school through labor 
activities was higher for boys than for girls. However, the result on girls is not conclusive. 
Although the program has a positive and significant impact on the enrolment of secondary 
school aged children living in formal urban areas; and a positive impact for children living in 
urban informal areas and tribal authority areas, it has no impact on the enrolment of 
secondary school aged children living in formal rural areas. Formal rural areas are 
characteristic of inadequate physical conditions in school and higher indirect costs suggesting 
that other factors (such as supply-side considerations among others) might have an 
overbearing effect on children living in rural areas. 
When compared to other cash transfers in Africa on education, particularly from 
Malawi, it was discovered that the Child Support Grant is also comparatively cost-effective; 
fairing as good as in an unconditional cash transfer but lower than a conditional cash transfer 
in Malawi. This suggests that the Child Support Grant has room to be more cost effective if 
conditionalities on education are fully introduced and enforced. Scale might be important for 
the slight difference in cost effectiveness estimates between the Child Support Grant and the 
vii 
 
unconditional program in Malawi. The Child Support Grant is reaching to millions of 
children when compared to programs in Malawi and Kenya with coverage of a few thousand 
beneficiaries. Average cost tent to fall with number beneficiaries. 
 The study also concluded that the Child Support Grant has a positive and significant 
impact on height-for-age; and a positive impact on weight-for-age for children in South 
Africa. Although the program has a significant impact on the health of children living in 
formal urban areas, it does not have an impact on health for children living in formal rural 
areas. Rural areas in South Africa still face challenges such as post-natal feeding support, 
social determinants of health such as low educational levels, poor housing and sanitation, 
insufficient health surveillance and information systems as well as a shortage of healthcare 
service providers. The complex supply-side limitations prevailing in the rural areas still have 
an overbearing effect on children living in formal rural areas. 
It is important to pay particular attention to children in their early years of life for the 
main reason that nutritional deficiencies experienced at this stage of life are very difficult to 
reverse and have a long-term effect on a child’s well-being. Although the impact of the Child 
Support Grant on the health (height-for-age and weight-for-age) of children aged 1 – 4 years 
is positive, and weakly significant in some cases, it is not strongly significant. One possible 
explanation for this is cascading effect from the effect of low up-take of the Child Support 
Grant by caregivers for children below the age of 1 year. Uptake of the Child Support Grant 
is lowest among children below the age of 1 year. 
 Given the challenges South Africa is experiencing as far as obesity is concerned 
where 25 percent of all girls and 20 percent of all boys are obese, the study discovered and 
reached a very important conclusion that the Child Support Grant does not increase the 
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chances of obesity among children. The Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the 
health of children living in South Africa and does not increase the chances of obesity among 
children. Based on the rigorous empirical analysis in this study, the Child Support Grant has a 
significant impact on human capital development in South Africa. 
On the basis of the findings presented herein, this dissertation makes policy 
recommendations. Although the Child Support Grant has a positive and significant impact on 
the enrolment of secondary school aged children, it does not have an impact on the enrolment 
of children living in formal rural areas. It is important, therefore, to pay special attention to 
children living in formal rural areas. The Child Support Grant does not have an impact on the 
health of children living in formal rural areas. At policy level, it is therefore important to pay 
special attention to children living in rural areas and children aged 1 – 4 years and to further 
encourage the uptake of the Child Support Grant among children below the age of 1 year so 
that the human capital development for these groups of children is also enhanced just like 
other groups of children in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Poverty alleviation is a pre-occupation of many governments, policy-makers and 
development practitioners the world over. A lot of attention is now being put towards 
programs and development tools with a potential to break inter-generational poverty among 
the poorest; particularly with a special focus on child poverty and human capital development. 
One such development tool that is receiving special attention is cash transfer programs; with 
a lot of evidence coming from the documented experiences from Latin American countries. 
Most of this experience is on conditional cash transfers; with a relatively few documented 
evidence on unconditional cash transfers.  
Cash transfers can be conditional or unconditional. The literature on cash transfers 
does not seem to be conclusive on whether conditional transfers are better than unconditional 
transfers. Factors most often taken into account when deciding whether to condition or not 
center a lot on political considerations, beliefs (Fizsbein and Schady, 2009); and a need to use 
conditions as a screening mechanism (Das et al., 2005), as well as demand and supply 
considerations (Adato and Bassett, 2008; Lagarde et al., 2009).    
In Africa, there is renewed interest in better understanding the impact of 
unconditional cash transfers; with a number of programs in their pilot stages. The Child 
Support Grant in South Africa is arguably the largest social protection program in Africa for 
children, reaching 11 million children by 2012 in a country with 18.6 million children; and 
one that has been around for over 15 years. It is paid to a caregiver of a child within an age-
eligible range and is paid up to six children per caregiver. The age eligibility criterion has 
been regularly adjusted over the years and now includes all children under the age of 18. For 
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most poor families in South Africa, the Child Support Grant is an important source of income. 
Although the Child Support Grant is known to have been largely unconditional since 
inception, there had been concerted efforts by the government to make the program 
conditional and the debate is still very live. The Child Support Grant is an interesting case 
study in understanding cash transfers in Africa and a better understanding of the impact of 
unconditional cash transfers on child poverty and human capital development; particularly 
education and health. This dissertation seeks to contribute to this relatively limited aspect of 
cash transfers. 
This study empirically assessed the impact of the Child Support Grant on the 
enrolment of secondary-school-aged children in South Africa; and the impact of the program 
on height-for-age and weight-for-age for children in South Africa. In assessing the impact of 
the program on enrolment, the analysis was limited to children aged 13 – 18 years for the 
obvious reason that they are more likely to be in secondary school. The analysis for the 
impact on health outcomes was limited to children under the age of 15; with further 
disaggregation into age cohorts of 1 – 4 years; 5 – 9 years; and 10 – 14 years, in order to be 
able to see the impact of the program on children in their early years of life. Nutritional 
deficiencies experienced in a child’s early years of life are difficult to reverse and have a 
long-term impact on the child’s well-being in future. 
Enrolment rates are very high in primary school but the country seems to have a 
serious challenge as far as secondary school education is concerned. Drop-out rates among 
secondary school children increase year-on-year, reaching almost 40 percent by the time 
children get into Grade 10 and almost 50 percent by Grade 12. The most cited reason why 
children do not attend school is financial constraints; with 24 percent citing no money (Hall, 
2011; Branson, Hofmeyr and Lam, 2013). Is the Child Support Grant doing something about 
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this for secondary-school-aged children? This dissertation addressed this question and the 
hypothesis on enrolment was to say that the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on 
the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children. 
When discussing child poverty and human capital development, it is important to talk 
about education but it is equally important to talk about health too; for the obvious reasons 
that a healthier child is more likely to do well in school, and a healthier child is more likely to 
be a healthier adult in future and contribute to the development of a country. The research 
also looked at the impact of the Child Support Grant on height-for-age and weight-for-age. 
South Africa is a country with a complex mix of under- and over-nutrition. The next natural 
question the research addressed was to answer whether the Child Support Grant does not 
contribute to obesity among children. Obesity exposes children to the risks of suffering from 
diabetes and heart diseases. Many countries the world over are grappling with the problem of 
obesity among children. Looking at obesity is therefore important and particularly so in South 
Africa; where 70 percent of all female adults and 40 percent of all male adults are obese, and 
where 25 percent of girls and 20 percent of boys are obese (The Economist, 14 June, 2014). 
The research sought to show that the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on height-
for-age and weight-for-age; and that the program does not increase the chances of obesity 
among children in South Africa. 
Prior studies have looked at the impact of the Child Support Grant on education. 
Most of the previous work on the impact of the Child Support Grant on education looks at 
primary school education. This dissertation expands on that and is distinct in that it pays 
attention on secondary-school-aged children. The age eligibility criterion recently included 
children aged 15 to 17 years; this dissertation contributes to the existing literature on the 
Child Support Grant by providing evidence on the impact of the program on the enrolment of 
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secondary-school-aged children. Whereas some previous researches used data from one 
province of South Africa, in this dissertation I used nationally representative data covering all 
the nine provinces of the country. 
There is also some existing literature on the impact of Old Age Pension on some 
health outcomes including height-for-age and weight-for-age of children in South Africa. In 
this research, particular interest is on a social protection program specifically meant for 
children; the Child Support Grant. This makes this research different and distinct from 
previous works that focused on a social protection program meant for the aged. Equally 
important, however, looking at the impact of the Child Support Grant on health outcomes is 
assessing a direct channel towards child poverty and human capital development. There is 
also some existing literature on the impact of the Child Support Grant on height-for-age. 
Much of this literature use data from one province, particularly the KwaZulu-Natal Income 
Dynamics Study. This dissertation builds on that and is one of the first works to use the first 
nationally representative panel data in South Africa.  
The study took advantage of the sudden change in government policy affecting 
caregivers who are in spousal relationships and the way the means-test threshold is now 
calculated that came into effect in 2008 and used these sudden changes in government policy 
as a natural experiment. So sudden was the change in policy, something with no precedence 
whatsoever given the history of policy announcements affecting the Child Support Grant 
since 1998, that it is difficult to imagine any economic agent to have anticipated such a 
change in policy. The study also took advantage of the first nationally representative panel 
study to get a deeper understanding of the dynamics affecting children in South Africa. The 
study finds that the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged children. The study also discovered that the Child Support Grant is 
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comparatively cost-effective compared to other programs on education in Africa, particularly 
Malawi and Kenya. Furthermore, the study finds that the program has a significant impact on 
height-for-age in general and on height-for-age and weight-for-age for children living in 
urban areas. The Child Support Grant does not contribute to the problem of obesity among 
children in South Africa.  
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 details the background 
information about the Child Support Grant; with section 1 of chapter 2 describing both age-
eligibility criteria applicable to children and means-test threshold applicable to caregivers. To 
qualify for the Child Support Grant, a child has to meet the age-eligibility criterion as well as 
coming from a household which is means-test eligible. Section 2 of Chapter 2 traces the 
growth of the Child Support Grant in terms of outreach; showing the importance of the 
program in terms of coverage. The grant amount has also been adjusted over the years and 
Section 3 dwells on that. Section 4 of Chapter 2 shows the importance of the Child Support 
Grant in terms of its share to total expenditure towards social assistance. South Africa is one 
of the very few countries in Africa with a comprehensive package of social protection 
programs namely: Old Age Pension; War Veterans Grant; Disability Grant; Care Dependency 
Grant; Foster Care Grant; and the Child Support Grant. Section 5 concludes the chapter by 
showing the overall importance of the Child Support Grant in terms of child poverty in South 
Africa. 
Chapter 3 gives a detailed literature review. Section 1 of Chapter 3 details literature 
review on the impact of cash transfers on education; drawing much from the Latin American, 
South Asian and Far East Asian experiences. Section 2 of Chapter 3 dwells on previous 
works on the impact of cash transfers on health. There is a rich literature mostly on 
conditional cash transfers on health from Latin American experiences. The debate on whether 
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to condition or not and considerations thereto are still areas of much discussion in the 
literature. This debate is very much alive in South Africa as well. Given this background, 
Section 3 of Chapter 3 gives a detailed treatment on what is known on the literature on 
conditional versus unconditional cash transfers. Section 4 of Chapter 3 focuses specifically 
on the existing literature on the Child Support Grant and section 5 concludes the chapter by 
identifying the gaps in literature and drawing distinctions of this dissertation work from other 
researches. 
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged children and section 1 of the chapter introduces the paper. Section 2 
of the chapter looks at a brief literature review and leads to hypothesis development. A full 
description of the data used and data treatment together with descriptive statistics are 
presented in section 3 of chapter 4. Section 4 of the chapter describes the methodology used 
in assessing the impact of the Child Support Grant starting off by detailing the natural 
experiment that came as a result of a sudden change in government policy affecting the Child 
Support Grant and a description of the empirical strategy adopted by looking at the 
Difference-in-Differences framework, Instrumental Variables method and Panel Fixed 
Effects method separately. Section 5 of the chapter presents the results; first results based on 
the Difference-in-Differences estimations followed by Instrumental Variables estimation 
results and lastly results based on Panel Fixed Effects estimations. The last sub-section of 
section 5 discusses the cost-effectiveness of the Child Support Grant. Section 6 concludes the 
chapter by drawing conclusions from a reconciliation of the results from the three empirical 
methods used and linking them to the testable hypotheses presented in section 2 of the 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5 assesses the impact of the Child Support Grant on health. When a 
discussion of child poverty and human capital development is at stake, it is important to 
discuss about education but it is also equally important to talk about health, for the obvious 
reasons that a healthier child is more likely to do well in school and a healthier child is more 
likely to be a healthier adult and contribute to the development of a country. Section 1 of 
chapter 5 introduces the chapter. Section 2 discusses a brief literature review and section 3 
details the objectives of the chapter, the research questions and testable hypotheses. Data and 
descriptive statistics as well as data treatment are outlined in section 4 of this chapter. Section 
5 of this chapter dwells on methodology used in the analysis, which describes the two 
empirical methods namely the Difference-in-Differences and Panel Fixed Effects methods. 
Results of the impact of the Child Support Grant on child health outcomes are presented in 
section 6 of the chapter. Difference-in-Differences results of the impact of the program on 
height-for-age and weight-for-age are presented first followed by robustness checks of these 
results. The second sub-section on results details Panel Fixed Effects estimation results of the 
program on height-for-age and weight-for-age. The last sub-section on results presents results 
on the effect of the Child Support Grant on obesity. Results from the last section answer the 
question as to whether the Child Support Grant contributes to the problem of obesity among 
children in South Africa. Section 7 of the chapter concludes the chapter by tying in all the 
results to the testable hypotheses presented in section 3 of this chapter. 
Chapter six concludes the dissertation. Section 1 of Chapter 6 summarizes the 
findings presented in the entire Dissertation. Drawing from the findings, Section 2 of the 
Chapter looks at policy implications and identifies potential areas of further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND: THE CHILD SUPPORT GRANT 
 
In 1998, through an Act of Parliament, the Government of South Africa introduced a 
grant meant to help children and to fight poverty. The grant is widely referred to as the Child 
Support Grant. It came into existence following years of research, consultations and 
recommendations by the Lund Committee for Child and Family Support which was 
established in 1995 to consider measures for the support of children and families; which 
played a critical role in the policy formulation process of the program. The then existing State 
Maintenance Grant did not target the poorest children equitably and the Child Support Grant 
was established to address this imbalance and to reach significantly more poor families. It is 
part of a wider social protection strategy of South Africa enshrined in the quest to provide 
social assistance to vulnerable groups of the society and fulfill Section 27 of the Constitution 
which guarantees citizens social security. 
The Child Support Grant is paid to a primary caregiver of a child within the eligible 
age range who passes the means-test. It is a monthly grant given per child and up to a 
maximum of six children per caregiver. The grant has been largely unconditional and did not 
stipulate any behavioral change on the part of the recipients1; such as is prevalent with most 
conditional cash transfers. However, there are certain requirements namely possession of a 
birth certificate for the child, an identity document for the mother, infant health record 
                                       
1 There have been several attempts to introduce conditions over the years (Hall, 2011; Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2010). In 
1998, the Child Support Grant had a range of conditions (for example proof that children had been immunized) which were 
later dropped that year; in 2004 the draft regulations stipulated that the child should receive immunization and attend school 
if of school-going age. ‘All these conditions were dropped from the regulations in recognition that they were both 
unnecessary and impossible to implement’ (Hall, 2011). The recent attempt was in 2010 when the government wanted to 
condition on school attendance but was not implemented following urgent submissions from children’s sector and human 
rights groups about the implications. However, the program is largely unconditional: not going to school does not result in 
the cancellation of the grant. 
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(Zembe-Mkabile et al., 2012). There is a clear stipulation in the recent Child Support Grant 
legislation to the effect that proof of school enrolment and attendance is not a condition for 
continued receipt of the grant2.  
At inception, the grant was meant to cater for children under the age of seven but has 
since been increased throughout the years. The Child Support Grant has grown in importance 
to become Africa’s largest cash transfer program for children in terms of both coverage and 
budget. It is unique in that it is the largest cash transfer in Africa and that has been there for 
nearly 15 years. Most cash transfers in Africa are in their pilot stage and cover up to a few 
thousands beneficiaries.  
 
2.1 Eligibility  
It has seen a remarkable transformation in terms of eligibility; increasing 
progressively over the years as detailed in Table 2.1 in appendix, which details the 
transformation on beneficiaries, eligibility and nominal grant amounts. From 1999 to 2002, 
the grant catered for children under the age of 7 and was increased to 9 years in 2003, 11 
years in 2004. From 2005 to 2008 it was targeted at children under the age of 14 years. It has 
been increased progressively and now it is virtually for all children under the age of 18 years. 
The inclusion of children up to the age of 17 years has very important policy implications. It 
can be said that in its early years, the Child Support Grant was aimed at pre- and primary 
school going children and the inclusion from children under the age of 14 to children under 
the age of 18 years implies that it now caters for both primary and secondary school-going 
children. Although in the beginning the authorities wanted to reach a target of 3 million 
                                       
2 See ‘Department of Social Development: Presentation on the regulations under the Social Assistance Act, 2004 (Act No. 
13 of 2004), 2010’; also cited in Zembe-Mkabile et al. (2012). 
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children, today the Department of Social Development is now targeting 100 percent of all 
eligible children in the country. The fact that eligibility is up to a total of 6 children from one 
family also means that the Child Support Grant is a very important source of income for 
families with more children and an increase in eligibility to children under 18 years has 
important implications to the society.  
In order to make sure the grant benefits the most-needy children, the government 
introduced a means-test threshold. The threshold was set at a household income not 
exceeding R 800 and R 1 100 per month for urban and rural households respectively. The 
means-test threshold remained constant for 10 years from 1998 to 2008. However, it was 
reviewed in 2008. From 22 August, 2008, the means-test was to be calculated as 10 times the 
grant amount; thereby introducing a scientific way of determining the threshold. In 2012, the 
means test threshold was set at R 2 800 per month (R 33 600 per annum)3 for a single 
caregiver and R 5 600 per month (R 67 200 per annum) for married caregivers.  
Before 2008, there was no distinction between single and married caregivers; they 
were all subjected to the same cut-off threshold. However, for the first time in the history of 
the Child Support Grant, with effect from 22 August, 2008, married caregivers’ (those in 
spousal relationship) means-test threshold was to be determined as double that of the single-
income caregivers. This was a tremendous and sharp change in policy that saw some 
households who were ineligible for the grant becoming suddenly eligible after the change in 
policy. Also, since 2008, the threshold does not distinguish between urban and rural 
caregivers anymore.  
                                       
3Approximately US$ 3 775.00 per annum 
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The caregiver does not necessarily mean biological parent but rather refers to a 
‘primary caregiver’. It is given to the person who looks after the daily needs of the child and 
this means that it does not necessarily mean that the caregiver has to be related to that child. 
This is based on the concept that the Child Support Grant must follow the child. In general, 
mostly the grant is received by the child’s parent. About 82 percent of the recipients are 
parents, 12 percent are grandparents and 3 percent aunt or uncle. The largest proportion of 
grant recipients is by women (McEwen and Woolard, 2012). About 2 percent of women 
recipients are teen mothers. In all the cases, they need to meet means-test eligibility criterion. 
 
2.2 Beneficiaries 
Table 2.1 also shows the number of beneficiaries of the Child Support Grant from 
1999 to 2012. For comparison purposes, Table 2.1 also includes data for other social grants 
meant for children; namely the Care Dependency Grant and the Foster Care Grant. The Care 
Dependency Grant is paid to parents, primary caregivers or foster parents of any child with 
any severe mental and/or physical disabilities between the ages of 1 and 18 years requiring 
full-home care. On the other hand, the Foster Care Grant is paid to parents for children 
between the ages of 0 and 18 years with provision for extension up to 21 years. It was created 
to provide for children removed from families into foster care who are deemed in need of 
such support by the courts. Table 2.1 shows that, although the nominal grant amounts for the 
Child Support Grant are comparatively lower than the other two social grants, it has grown 
tremendously over the years in terms of coverage, starting with about 22,000 children in 1999 
and skyrocketed to 5.4 million by 2005, 8.2 million by 2007 and 10.9 million by 2012. South 
Africa is a country with 49.9 million people, of which 18.6 million are children under the age 
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of 18 (UNICEF, 2011); this goes to show how important the Child Support Grant is in terms 
of coverage.  
A fairly low uptake in the early years of the program is widely attributed to 
bureaucratic challenges that dodged the program but have since been addressed over the 
years. Challenges, however, are still experienced by other eligible families. In 2008, 2.1 
million eligible children (27 percent of all eligible children) were not receiving the grant; and 
in 2012 (Cluver et al., 2013; Coetzee, 2010). Lack of documentation is cited as the biggest 
barrier to accessing the Child Support Grant (Zembe-Mkabile, 2012; South Africa Human 
Rights Commission/UNICEF, 2011); with 34 percent citing lack of documentation. This is 
followed by 24 percent citing ‘other reasons’ as the militating factor. A comparatively large 
proportion of caregivers indicated that ‘they have not gotten around it’ and ‘cannot be 
bothered’ pushing the figures at 12 percent and 9 percent respectively. Five percent and 6 
percent cited that they ‘do not know how to apply’ and ‘in the process of applying’ 
respectively. However, the number of beneficiaries is projected to increase by 2 million in the 
next few years with a growth rate of 4.9 per cent per year (Tibert et al., 2013). 
Table 2.2 in appendix shows the breakdown of beneficiaries by province from 1999 
to 2009. KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape Provinces have the highest beneficiaries of the 
Child Support Grant for all the years. This shows that the Child Support Grant is very 
important in poverty alleviation4 since these are among the poorest provinces in South Africa. 
Research by the Department of Welfare found that poorest children are located in the 
provinces of KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and the Eastern Cape (Triegaardt, 2005). In the 
                                       
4 Dubihlela and Dubihlela (2014) also concluded that social grants play an important role in poverty alleviation among 
female headed households. Worrying that social welfare in South Africa might cause dependency on the state, Potts (2012) 
concluded that dependency on the state is not straight forward and that it varies across grants. 
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Eastern Cape Province, for example, 78 per cent of children live in poor households. Poverty 
in South Africa imitates racial contours of the society and this shows how important the Child 
Support Grant is in reaching to the poor and fighting child poverty. Sixty-four per cent (11.9 
million children) of all children live in income poverty. Children are more likely to live in 
poorer households. Some 7 million children live in the poorest 20 percent of households 
while only 1.7 million live in the richest 20 percent (UNICEF, 2011). In the early years of the 
program, relatively wealthier and more urban provinces of Western Cape and Gauteng 
registered a disproportionate share of the Child Support Grant in relation to levels of poverty 
and numbers of children in these provinces. Table 2.3 and 2.4 show the breakdowns of the 
beneficiaries according to age and province as at 30 June 2011. This snapshot presentation 
shows that age cohort 0-7 years recorded the highest beneficiaries for all the provinces with 
3-4 years and 4-5 years cohorts dominating. This, in part, can be explained by the staggered 
eligibility conditions. The 0-7 age cohort has been eligible since 1999 as compared to other 
cohorts. However, the uptake of the Child Support Grant is lowest among children below the 
age of 1 year. 
 
2.3 Grant amount 
The amount of the grant has been growing over the years as highlighted in Table 2.1. 
It started off at R 100 in 1999 and has successively been adjusted over the years; and by April 
2013 the monthly amount stood at R 280. With effect from 1 October, 2014, the monthly 
grant amount is pegged at R 320. For a family with six eligible children, this translates into 
an income of R 1 920 per month; approximately US $387 using the World Bank’s 2012 PPP 
conversion factor for private consumption (LCU per international $) rate. The adjustments of 
nominal grant amounts over the years have also seen the real grant value increasing over the 
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years. The real value of the Child Support Grant in April 2013 was R 134 in 1999 money 
terms. This saves to confirm that the Child Support Grant nominal value adjustments over the 
years were successful in preserving the purchasing power of the grant. 
 
2.4 Government Expenditure on Child Support Grant 
 
The increase in numbers, both in terms of increased beneficiaries and nominal grant 
value, over the years has also had a noticeable impact on the fiscus as detailed in Table 2.5, 
which details social grants expenditure by type of grant and province from fiscal year 2003 to 
2010 and in Table 2.6. The term Social Assistance Grants is an umbrella term used to refer to 
‘non-contributory and income-tested benefits provided by the state to vulnerable groups such 
as the disabled, the elderly and children in poor households’ (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2010). 
The Child Support Grant is not the only social grant in South Africa. There are five other 
grants namely: the Old-age, War Veterans5, Disability, Foster care, and Care Dependency. 
The Child Support Grant however, is the largest in terms of beneficiaries and the fastest 
growing. It started off with an uptake of only 10 percent in 2000 and reaching 63 percent in 
2005, costing 3.5 percent of GDP and higher since then. The total expenditure for the Child 
Support Grant has been growing at an average rate of 19.4 per cent from 2003 to 2010 and 
7.6 percent as of 2013. It has continued to be an important aspect of the budget for social 
development, accounting for 36.8 percent of the total budget towards social assistance and 
second only from the Old Age Grant which consumes 39 percent of the total budget towards 
social assistance. 
                                       
5 ‘The war veterans’ grants is paid to people of 60 years and more, who served in the South African army during the First 
World War (1914 – 1918), the Second World War (1939 – 1945) or the Korean War (1950 – 1953)’ (Dubihlela and 
Dubihlela, 2014).  
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2.5 Conclusion 
The adjustment in the means-test threshold and the extension of the age eligibility 
criteria to include all children under the age of 18 years as well as the continual review of the 
grant amount means that the grant is becoming more accessible and important to many people. 
The poverty line in South Africa is put at R 515 per month per person. With an amount of   
R 320 per child per month and up to six children from one family, the grant is by all 
standards an important source of income for poor households. It is estimated that about 50 
percent of the population lives below the poverty line. It is also estimated that for most 
families the Child Support Grant accounts for 40 percent of reported incomes. The Child 
Support Grant may be the sole source of income for many poor families; making it essential 
for people’s survival. It, therefore, is an important source of income for poor families and is 
an important weapon in the fight against child and intergenerational poverty. The Child 
Support Grant therefore presents a unique opportunity to gain further understanding on how 
cash transfers work in developing countries and provide another perspective to the well 
documented conditional cash transfers from Latin America and Asia.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Poverty alleviation is a preoccupation of many governments, development 
practitioners and policy makers the world over. Different programs have been put forward 
and implemented with varying levels of success in different parts of the world. One such 
program is cash transfers which has been implemented in many developing countries with 
prominence in Latin and Central America. Many of these programs aim to address 
intergenerational poverty by focusing on child poverty and human capital development 
(Ponce and Bedi, 2010); particularly education and health. This is important because children, 
more often than not, are the most vulnerable groups due to their age, physical and 
developmental fragility, societal status and dependence on others (Gabel, 2012). The effect of 
childhood poverty has long-term implications on children’s physical, social, emotional, 
neurological, mental and physical development (Meaney, 2001; Shonkoff and Phillips, 2000; 
McEwen, 2003; cited in ibid).  
Growing up in poverty is correlated with diminished cognitive achievement as 
measured by standardized intelligence tests (Farah et al., 2006). On another hand, stunting, 
for example, is very difficult to reverse after the first two years of a child’s life leading to 
proven reduced work capacity and less productive livelihoods as adults. Children who lacked 
iron and iodine in their early years perform worse off in school compared with those who did 
not; and insufficient investment in childhood increase the likelihood of poverty in adulthood; 
and exacerbate the intergenerational transmission of poverty (Grantham-McGregor et al., 
2007; Samson, Heinrich, and Williams, 2008; Handa, Devereux, and Webb, 2010; Heckman 
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and Carneiro, 2003; ibid); and there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that cash 
transfer programs can increase nutritional, health and educational well-being of children 
(Gabel; 2012). 
To shed light on what is known on cash transfers and human capital development, 
the literature review will assess the impact of cash transfers on education and health 
separately, drawing from Latin American and South Asian experiences. It will then focus on 
the debate on conditional versus unconditional transfers. This is very important and 
particularly so in the case of the Child Support Grant were the debate has stoked the program 
since its inception in 1998. Lastly, the literature review will look at the existing literature on 
the Child Support Grant in general and on education and health in particular; and identify 
gaps from the literature review, which become the premises of this research where upon I 
bridge and expand on these gaps. 
 
3.2 Impact of cash transfers on education 
A number of researchers focused on the impact of cash transfers on education 
(Schultz, 2000; 2004; Behrman, Sengupta and Todd, 2000; 2005; Todd and Wolpin, 2006; 
Behrman, Parker and Todd, 2006; 2007; Maluccio and Flores, 2004). Slavin (2010) reviewed 
research on the effects of conditional cash transfers and other financial incentive schemes on 
educational outcomes both in developing countries (Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, 
Jamaica, Pakistan, and Kenya) and developed countries (Israel, UK, and USA) and 
discovered that providing families with significant financial incentives in developing 
countries modestly increases secondary school attendances although effects on graduation 
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rates and on actual learning are less well known; and less supportive results in developed 
countries.  
Assessing the impact of cash transfers on enrolment, Attanasio, Fitzsimons and 
Gomez (2005) found an effect of 5-10 percent increase in enrolment for children aged 12-17 
years in Colombia. However, there was no effect for children aged 8-13 years living in urban 
areas but for children living in the rural areas with boys registering higher impacts in both 
rural and urban for primary school-aged children. For secondary school children, effects were 
large for boys in the urban areas and for girls in the rural areas (ibid). In a similar work but a 
different program (on Subsidios Condicionados a la Asistencia Escolar cited in Slavin, 2010), 
cash transfers increased attendance by 2.8 percent; recording larger effects for children aged 
9-11 years as compared to the effect for children aged 6-8 years. One of the most important 
conclusions from this program is that the graduation bonus significantly increased the 
chances of secondary school graduation and entry into post-secondary school education (by a 
gain of 49.7 percent).  
Working on Ecuador, Schady and Araujo (2006) also found a program effect of 10 
percent increase in enrolment for children aged 6-17 years. In Bangladesh, Khandler, Pitt and 
Fuwa (2003) found a 12 percent increase in probability of enrolment for girls aged 11-18 
years. Filmer and Schady (2011) found that a modest cash transfer, equivalent to 
approximately 2 percent of the consumption of the median recipient household in Cambodia, 
had a substantial impact on school attendance, approximately 25 percentage points (although 
a somewhat larger transfer did not raise attendance rates above this level, probably suggesting 
that program design might also be important). In Pakistan, girl’s schools that received stipend 
witnessed an increase in attendance of about 9 percent (Chaudhury and Parajuli, 2006; cited 
in Slavin, 2010). 
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In terms of educational outcomes, a sizeable number of impact evaluation studies 
have shown that such programs have led to an increase in school enrolment, ensured regular 
school attendance and led to a reduction in child labor (ibid; Galiani and McEwan, 2013; 
Patrinos, 2007; Barrera-Osario, Bertrnd, Linden, and Perez-Calle, 2008; Glewwe and Olinto, 
2004 cited in Gabel, 2012; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). However, De Janvry et al (2006) 
concluded that although conditional transfers helped protect enrolment, they do not 
completely discourage (‘refrain’) parents from increasing child work in the presence of 
shocks. In general, however, evidence from conditional cash transfers, mostly from Latin 
American countries, suggests that cash transfers have an impact on schooling outcomes.   
Although empirical evidence on students’ test scores is scarce, Ponce and Bedi (2010) opined 
that they may also be expected to exert a positive impact. 
 
3.3 Impact of cash transfers on health 
There is also a rich body of literature on the impact of cash transfers on health 
(Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld, 2008; Attanasio, 2005; Gertler, 2000; Maluccio, 2004; 
Behrman, 2005; 2004; Lagarde et al., 2009). Health and education of children are important 
aspects of human capital development and in the fight of intergenerational poverty. As Glewe 
and Miguel (2008) noted, poor health may reduce learning through fewer years enrolled, 
lower daily attendance, and less efficient learning per day spent in school; and inevitably 
having a long-term impact on a child’s future. Much of the literature on the impact of cash 
transfers on health is from Latin American experiences as well (Gertler, 2004; Behrman and 
Hoddinott, 2005; Gertler and Boyce, 2001).  
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Maluccio and Flores (2004) found that cash transfers in Nicaragua reduce the 
prevalence of stunting in children under the age of 5 years by 5 percent and underweight by 6 
percent. Maluccio (2004) found a positive impact on height-for-age (an increase in height-
for-age by 0.17 standard deviations) for children under the age of 5 years. In Colombia, 
Attanasio et al. (2005) noted a 0.44 centimeters increase in height for infants under 24 
months old. 
 Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld (2008) used a doubling of cash transfer in Mexico to 
find the impact of cash transfers on child health, growth and development; concluding that a 
doubling of cash transfers was associated with higher height-for-age Z score (0.20 standard 
deviations); lower prevalence of stunting (-0.10 standard deviations); lower body-mass index 
for age percentile (-2.85 standard deviations); and lower prevalence of being overweight    
(-0.08 standard deviations), and also associated with children doing better on a scale of motor 
development; three scales of cognitive development, and with receptive language. In another 
research; an unconditional cash transfer in Ecuador, however, Fernald and Hidrobo (2011) 
found no effects on height-for-age z-score among other health and child development 
outcomes.  
 Lagarde et al. (2009) reviewed 29 papers on the impact of conditional cash transfers 
on access to care and health outcomes. They limited their analysis to conditional cash 
transfers and settled on ten papers reporting results on six studies and concluded that 
conditional cash transfers may lead to a number of benefits to health for poor populations. 
For children’s anthropometric outcomes in particular, they found positive effects on 
children’s growth; an ‘increase in height by about 1 centimeter amongst children less than 4 
years old’. Interestingly, they discovered contradictory findings on the impact on height-for-
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age Z-scores with one study reporting a significant increase while the other indicating a 
negative impact; though similar in magnitude. 
 Morris et al. (2004), working on Bolsa Alimentacao in Brazil, also found a negative 
and significant impact on mean height-for-age for children under the age of 7 years. However, 
they did not find a significant impact on height-for-age for children under the age of 20 
months; for children aged 24 – 48 months; and for children aged 4 – 7 years. Neither did they 
find a significant impact on weight-for-age for children under the age of 24 months; for 
children aged 24 – 48 months; for children aged 4 – 7 years; and for all children under the 
age of 7 years. 
 Another piece of literature on the impact of cash transfers on children’s height comes 
from Behrman (2005) and from Gertler (2000). Working on Progresa in Mexico, Behrman 
(2005) discovered a significant impact on the height of children aged 12 – 36 months (an 
increase in height by 1.016 centimeters) and children aged 24 – 36 months (an increase in 
height by 1.224 centimeters). However, the author did not find significant results for children   
aged 4 – 12 months; and for children aged 36 – 48 months. Also working on Progresa, 
Gertler (2000) also found a significant impact on the height of children aged 12 – 36 months; 
discovering an increase in height by 0.959 centimeters. These results are also well 
summarized in Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer (2009). Other researches which concentrated on 
height-for-age and weight-for-age, as summarized by Manley et al. (2013) who reviewed 
30,000 articles relating cash transfer programs and height-for-age, are by Ahmed et al. (2009); 
Vera-Hernadez et al. (2010); Gitter et al. (2010); Rivera et al. (2004); Barrios et al. (2008); 
Perova and Vakis (2009); Gomez et al. (2010); and Himaz (2008). All this work is on Latin 
American experiences except the work by Ahmed et al. (2009) and Himaz (2008) which is 
based on South Asian experience; Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in particular. 
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 Parker, Rubalcava and Teruel (2008) reviewed cash transfers in Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, Colombia, Brazil and ‘other countries’ (Bangladesh and Cambodia). They 
concluded that ‘the diverse studies showed almost uniformly positive results on the short-
term indicators measured’; including, among others, better health. However, they noted that 
although conditional cash transfers are generally regarded as successful, it is not clear the 
success comes from the price effect (conditionality) or some other factors such as the income 
effect or ‘the potential intra household allocation effect deriving from women receiving the 
transfer’. To this effect, there is a large body of literature that pays particular attention on 
conditional transfers versus unconditional transfers. Before looking at the existing literature 
on the Child Support Grant, it is worthwhile to pay special attention to the current debates in 
the literature on conditional versus unconditional cash transfers for the obvious reason that 
this subject is also very rive in South Africa. 
 
3.4 Conditional versus Unconditional Cash Transfers 
Cash transfers can be conditional or unconditional with conditional transfers 
prominent in many Latin American countries (Parker, Rubalcava, and Teruel, 2008; Skoufias 
et al. 2001; Angelucci et al., 2009; Behrman et al., 2005; Rawlings and Rubio, 2005). The 
case of conditional versus unconditional has been debated extensively in the literature. While 
significant impacts have been demonstrated quantitatively, Adato, Roopnaraine and Becker 
(2011) argued, little attention is paid to why conditional cash transfers have these observed 
impacts, and as importantly – why impacts are not greater than they are. Several arguments 
are advanced for and against conditions. Fiszbein and Schady (2009), for example, developed 
an illustrative depiction of considerations to be taken into account in order to determine 
whether conditioning is the right policy instrument.  Assuming rationality among economic 
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agents, well-functioning markets and competent governments, the best option would be 
unconditional cash transfers. Revealed preferences have shown that unconditional cash 
transfers are more preferable and consumers are at least as well-off under a cash transfer just 
as they would under a subsidy for a particular good. 
Conditions work well if private investment in children’s human capital is believed to 
be below private optimal level emanating from either misguided believe about the nature of 
process of investments in the human capital development of a child (it can also be due to a 
failure to understand the underlying investment returns thereto) to what the authors called 
‘imperfect information, myopia, and incomplete altruism’ or it can be below the social 
optimal level. Parents normally make investment decisions for their children. Viewed in 
another way, there exists a principal-agent relationship. If parents discount the future at a 
higher rate, they demand a suboptimal level of schooling for their children. In the presence of 
credit market constraints and such a principal-agent problem, this would be more akin to a 
lower expected rate of return to education. In that case, then a conditional cash transfer would 
be more appropriate.  
In the presence of wrong beliefs and credit market imperfections, even an 
unconditional transfer will have an income effect that would reduce the effect of missing 
credit markets on educational investment but however, a conditional transfer would have a 
larger positive effect on investment. Fiszbein and Schady (2009) argued that this emanates 
from the fact that a conditional transfer adds a substitution effect to the income effect of the 
unconditional transfer. In a case where credit constraint is the only market failure, an 
unconditional transfer is more appropriate. 
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There are political considerations as well. Conditioning may increase public support 
for the office bearers or even so as a result of influences of voting, lobbying and political 
bargaining. Society may be putting more value on the consumption of a particular good such 
as education such that additional consumption of the good is viewed as socially acceptable 
leading to conditions to incentivize its consumption. Fiszbein and Schady (2009) argued that 
the conditions would then be justified by merely making redistribution more acceptable to 
taxpayers and voters; a view shared by Parker et al. (2008) that conditional programs might 
be more attractive politically as they are less likely to be viewed as a “handout”. 
Conditions can be used as a screening mechanism and can induce self-selection for 
those actually intended by the program and those not intended opting out (Das et al, 2005) 
thereby ensuring that the poor receive more than the rich. A good example prevails in South 
Asia where conditions are placed on attendance in public schools because the rich use private 
schooling. In a context with extremely low school quality, unconditional cash transfers might 
increase welfare more than conditional cash transfers (Parker et al., 2008). Rey and Estevan 
(2013) reached the same conclusion. They investigated the relative merits of unconditional 
cash transfers, conditional cash transfers, and the effects of improvements in education 
quality on efficiency and welfare; concluding that under sufficiently accurate targeting, 
conditional cash transfers are more effective than unconditional cash transfers in enhancing 
the efficiency of household’s decisions, however, an unconditional cash transfer is superior to 
conditional cash transfer in terms of welfare unless targeting is perfect, in which case they are 
equivalent; and that education quality is welfare improving, but may not be efficiency 
enhancing when public education quality is very low. 
Paxson and Schady (2010) also examined both conditional and unconditional 
transfers. In their paper, they used a randomized ‘new’ social program in rural Ecuador to 
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assess the impact of relatively small cash transfers on child health and cognitive development 
and found no treatment effects for the sample as a whole, but modest effects for the poorest. 
Das et al. (2005) presented a case which shows that in the standard economic framework 
unconditional cash is better than conditional cash. They discuss how well conditional cash 
transfers address market failures and how well it targets resources to a particular group.  
Results from Mexico by De Janvry et al. (2006, cited in Adato and Bassett, 2008) 
found that a one dollar of conditional cash transfer income is about eight times more effective 
at inducing enrolment than a dollar of unconditional cash transfer income, at the mean 
income of the poor. In a somewhat related approach, Brauw and Hoddinott (2011) exploited 
the fact that some beneficiaries who received transfers in a Mexican program did not receive 
the forms needed to monitor the attendance of their children at school and their results 
showed that the absence of these forms reduced the likelihood that children attended school 
with this effect acute when children are transitioning to lower secondary school. However, it 
is important to note that conditional cash transfers, just like public works programs, demand 
higher administrative capacity than unconditional programs (Sedlacek et al. 2003 cited in 
Samson et al. 2010). Unconditional transfers provide the most immediate short-to medium-
term response and are good for countries with limited fiscal space since they deliver ‘as much 
benefit as possible to the poor per unit expenditure’ (ibid). 
There are also a few evaluations comparing conditional and unconditional programs 
in African countries. Adato and Bassett (2008) noted that analysis of economic benefits and 
costs of conditionality are not easy and straight forward to quantify and even more difficult 
are the social benefits and costs. With a growing presence in Eastern and Southern Africa, 
unconditional cash transfers have proved to have positive impacts on welfare with 
pronounced impacts on school enrolment, attendance and nutrition; with impacts on health 
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found in Zambia, South Africa, and Malawi. Most of programs in Southern Africa are in their 
pilot stages; representing a new wave of social protection programs, though with limited 
coverage and weak institutionalization (Nino-Zarazua et al., 2012) except maybe in the case 
of South Africa. The Social Cash Transfer Scheme (SCTS), an unconditional program in 
Zambia, has registered an increase in enrolment rates by 8 percentage points for 14-15 year 
olds and 10.4 percentage points for 5-6 year olds (Adato and Bassett, 2009); and a drop in 
households not sending at least one child to school from 41.4 percent to 33.8 percent; an 
impact on enrolment for asset-poor households of between 6 and 11.4 percentage points in 
two of the three districts evaluated; a fall in self-reported incidence of illness of 14.2 
percentage points among the elderly, 12 percentage point for children under five and adults of 
productive age. 
In Malawi, The Mchinji Cash Transfer program saw a significant higher percentage 
of newly enrolled children of 8.3 percent in intervention households compared with 3.4 
percent in comparison group; a 3 percentage points decrease in drop-out rates (Miller, Tsoka, 
and Reichert, 2008, cited in Adato and Bassett, 2009); a 13 percentage points decrease in 
incidence of illness for children compared with non-beneficiaries; and a 11 percentage points 
decrease in underweight although there was no change in weight-for-age z-score. In 
Mozambique, the GAPVU program recorded an increase of 0.2 standard deviations in height-
for-age, if received in first year of life and for at least two-thirds of first three years.  
In Ghana, the Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty (LEAP) combines 
conditional and unconditional cash transfers with social services. The conditions include 
school enrolment and retention, registration at birth, uptake of post-natal care and 
immunizations for young children, conditions on the fight against child trafficking and labor; 
and enrolment in the National Health Insurance Scheme (ibid). It targets vulnerable 
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population groups; the aged, un- and underemployed, HIV AIDS households, extreme poor, 
and the disabled.  
One of the most recent works on unconditional cash transfers is by Haushofer and 
Shapiro (2013), who conducted a randomized controlled trial (RCT) of the unconditional 
cash transfer program implemented by the NGO GiveDirectly in Western Kenya between 
2011 and 2012. The eligibility criterion was simply ‘living in a thatched house’. They 
concluded that the unconditional cash transfer increased asset holdings by 58 percent over the 
control group mean and by 39 percent of the average amount transferred; increased food 
consumption by 20 percent and 30 percent reduction in food insecurity for respondents and 
42 percent in the number of days children go without food; increased investment in and 
revenue from livestock and small businesses by 48 percent and 38 percent, respectively; and 
lead to a 0.18 standard deviation increase in happiness, a 0.15 standard deviations increase in 
life satisfaction, and a 0.14 standard deviations reduction in stress.  
One of the important lessons from Haushofer and Shapiro’s paper is on the design of 
unconditional cash transfers. The authors noted that ‘monthly transfers have stronger effects 
on food security than lump-sum transfers, while lump-sum transfers show larger effects than 
monthly transfers on particular types of assets such as metal roofs. Large transfers produce 
larger treatment effects than small transfers on most outcomes, but with decreasing marginal 
returns’. They did not observe significant differences in outcomes when making transfers to 
the female versus the male in the household; all important for policy makers. 
There are important debates in some countries whether to condition or not and South 
Africa presents an example of such (Hall, 2011; Gabel, 2012; Woolard and Leibbrant, 2010; 
Woolard, Harttgen and Klasen, 2010; Budlender and Woolard, 2006; Lund et al., 2008). 
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Africa presents a complex set-up which makes the debate even more meaningful; supply-side 
considerations are as important as the demand-side considerations. As Adato and Bassett 
(2008) noted, ‘cash cannot be conditioned on services that are nonexistent, too far away, or of 
very poor quality’. As Manley et al. (2013) concluded, ‘unconditional transfers do as well as 
anything, and transfers conditional on participation in health care are also effective. Setting 
other conditions may be counterproductive’. They noted that although the discussion on 
unconditional versus conditional transfers is predominant when discussing the value of cash 
transfers, ‘conditionality appears to be much less important than a number of other issues, 
such as the age and sex of the children in the household and access to health care’.  
Adato, Roopnaraine and Becker (2011) on the assumption that cash incentive will 
produce behavior change (on health care decisions) found multiple sociocultural and 
structural influences that compete with cash including beliefs around traditional and modern 
practices, social-cultural norms, gender relations, and the quotidian experience of poverty in 
many dimensions. They concluded that impacts can be increased through a better 
understanding of multiple contextual influences, and greater attention to the education 
components and complementary interventions.  
The debate on conditional versus unconditional has always been very topical and it is 
very relevant in the case of South Africa and the Child Support Grant in particular6. The 
discussion so far has been on cash transfers in general. However, there is a growing body of 
literature on the Child Support Grant. 
 
                                       
6 There have been concerted efforts to put conditions on the Child Support Grant throughout the history of the program, 
which is always faced with running battles with civil society and child organizations opposing the imposition of conditions 
arguing that it is a right for children to get the support as enshrined in the country’s constitution which undertakes to protect 
vulnerable members of the society by providing social protection. 
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3.5 Existing literature on the Child Support Grant 
South Africa is one of the middle-income countries with a very high income 
inequality predating to the apartheid era. In general, however, social transfer programs in 
South Africa are believed to have reduced poverty gap by 47 percent (Samson et al. 2005 
cited in Samson et al. 2010), and the country’s Gini coefficient by three percentage points. 
Earlier works on the impact of cash transfers in South Africa looked at the impact of the Old 
Age Pension (Case and Deaton, 1998; Case, 2001; Duflo, 2003; Edmonds, Mammen and 
Miller, 2005; Edmonds, 2006; Hamudi and Thomas; 2005; Ardington, Case and Hosegood, 
2009; Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller, 2003; Ranchhod, 2010; Posel, Fairburn, and Lund, 
2006; all cited in Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2010; and Klasen and Woolard, 2005; Wittenberg, 
2001; Jensen, 2004; Posel et al., 2004; cited in Budlender and Woolard, 2006). 
Various earlier studies on the effect on children’s education have found significant 
positive effect on children living in households that include Old Age Pension recipients 
(Lund, 1993; cited in Coetzee, 2011). The social pension in South Africa was estimated to 
have a long term effect on the underlying determinants of growth where school enrolment of 
children living in three-generation households increased by about 3.1 percent with 5 percent 
for the poor and 7 percent for girls (Scott, 2009).  
For the Old Age, Duflo (2003) showed that girls whose grandmothers receive 
transfers have large improvements of 1.2 standard deviations in weight and height. In a 
similar work, Duflo (2000) found that pensions received by women improved girls’ weight 
given height by 1.19 standard deviations and height-for-age by 1.16 standard deviations. 
Samuel et al. (2004 cited in Adato and Bassett, 2008) also concluded that household receipt 
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of an Old Age Pension is associated with a 20 to 25 percent reduction in school non-
attendance gap.  
For the Child Support Grant in particular, a study in Umkhanyakude District of 
KwaZulu-Natal Province found that the receipt of the cash transfer in 2002 was linked to an 
8.1 percentage point increase in enrolment among 6-year-olds and a 1.8 point increase for  
7-year-olds (ibid). Boler (2007, in Eyal et al., 2011) used the KwaZulu-Natal Income 
Dynamics Study and found that Child Support Grant receipt does not affect primary school 
completion rates. However, the research found out that it appears to protect boys from drop-
out. These impacts interact with nutritional impacts; poor children are more likely to be late 
both in school enrolment and completion (Adato and Bassett, 2008).  
Access to the Child Support Grant in the first three years of a child’s life has been 
found to increase child height; a conclusion also reached by Aguero et al. (2007) working on 
KwaZulu-Natal children. Also writing on nutrition, Aguero and Carter (2010) analyzed the 
impact of grants on child height-for-age and found significant impacts. Aguero, Carter and 
Woolard (2010) also reached the same conclusion. Using survey data from Eastern Cape, 
Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and Western Cape provinces, the Department of Social 
Development found that the Child Support Grant increases the probability of monitoring the 
growth of a child in the first two years of life by 7.7 percentage points, and an improvement 
of height-for-age scores for children with mothers with eight grades of schooling (Tiberti, et 
al., 2013). 
Coeztee (2011) used propensity score matching with a binary outcome variable to 
estimate the impact of the Child Support Grant on child health, nutrition and education; and 
concluded that no convincing evidence of improvements on any of the outcome variables is 
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found. The author further employed a generalized form of the propensity scores and 
discovered a positive treatment effect for children’s height-for-age and progress through the 
school system but cautioned that although these estimates do provide some evidence of the 
positive effect of the Child Support Grant on the lives of children, the estimates are small and 
do not provide clear evidence that transfers received by caregivers are spent mainly on 
improving the well-being of beneficiary children. 
Eyal and Woolard (2011) estimated the effect of the Child Support Grant on mothers’ 
labor supply and discovered that there are no significant differences between mothers of 
eligible and ineligible children in the samples used, over the years. They also concluded that 
the effect of having an age eligible child is large and mothers who become recipients in their 
twenties experience an average increase in employment probability of 15 percent and in labor 
force participation of 9 percent. Tiberti, et al. (2013) used a micro-simulation-Computable 
General Equilibrium Analysis to find economy-wide impacts of the Child Support Grant and 
concluded that there was a positive link between the Child Support Grant and the probability 
of participating in the labor force. Other works on the impact of the Child Support Grant on 
labor market behavior include works by Williams (2007); CASE (2008); and Noble et al. 
(2008), cited in ibid. 
A few studies looked at the impact of the Child Support Grant on gender related 
issues. Patel et al. (2012), for example, assessed the gendered impact of the Child Support 
Grant in Doornkop, Soweto and discovered that ‘it plays a key role in reducing income 
poverty among the very poor’. Makiwane et al. (2006) analyzed whether the Child Support 
Grant increases teenage pregnancy and concluded that there is no relationship between 
teenage fertility and the Child Support Grant. This is an important conclusion; otherwise it 
was going to be a huge social cost. 
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McEwen and Woolard (2012) examined the fiscal impact of this rapidly expanding 
assistance program (Child Support Grant). They investigated the expected costs of cash 
transfers to children in South Africa up to 2015. Their major conclusion is that the child 
population is not expected to grow between 2008 and 2015 and thus the fiscal cost of the 
Child Support Grant is expected to stabilize in the near future. 
Much of the work that has been done on the Child Support Grant tended to put more 
emphasis on health and nutrition outcomes. There are some that concentrated on education as 
well (Samson et al., 2008; Williams and Samson, 2007; Aguero et al., 2009; Budlender and 
Woolard, 2006; Samson et al., 2004; cited in Eyal and Woolard, 2011). As Fleisch et al. 
(2012) noted that there is a new direction of research on patterns of enrolment that comes 
from studies of the relationship between social grants and school enrolment and a few have 
begun to explore this relationship within the South African context. Although they have 
shown an interest in assessing the impact of the Child Support Grant on education, none has 
specifically paid particular attention to secondary-school- aged children; in part because only 
recently does the age eligibility apply to children aged 15 to 17 years. To my knowledge, this 
research is one of the very few to specifically concentrate on this group of children. To the 
best of my knowledge, I do not know any research that has empirically and rigorously 
evaluated the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged 
children. This dissertation bridges this gap in literature. 
Boler (2007) used the KwaZulu-Natal Incomes Dynamics Study to study the impact 
of the Child Support Grant on primary school completion rates and reached an important 
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conclusion that it does not affect completion rates7. However, the study used data from one 
province of South Africa. I used a nationally representative data collected in all the nine 
provinces of South Africa. Although Coeztee (2011) analyzed the impact of the Child 
Support Grant on education among health and nutrition outcomes, the author used cross-
sectional analysis and employed propensity score matching; reaching a conclusion that no 
convincing evidence of improvements on any of the outcome variables is found and cautions 
that there is no clear evidence that transfers received by caregivers are spent mainly on 
improving the well-being of children begs for more confrontation on the subject. My research 
confronts the subject with a bigger dataset and an analysis able to follow the same child over 
a longer period in trying to ascertain the true impact of the program; using different 
methodologies altogether.  
On the other hand, Tiberti et al. (2013) were interested at looking at the economy-
wide impacts of the grant focusing on multiplier effects with special attention to household-
level impacts including changes in labor supply of different household members; investments 
of part of the funds into productive activities, and local economy impacts including transfers 
between beneficiaries and ineligible households; effects on local goods and labor markets; 
and multiplier effects on income and/or welfare. All important, however, this research 
focuses on finding out the impact of the program on the enrolment of secondary school-aged 
children and on health outcomes for children living in South Africa; at a very micro-level. 
 
 
 
                                       
7 Other works that concentrated on KwaZulu-Natal province include: Ardington, 1998; Case et al., 2005; Hamoudi and 
Thomas, 2005; Aguero et al., 2005; Yamuchi, 2005 (all cited in Budlender and Woolard, 2006). 
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3.6 Conclusion 
Social Protection has a long history in South Africa (as way back as 1928; ibid) and 
the Child Support Grant, though fairly a recent program compared to other programs, has 
been around for 14 years now. The Child Support Grant presents an interesting case study 
chiefly because of its size and coverage and more importantly because it offers a platform to 
compare it with results from the much celebrated Latin American and Asian conditional cash 
transfers. Much of the work on cash transfers draws from Latin American experiences; as 
shown in this chapter. This research contributes to the existing literature on cash transfers in 
general and a case of South Africa in particular.  
This research is more-timely in understanding the impact of this form of poverty 
alleviation strategy in South Africa. There is a renewed interest in cash transfers with a 
number of pilot projects in Southern and Eastern Africa; and no doubt, it is more urgent to 
gain a better and fuller understanding in order to influence policy in this region. The next two 
chapters are devoted to assessing the impact of the Child Support Grant on enrolment and 
health for children in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AN IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE CHILD SUPPORT GRANT ON THE 
ENROLMENT OF SECONDARY-SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
There has been a growing interest in understanding the impact of unconditional cash 
transfers on poverty alleviation and human capital development. Most of this attention is on 
pilot experiences in East and Southern Africa. Cash transfers, in general, are widely believed 
to be an alternative strategy for poverty alleviation.  
South Africa’s Child Support Grant is the largest cash transfer for children in Africa; 
reaching to 11 million children in a country with 18.6 million children under the age of 18 
and where 11.9 million children live in income poverty (UNICEF, 2011). It accounts for 36.8 
per cent of total budget towards social assistance and is only second from the Old Age grant 
which consumes 39 per cent of the total budget towards social assistance (National Treasury, 
National Budget; 2013). Eligibility for the Child Support Grant is based on two criteria: age 
for the child and means-test income threshold for the caregiver. Over the years, the age 
eligibility criterion has been raised starting from children under the age of 7 in 1998 to 
children under the age of 18 by 2013. The grant amount has been growing at a rate of 6 per 
cent starting at R 100 per month per child in 1999 and reaching R 320 by October, 2014. A 
total of six eligible children from an eligible caregiver are allowed to benefit from the Child 
Support Grant. It is therefore an important source of income for poor families with many 
children and an increase to include children under the age of 18 has important welfare 
implications to society.   
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This research sought to find out the impact of the Child Support Grant on schooling with 
special attention on enrolment of secondary-school-aged children. There was an important 
change in government policy in 2008 concerning means-test eligibility criteria for married 
caregivers that offers a ‘natural’ opportunity to create a good counterfactual to assess the 
impact of the program. South Africa has a serious challenge as far as secondary school 
education is concerned. Dropout rates are as low as less than 3 percent from grade zero to 
grade 6 (primary school) but as children enter into secondary school, dropout rates increase 
sharply and increase by grade reaching as high as 40 percent by the time children reach grade 
10 and reaching almost 50 percent by the time children sit for their matric, which is taken in 
grade 12. There is no difference in dropout rates between boys and girls from grade zero to 
grade 6 but the gap widens as children enter secondary school and for the entire period of 
secondary school life; with dropout rate for boys being higher than that of girls. The most 
cited reason for dropping out of secondary school is financial constraints; with 24 percent of 
all children, 23 percent of all boys and 18 percent of all girls citing financial constraint as the 
main reason for dropping out of school.  
Now that the Child Support Grant caters for all children under the age of 18 years, it is 
now also an important source of income for secondary-school-aged children as well. I 
hypothesize that the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged children. I also hypothesize that the Child Support Grant has a 
significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged boys. The chapter proceeds as 
follows: Section 4.2 is on literature review; Section 4.3 covers data and data treatment; 
Section 4.4 dwells on the methodology and empirical strategy and Section 4.5 presents the 
results. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.  
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4.2 Brief Literature Review and hypotheses 
A lot of work on cash transfers is on Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) with 
detailed experiences from Latin America (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005; Angelucci and 
Attanaso, 2009; Behrman et al., 2005; Skoufias et al., 2001; Das et al, 2005; Paxson and 
Schady, 2010; Bastagli, 2008; Gertler et al., 2006) and in South East Asia (Chaudhury and 
Parajuli, 2006; Meng and Pfau, 2012; Ferreira et al., 2009). Many of these researches 
document success stories in increasing enrolment rates; among other outcome variables. 
However, as Haushofer and Shapiro (2013) also noted, unconditional cash transfers are 
relatively less common and their impacts and design are also less well understood. Schubert 
and Slater (2006) argued that there have been no rigorous analyses of the respective costs and 
benefits of conditional versus unconditional transfers.  
Recently, there has been renewed interest in understanding whether cash transfers 
should be conditioned or not. Baird, McIntosh, and Ozler (2011) assessed the role of 
conditionality in cash transfer programs using a unique experiment featuring two distinct 
interventions; unconditional transfers (UCT arm) and conditional on school attendance, 
targeted at adolescent girls in Malawi. They observed a modest decline in dropout rate in the 
UCT arm in comparison with the control group (it was only 43 percent as large as the impact 
in the CCT arm at the end of the 2-year program8.  
In a similar approach, Robertson et al, (2013) carried out a matched, cluster-
randomized controlled trial in ten sites in Manicaland province, Zimbabwe, to investigate the 
effects of unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) and conditional cash transfers (CCTs) on birth 
                                       
8 The authors also found out that teenage pregnancy and marriage rates were substantially lower in the UCT than in the 
CCT arm, entirely due to the impact of UCTs on these outcomes among girls who dropped out of school. 
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registration, vaccination uptake, and school attendance. They found out that, compared with 
control clusters, and the proportions of children aged 6-12 years who attended school at least 
80 percent of the time was 7.2 percent higher in the UCT group and 7.6 percent in the CCT 
group than in the control group.  
A noticeable amount of work on social protection in general and cash transfers in 
particular also exist in South Africa. Various earlier studies on the effect on children’s 
education have found significant positive effect on children living in households that include 
Old Age Pension recipients (Lund, 1993; cited in Coetzee, 2011). The social pension in South 
Africa was estimated to have a long term effect on the underlying determinants of growth 
where school enrolment of children living in three-generation households increased by about 
3.1 percent with 5 percent for the poor and 7 percent for girls (Scott, 2009). These impacts 
interact with nutritional impacts; poor children are more likely to be late both in school 
enrolment and completion (Adato and Bassett, 2008).  
A study of an unconditional cash transfer in Umkhanyakude District of KwaZulu-
Natal Province found that the receipt of the cash transfer in 2002 was linked to an 8.1 
percentage point increase in enrolment among 6-year-olds and a 1.8 point increase for 7-year-
olds (ibid). Samuel et al. (2004 cited in Adato and Bassett, 2008) also concluded that in 
South Africa household receipt of an Old Age Pension is associated with a 20 to 25 percent 
reduction in the non-attendance gap. Boler (2007, in Eyal et al, 2011) used the KwaZulu-
Natal Income Dynamics Study and found that the Child Support Grant receipt does not affect 
primary school completion rates. However, the paper found out that it appears to protect boys 
from drop-out. 
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Coeztee (2011) used propensity score matching with a binary outcome variable to 
estimate the impact of the Child Support Grant on child health, nutrition and education and 
concluded that no convincing evidence of improvements on any of the outcome variables is 
found. The author further employed a generalized form of the propensity scores and 
discovered a positive treatment effect for children’s height-for-age and progress through the 
school system but cautioned that although these estimates do provide some evidence of the 
positive effect of the Child Support Grant on the lives of children, the estimates are small and 
do not provide clear evidence that transfers received by caregivers are spent mainly on 
improving the well-being of beneficiary children. 
Much of the work that has been done on the Child Support Grant tended to put more 
emphasis on health and nutrition outcomes. There are some that concentrated on education as 
well. For example, Boler (2007) used the KwaZulu-Natal Incomes Dynamics Study to study 
the impact of the Child Support Grant on primary school completion rates and reached an 
important conclusion that it does not affect completion rates. However, the study used data 
from one province of South Africa. This dissertation contributes to the current literature on 
the impact of the Child Support Grant on education by using a nationally representative data 
collected in all the nine provinces of South Africa; and the results thereto will advise policy-
makers at the national level. Although other researchers looked at the impact of the Child 
Support Grant on education, none to the best of my knowledge has paid particular attention to 
the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children. 
This is, in part, due to the fact that the age-eligibility has been recently adjusted to include 
children aged 15, 16, and 17 years. This dissertation bridges this gap in literature by 
providing a rigorous empirical evaluation of the impact of the Child Support Grant on the 
enrolment of secondary-school-aged children. It contributes to the existing literature on cash 
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transfers in general and a case of South Africa in particular. This research is timely in 
understanding the impact of this form of poverty alleviation strategy in South Africa on 
human capital development.  
 
4.2.2 Testable hypotheses 
In general, enrolment rates in South Africa are high especially for children aged    
6 – 13 years; with rates well above 90 percent for this group. Dropout is negligible in primary 
school (grades 0 – 6). There is, however, a clear and noticeable trend for children aged    
14 – 17 years. Dropout rates increase year-on-year thereafter and higher for males than for 
females beginning in grade 6. This age cohort is mainly comprised of children who are more 
likely to be in secondary school. Enrolment rates for this group falls with age; with enrolment 
rates for 17 year olds averaging 85 percent. In 2010, for example, there were more than 1 
million grade-ten pupils but two years later when this cohort reached grade 12, the graduating 
class, their number had fallen by half (Economist, 3rd May 2014). For those who were in 
grade 11 in 2008, about 40 percent of both males and females had dropped out of the 
schooling system without completing matric9 (taken in grade 12) by 2010 (NIDS, 2012; 
Branson et al., 2013). From grade 6 onwards, dropout rates are higher for boys than for girls. 
This steep drop-out before the matric has been a persistent pattern in recent years. The high 
drop-out rate when coupled with already low pass rates (forty percent who start school pass 
the matric in grade 12, and only 5 percent pass math with a mark above 50 percent, and only 
12 percent achieve high enough marks to get into universities), has important policy 
                                       
9 Yet completing grade 12 has been found to protect post-secondary adults from unemployment and idleness. Branson et al. 
(2013) discovered that only 40 percent of respondents under 26 years who completed grade 12 (matric) are either 
unemployed or out of the labor force compared to 70 percent of respondents who completed grade 10 and 11 but did not 
complete matric. 
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implications. The most common reason cited for dropping out of school is financial constraint; 
23 percent of male dropouts and 18 percent of female dropouts cited that they could not 
afford to stay in school (ibid). Now that the Child Support Grant caters for all children under 
the age of 18 years; virtually all children in South Africa, the program is an important source 
of income for secondary-school-aged children as well. Therefore, the following hypotheses 
are worth testing: 
Hypothesis 4.1: The Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged children in South Africa. 
Hypothesis 4.2: The Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged girls in South Africa. 
Hypothesis 4.3: The Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged boys in South Africa. 
Now that the age-eligibility criteria for the Child Support Grant has been expanded to include 
children under the age of 15, 16, 17 and 18 (secondary-school-going ages) in 2009 to 2012 
respectively, it is important to empirically test whether the Child Support Grant is 
encouraging children to stay longer in school than they used to do; by assessing the impact of 
the program on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children in South Africa and hence  
contribute to the literature on cash transfers in general and to the limited work on the impact 
of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children and its role 
on human capital development by answering the question: What is the impact of the Child 
Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children in South Africa? 
 
42 
 
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 South African General Household Survey (GHS) Data 
I made use of the South African General Household Survey (GHS) data published by 
Statistics South Africa. The survey has been executed annually since 2002 and can be used to 
determine the level of development, performance of programs and to measure multiple facets 
of living conditions of households in South Africa. It covers six broad areas; namely 
education, health and social development, housing, household access to services and facilities, 
and food security and agriculture. The GHS is a nationally representative data since the 
survey covers all the nine provinces of South Africa. I used data from 2007 to 2012; 
inclusively, restricting my analysis to secondary-school-aged (13 to 18; inclusive) children 
and the whole dataset for the six consecutive year period provided me a total of 77 745 
secondary-school-aged children. 
Table 4.1 in appendix reports descriptive statistics for enrolment and all other control 
variables used in the regressions. Overall enrolment rates increased from 90 percent in 2007 
to 93 percent by 2012. They tend to be higher among the lower age cohorts and falling with 
age suggesting a general trend where children drop off from school. There was a general 
trend where enrolment rates were increasing each year when considered per age cohorts. 
Generally, each household has an average size of 6 people, an average of 3.4 siblings and a 
household head with an average age of 52 years and seven years of education. In 2007,    
8.7 percent of the children were from double income households and the other years were 
averaging 7 percent except for 2012 with a figure of 10.1 percent. For all the years, there 
were as many male children as female children; on average. The percentage of mothers who 
are resident is twice as high as the percentage for fathers who are resident for almost all the 
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years. There was a marked increase in the uptake of the Child Support Grant over the whole 
period; starting with a mere 8.8 percent in 2007, increasing successively each year and 
reaching a high of 50.8 percent by 2012.  
Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics by age. The 15 year old cohort had an 
enrolment rate of 94 percent in 2007 and reached 97 percent by 2012. Correspondingly, the 
uptake of the Child Support Grant was 2.2 percent in 2007 and reached a high of 56.5 percent 
by 2012. Enrolment rates for the 16-year olds, although high, increased from 92.2 percent in 
2007 to 93.1 percent in 2011 and 94.4 percent in 2012. Relatively, enrolment rates for 17-
year-olds were at 86.6 percent in 2007 and increased to 87.4 percent by 2011 and 88.7 
percent in 2012. Enrolment rates for children aged 16 and 17 years are comparatively lower 
suggesting that children drop out of school year by year. This has serious implications on 
secondary-school completion. On average, children sit for the matric national examinations 
when they reach 17 years; in grade 12. This, therefore, suggests that few children reach grade 
12 and few children sit for the national examinations. 
Enrolment rates among the treatment group based on 2008 means-test threshold were 
88.8 percent in 2007 and increased to 90.1 percent in 2008 and 91.8 percent by 2012. 
Correspondingly, enrolment rates among the control group were 89.7 percent in 2007 and 
2008 and levelling off at an average of 85 percent in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Enrolment rates 
for the treatment group based on 2012 means-test threshold were 90.4 percent and increased 
to 93 percent in 2008 compared to 89.6 and 89.5 in 2007 and 2008 respectively for the 
control group; as detailed in Table 4.3 in appendix. Generally, enrolment rates fell slightly in 
both treatment and control groups in 2009 (probably suggesting an exogenous shock from the 
global financial crisis). This does not have a serious problem with the identification strategy 
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discussed later because it affected both the treatment and control groups. It was going to be 
worrisome if this had affected only one group.  
Table 4.4 shows descriptive statistics of child characteristics by treatment and control 
groups in 2007 (base year); based on the ‘low income’ control group. The difference in 
average enrolment rates between children in the control and treatment groups are statistically 
not different from zero (p-value = 0.267); suggesting that the average enrolment rates were 
the same for the two groups in 2007. The average age of the children in the control group was 
15.7 years and 15.68 years for children in the treatment group; the difference of which is 
statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.834). The average proportion of boys in both the 
control and treatment groups is the same and the difference in the means is statistically not 
different from zero (p-value = 0.916); which is the same for the proportion of girls in the two 
groups.  
There were 2.5 percent white children in the control group and 1.8 percent in the 
treatment group and the difference between them is statistically negligible. Sixty-four percent 
of children were under seventeen years in both the treatment and control groups. Other 
characteristics checked are: number of siblings; household size; head’s education; head’s age; 
proportion of children in grades 7, 8, and 10; and proportion of children in provinces, which 
were all not statistically different from each other. The fact that the treatment and control 
groups had similar characteristics in 2007 is a very important premise for the difference-in-
differences framework; which is detailed in the next section. For the Difference-in-
Differences framework to work well, both the treatment and control groups should be 
comprised of similar characteristics before a change in policy. This point is confirmed here 
by the insignificant p-values, which measure the difference in means. I will come back to this 
point fully under methodology and identification strategy in the next section.  
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Table 4.5 details descriptive statistics of take-up rates of the Child Support Grant 
from 2007 to 2012 by treatment and control groups. Panel A and Panel B of Table 4.5 show 
take-up rates by treatment and control groups based on 2008 means-test threshold 
respectively whereas Panel C and Panel D show take-up rates by treatment and control 
groups based on 2012 means-test threshold. Take-up rates in treatment groups saw a sharp 
increase from a low of 6 percent and 4 percent in 2007 reaching 34.3 percent and 30.6 
percent by 2010 to a high of 53.7 percent and 51.4 percent by 2012 for treatment groups 
based on 2008 and 2012 means-test thresholds respectively. Take-up rates remained 
relatively low throughout the time period in the high income control groups starting with a 
low of 2.6 percent and averaging less than 10 percent by 2010. This is attributed to the fact 
that the high income control group is largely means-test ineligible for the grant. On the other 
hand, Table 4.6 shows descriptive statistics of enrolment by gender from 2007 to 2012.  
Panel A shows enrolment rates for girls; Panel B for boys; Panel C for treatment group by 
gender; and Panel D for control group by gender. Enrolment rates for boys grew over time at 
a higher rate from 89.5 percent to 93 percent in 2007 and 2012 respectively as compared to 
those for girls in the treatment group which grew from 88 percent to 90.6 percent in the two 
time periods respectively.  
 
4.3.2 National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) 
 My second data came from the National Income Dynamics Study. The National 
Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) is the first nationally representative panel data in South 
Africa, which came into being through a Presidential Decree. The NIDS is a comprehensive 
study which investigates the livelihoods and well-being of households and individuals over 
time and how they cope with shocks in life. It examines changes in poverty; household 
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composition and structure; demographic perspectives and development including fertility, 
mortality and migration; economic activity and labor market issues; human capital 
development on health and education; as well as changes in vulnerability and social capital. 
The study has three waves: the first wave carried out in 2008; wave 2, which was conducted 
in 2010 and early 2011; and wave 3, which was carried out in 2012 and became available in 
September, 2013.  
 The NIDS enables me to study children as they transition through phases of life and 
gives an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the underlying fundamentals that 
facilitate or impede their progress through education. In assessing the impact of the Child 
Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children, I used Wave 2 and Wave 
3 data of the National Income Dynamics Study. I limited my sample to children aged 13 – 18 
years in 2010. Using Wave 2 instead of Wave 1 was motivated by taking into consideration 
the age eligibility criterion and the fact that the NIDS is a longitudinal study. Any child who 
was above the age of 13 years was not eligible for the Child Support Grant in 2008; making 
my analysis where I am particularly interested in children aged 13 – 18 years not feasible 
when using Wave 1 because a child aged above 13 years would transition through secondary 
school education without receiving the Child Support Grant owing to being age-ineligible. 
On the other hand, the age eligibility criterion was adjusted to include all children under the 
age of 16 years; under the age of 17 years; and under the age of 18 years in 2010; 2011; and 
2012 respectively; making Wave 2 (carried out in 2010) and Wave 3 (carried out in 2012) 
more appropriate to gain insight into the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment 
of secondary-school-aged children. A child aged 13 years was age-eligible in 2010 and would 
be 15 years old in 2012 and still age-eligible for the grant. Likewise, a child aged 15 years in 
2010 was age-eligible and would be 17 years old in 2012 and still age-eligible for the grant. 
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 Descriptively, the average age of children in my sample of secondary-school-aged 
children was 15.3 years in 2010 and 16.9 years in 2012; with 49 percent of all children 
comprised of boys in the two time periods. Enrolment rates averaged 93 percent and 88.7 
percent in the two time periods respectively. The proportion of children who reported having 
passed the previous year fell from 91.4 percent in 2010 to 77.8 percent in 2012. Thirty-two 
percent of children received the Child Support Grant in 2010 compared to 38.1 percent in 
2012. On average, 10.3 percent of all children aged 13 – 18 years were of mixed races in 
2010 and 10.5 in 2012; 1.25 percent whites; and 0.79 percent in 2010 and 0.68 percent in 
2012 were of Indian origins; and the remainder were of African origin.  
In terms of household characteristics, average household size was 6.7 and 6.4 
persons in 2010 and 2012 respectively; 85.5 and 82.1 percent had their mothers still alive in 
2010 and 2012 respectively. The proportion of children who had their fathers alive fell from 
73.8 percent in 2010 to 67.3 percent in 2012. There was an increase in household real income 
from R 4 723 in 2010 to R 4 970 in 2012; as detailed in Table 4.7. 
Breaking the sample according to geo-regions, 7.4 percent and 6.9 percent of 
children were living in formal rural areas; 54.4 percent and 52.8 percent lived in Tribal 
Authority areas; 5.9 percent and 6.3 percent lived in informal urban areas; and the remainder 
lived in formal urban areas in the two time periods respectively. Disaggregating the sample 
into different geo-regions is important and insightful. Formal rural areas, for example, are 
‘sparsely populated areas in which people farm or depend on natural resources, including 
villages and small towns that are dispersed through these areas’ and are characteristic of 
inadequate physical conditions in schools and with comparatively weak learner performance. 
Many rural schools lack clean running water, electricity, libraries, laboratories and computers 
as well as a lack of accompanying good quality local services.  
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4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 Natural Experiment 
The Child Support Grant is regulated under the Social Assistance Act 13, 2004 and 
any changes to it are announced through a government notice and published in the 
government gazette. There have been several announcements and amendments that have been 
made since 1998. Notable were the adjustments in the grant amounts over the years, which 
have been increased generally by 6 per cent each time; as well as age eligibility of children.  
Before August 22, 2008, the means-test threshold was set at R 800 for households in 
the urban areas and R 1,100 for households in the rural areas. There was no distinction 
between single and double income caregivers. The policy tended to disadvantage against 
double income caregivers since household income was used and double income caregivers 
were more likely to fall above the means-test threshold. Furthermore, before 22 August 2008, 
there was no scientific way to calculate the means-test cut-off; it was just done through a 
government notice and had stayed at R 800 and R 1,100 for urban and rural households 
respectively for a very long time; for 10 years.  
The ‘Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004: Regulations relating to the application for 
and payment of social assistance and the requirements or conditions in respect of eligibility 
for social assistance, Government Gazette 31356, Government Notice Number R. 898 of 22 
August 2008’ brought drastic policy changes that would never have been anticipated thereby 
providing a natural experiment in the administration and regulation of the Child Support 
Grant. For the first time in the history of the Child Support Grant, the means-test threshold 
was to take into account double income caregivers by recognizing the determination as ‘half 
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the annual income of the applicant and his or her spouse, where the applicant is in a spousal 
relationship’. This means that: 
Letting WH = husband’s annual income,  
  WW = wife’s annual income,  
  CHI = combined household income,  
  A  = annual income threshold  
  CHI ≡ 
𝑊𝐻 
2
+ 𝑊𝑊
2
 ≤ 𝐴 → 𝑊𝐻 + 𝑊𝑊 ≤ 2A 
What this means therefore is that, with effect from 22 August 2008, the means-test threshold 
for double income caregivers is now double the income threshold for single income 
caregivers. This is a landmark change in policy for double income caregivers, which gives a 
natural experiment to assess the impact of the Child Support Grant on a number of outcome 
variables. Now there are households who are in a spousal relationship and before this 
landmark change in policy were not eligible for the Child Support Grant but who found 
themselves eligible after the change in policy. This change in policy was so drastic and was 
never anticipated so much so that it acts as a natural experiment. People might have 
anticipated a change in grant amount considering that it has been growing constantly at 6 per 
cent; it is difficult, however, to think that households might have anticipated the drastic 
change in policy now affecting double income caregivers. It was a landmark change in policy; 
one that does not have a precedence from 1998 to 2008. 
Furthermore, and for the first time, the determination of the means-test threshold was 
going to be based on the following formula: 
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 A = B x 10; where 
i. A = annual income threshold 
ii. B = annual value of the Child Support Grant 
With this regulation, the means-test threshold adjusts automatically when the grant amount is 
adjusted. This also means that from 22 August 2008, there would not be any distinction 
between means-test thresholds for urban and rural households. Urban and rural households’ 
means-test thresholds are now determined using the same formula. This is relatively more 
scientific and straight forward a determination than the one previously used. 
This presents a natural experiment to assess the impact of the Child Support Grant on 
enrolment; for example. There are double income caregivers who, before the change in policy, 
were not eligible because their income was greater than the single income threshold and 
because the policy did not recognize that they were double income caregivers, they tended to 
be naturally ‘discriminated’ by the prevailing policy. After the drastic change in policy, these 
households found themselves eligible for the grant. This allows the employment of the 
Difference-in-Differences method to assess the impact of the Child Support Grant on 
enrolment. Difference-in-Differences method is well-suited to estimating the effect of sharp 
changes in government policy (Angrist and Krueger, 1999). This entails designing treatment 
and control groups in order to separate the change in enrolment rates as a result of the 
program from changes that affected enrolment in general. Treatment group is comprised of 
children who are age-eligible and whose caregiver(s) were not means-test eligible before the 
change in policy but who found themselves eligible after the change in policy. Control group 
is comprised of children who are age-eligible and whose caregiver(s) were means-test 
ineligible before the change in policy and remained ineligible after the change in policy. 
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Alternatively, for robustness check, another control group comprises of children who are age-
eligible and whose caregiver(s) were means-test eligible before the change in policy and 
remained eligible after the change in policy.  
The sudden change in policy allows me to use Instrumental Variable Method as well; 
having an age-eligible child in the expanded years is correlated with the Child Support Grant 
but is not directly related with enrolment. More importantly too, the fact that I also have data 
with repeated observations allows me to deal with unobserved fixed characteristics after 
which my explanatory variables become strictly exogenous and as a result the program 
impact estimate will be a true reflection of the impact of the Child Support Grant on the 
enrolment of secondary-school-aged children. Given this background, I used the Difference-
in-Differences framework, Instrumental Variables and Panel Fixed Effects methods to 
estimate the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged 
children. 
 
4.2.2 Empirical Strategy 
1. Difference-in-Differences Model 
The Difference-in-Differences estimator takes advantage of a comparison of participants 
and non-participants before and after the intervention (Khandker et al., 2010). This works by 
identifying treatment effect through comparing average difference between treatment and 
control groups; as Kim et al. (2008) put it, ‘the DD estimator is often used to estimate a 
causal treatment effect when the outcome of interest is observed for both treatment and 
comparison groups before and after the treatment in question’. The main assumption is that 
the treatment should determine which potential response is realized, but be otherwise 
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unrelated to it (Myoung-Jae Lee, 2005). The model specification that I worked with is as 
follows: 
S = 𝛽0 + 𝛿0𝑑2 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿1𝑑2.𝑑𝑑 + 𝜃𝑘𝑋𝑘 + 𝜀  
In this case β0 captures the control group in 2007 and the sum of β0 and δ0 captures the effect 
to the control group in the ‘after’ period. The coefficient, δ0, is the before and after difference 
for the control group. It is the counterfactual measure of the treatment group in the ‘after’ and 
the ‘before’ period; reflecting what the treatment group would have been in the absence of 
the program. The sum of δ0 and δ1 is the difference in the treatment group between the two 
years or time periods. The coefficient of interest is δ1 which measures the true impact of the 
program. It is the Difference-in-Differences estimator. S is the outcome variable; enrolment. 
I borrow from Eissa and Hoynes (2006) who used a similar treatment to assess the impact 
of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Their idea was to use an exogenous change in tax 
rates as a ‘natural experiment’. In a natural experiment, the objective is to identify a group 
that is affected by the exogenous shock (the treatment group) and another that is not (the 
control group). The difference between the response of the treatment group and the control 
group is the Difference-in-Differences estimator. One of the major criticisms of Eissa’s 
approach by James Heckman was the potential endogeneity problem emanating from people 
moving from the treatment to the control group and vice versa making for a very poorly 
controlled experiment. The control group for those who were not means test-eligible because 
their household income was high are less likely to move backwards into treatment group 
unless there are major structural changes.  
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2. Instrumental Variables Method 
The framework that I worked with involves identifying a variable that is correlated with 
the Child Support Grant but not itself directly correlated with enrolment. My instrument for 
the Child Support Grant is whether a household ‘has a child in the expanded year’. For a 
child to receive the grant, the eligibility criterion is based on being age eligible and from a 
means-test eligible household. Having an eligible child is surely correlated with receiving the 
Child Support Grant. However, because the program is largely unconditional, being eligible 
for the grant is not itself directly correlated with enrolment.  
The motivation on this part is driven by the fact that Instrumental Variable Method can 
be used where treatment effect heterogeneity is important. As Angrist and Pischke (2009) 
noted, a framework with heterogeneous treatment effects allows an assessment of both 
internal and external validity of IV estimates. I develop my model as follows: 
Let: 
𝑆𝑖(𝑑, 𝑧)=  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑑 𝑝 𝑤𝑝𝑒𝑝 𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑖 𝑐ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑑 𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑝𝑎𝑝 𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖 𝐷𝑖= 𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑝 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑧 
𝐷1𝑖 = child i’s treatment status when 𝑧𝑖 = 1 
𝐷0𝑖 = child i’s treatment status when 𝑍𝑖 = 0 
𝐷𝑖 =  𝐷0𝑖 + (𝐷1𝑖 − 𝐷0𝑖)𝑍𝑖 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑖𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 = 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖  
where: 
𝜋0 ≡ 𝐸[𝐷0𝑖] 𝑝𝑝𝑑 𝜋1𝑖 ≡ (𝐷1𝑖 − 𝐷0𝑖)  
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Given this framework, 𝜋1𝑖, therefore, is the heterogeneous casual effect of the instrument on 
observed treatment status.  
 
Main Assumptions 
The main assumption in this framework is that the instrument is as good as randomly 
assigned. This is derived from the independence assumption where the understanding is that 
it is independent of the vector of potential outcomes and potential treatment assignments: 
E[𝑆𝑖|𝑍𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑆𝑖|𝑍𝑖 = 0]   
= E[𝑆𝑖(𝐷1𝑖 , 1)|𝑍𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑆𝑖(𝐷0𝑖 , 0)|𝑍𝑖 = 0]  
= E[𝑆𝑖(𝐷1𝑖 , 1) − 𝑆𝑖(𝐷0𝑖 , 0)]     
and or 
  E[𝐷𝑖|𝑍𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝐷𝑖|𝑍𝑖 = 0] = 𝐸[𝐷1𝑖|𝑍𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝐷0𝑖|𝑍𝑖 = 0] 
= E[𝐷1𝑖 − 𝐷0𝑖]   
In short, 
 [{𝑆𝑖(𝑑, 𝑧);∀𝑑, 𝑧},𝐷1𝑖 ,𝐷0𝑖] ⊥ 𝑍𝑖 
Since my model incorporates covariates, it is important to think of the instrumental variable 
as being ‘as good as randomly assigned’ conditional on covariates, 𝑋𝑖 and my generalized 
case would be: 
[{𝑆𝑖(𝑑, 𝑧);∀𝑑, 𝑧},𝐷1𝑖 ,𝐷0𝑖] ⊥ 𝑍𝑖|𝑋𝑖  
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Using ‘having an age-eligible child in the expanded years’ as an instrument satisfies 
the assumption of randomness. For a child to be age-eligible for the grant that child must 
have been born after a certain year. For example, in 2008 only children under the age of 14 
years were age-eligible for the grant; in 2009 children under the age of 15; 2010 children 
under the age of 16; in 2011 children under the age of 17 and in 2012 children under the age 
of 18. For a child to be age-eligible then that child must have been born after 1993. Only 
nature determines when and in which year a child is born; nature randomizes. It is, therefore, 
plausible to conclude that my instrument is as good as randomly assigned conditional on 
other covariates used in my regressions. 
The second assumption is exclusion restriction: 
 𝑆𝑖(𝑑, 0) = 𝑆𝑖(𝑑, 1)𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑑 = 0,1  
𝑆1𝑖 ≡ 𝑆𝑖(1,1) = 𝑆𝑖(1,0);  
𝑆0𝑖 ≡ 𝑆𝑖(0,1) = 𝑆𝑖(0,0) and therefore, 
𝑆𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖(0,𝑍𝑖) + [𝑆𝑖(1,𝑍𝑖) − 𝑆𝑖(0,𝑍𝑖)]𝐷𝑖  
= 𝑆0𝑖 + (𝑆1𝑖 − 𝑆0𝑖)𝐷𝑖  
This can conveniently be written as: 
𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝜌𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 ;𝑤ℎ𝑝𝑒𝑝 𝛼0 ≡ 𝐸[𝑆0𝑖]𝑝𝑝𝑑 𝜌𝑖 ≡ 𝑆1𝑖 − 𝑆0𝑖  
The third assumption is that while the instrument might have no effect on the 
probability of enrolment for some children, there is no child who has been kept out of school 
by coming from a household with a child in the expanded years (the instrument). This is the 
assumption of monotonicity; summarized as follows: 
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𝐷1𝑖 ≥ 𝐷0𝑖  𝑝𝑒 𝐷1𝑖 ≤ 𝐷0𝑖   𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝  
Given these three assumptions, as Angrist and Pischke (2009) also argued, an instrument that 
is as good as randomly assigned, affects outcome through a single known channel, has a first 
stage, and affects the causal channel of interest only in one direction can be used to estimate 
the average causal effect on the affected group. The IV estimates of the impact of the Child 
Support Grant on enrolment using ‘having an age-eligible child in the expanded years’ 
captures the effect of the program on children who are enrolled because of the grant but who 
would not otherwise have enrolled. 
 
3. Panel Fixed Effects 
Some of the major concerns in impact evaluations are selection bias and omitted variable 
bias emanating from unobserved and fixed characteristics that are related to both outcome 
variables and explanatory variables. In my analysis, I am concerned with unobserved factors 
that affect enrolment that are correlated with some of my explanatory variables; for example 
innate ability. Highly motivated children or children with higher innate ability are more likely 
to be enrolled in school irrespective of the existence of the Child Support Grant. On another 
hand, some parents, probably because of a unique characteristic in them, are more likely to 
take up the Child Support Grant than others who do not possess such characteristic; and as a 
result, my explanatory variables are more likely to be endogenous. As Angrist and Krueger 
(1999) argued, I can use repeated observations to control for unobserved and time-invariant 
characteristics that are related to both dependent and explanatory variables. In a similar 
motivation, therefore, I used the Fixed-Effects identification strategy to estimate the impact 
of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children and the 
general model that I worked with is as follows: 
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𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝑖 + 𝐶𝑖𝑖𝛿𝑖 + λ𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖  
Where 𝑆𝑖𝑖 is enrolment status for child i at time t; 𝛼𝑖 is a fixed characteristic for child i; 
𝑋𝑖𝑖
′  is a vector capturing a host of time varying covariates controlled for; 𝐶𝑖𝑖 is the Child 
Support Grant status for child i at time t; and 𝜀𝑖𝑖 is uncorrelated with both the time-varying 
covariates and fixed characteristics (by construction).  
This way, I have separated the correlation between the Child Support Grant and 
unobserved enrolment potential as well as unobserved unique fixed characteristics that make 
some parents take up the Child Support Grant to be described by an additive time-invariant 
covariate 𝛼𝑖, which has a constant coefficient each period enabling differencing between time 
periods to eliminate λ𝛼𝑖; and as a result my explanatory variables become strictly exogenous 
and the program estimate becomes the true reflection of the impact of the Child Support 
Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children. The main assumptions are that λ 
is time-invariant and the correlation between the Child Support Grant status, 𝐶𝑖𝑖 , and the 
idiosyncratic error is zero in each time period.  
Panel Fixed Effects identification strategy is appealing because of the superiority of 
repeated observations and the fact that Panel Fixed Effects models can be subjected to a 
variety of specification tests (Angrist and Krueger, 1999). As noted by Hsiao (2006), Panel 
Fixed Effects gives greater capacity for capturing the complexity of human behavior 
especially in evaluating the effectiveness of social programs. Panel data analysis has an added 
advantage of improving the efficiency of econometric estimates. Given this background, I 
exploited the richness and uniqueness of panel in assessing the impact of the Child Support 
Grant on the enrolment of secondary school aged children in South Africa. Using the three 
empirical methods detailed in this section, the next section details the results thereto. 
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Results Based on Difference-in-Differences Estimations 
Difference-in-Differences estimation results of the impact of the Child Support Grant 
on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children in this chapter are based on the General 
Household Survey (GHS) data. Table 4.8 in the appendix shows results using both the ‘Low 
income’ and ‘High income’ control groups using 2007 and 2012 data on secondary school-
going-aged (13 to 18) children. Columns 1 to 3 show results based on 2008 means-test 
threshold; which was pegged at R 2 200 for single caregivers and implying R 4 400 for 
double income caregivers. The treatment group for columns 1 to 3 comprises of children 
from households whose income was between R 2 200 and R 4 400 and received the Child 
Support Grant. These are households who were not means-test eligible before the change in 
policy and found themselves eligible after the change in policy. The ‘Low income’ control 
group is comprised of children from households whose income was below R 2 200. These 
households were means-test eligible before the drastic change in policy and remained so after 
the change in policy. The ‘High income’ control group is comprised of children from 
households whose income was greater than R 4 400 who did not receive the Child Support 
Grant and were not means-test eligible before the change in policy and remained ineligible 
after the change in policy. 
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 4.8 show estimation results based on 2012 means-test 
threshold; which was now R 2 800 for single income caregivers and R 5 600 for double 
income caregivers. The treatment group for columns 4 to 6 comprises of children whose 
household income was between R 2 800 and R 5 600 who received the Child Support Grant. 
The ‘Low income’ control group in turn comprised of children from households whose 
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income was below R 2 800 and ‘High income’ control group from households whose income 
was above R 5 600 who were means-test ineligible for the grant and did not receive the grant. 
The inclusion of columns 4 to 6 was for robustness check; I expected results for columns 1 to 
3 to be generally similar and not very different from results for columns 4 to 6. Another 
dimension for robustness check was to compare results using the ‘Low income’ control group 
and those for the ‘High income’ control group. Generally, they should not be very different. 
Although they are not very different, for the purpose of my analysis, I will concentrate on the 
results based on the ‘High income’ control group for my interpretation. 
Although results in this section are based on the Difference-in-Differences 
framework, I also controlled for a host of other covariates in my regressions10. One of the 
most important premises of the Difference-in-Differences framework is to make sure that my 
treatment and control groups are comprised of similar characteristics before the change in 
policy; and as shown in section 4.3.1 and Table 4.4, my treatment and control groups were 
comprised of similar characteristics before the change in policy as evidenced by the 
insignificant p-values in Table 4.4 which measure the difference in means. All the same, I 
went on to control for a host of other covariates just to increase the precision of my estimates 
and to be rest assured that I do not suffer from any confoundedness. 
Estimation results in Table 4.8, column 3, show that for a secondary-school-aged 
(aged 13 -18) child, receiving the Child Support Grant increases the probability of enrolment 
by 11.06 percentage points; which is significant at 1 percent. This result supports hypothesis 
4.1 in section 4.2.2 in this chapter, which says that the Child Support Grant has a significant 
                                       
10 To capture household characteristics I controlled for household head’s age, household head’s age squared, household size, 
household head’s education, binary variable to indicate whether father of child is alive, binary variable to indicate whether 
the father of child is resident, binary variable to indicate whether the mother of child is resident, binary variable to indicate 
whether a child is from a dual income household, and log of real income. Child characteristics controlled for are: child’s age; 
number of siblings; gender dummy; and race dummies. 
60 
 
impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children. Another year of education 
reduces the probability of enrolment by 4.5 percentage points for secondary-school-aged 
children. An increase of household income by 1 percent increases the probability of 
enrolment by 4.4 percentage points; which is statistically significant at 1 percent. As expected, 
all the results in columns (1) to (6) are not very different from each other.  
Table 4.9 shows estimation results of the impact of the Child Support Grant on the 
enrolment of secondary-school-aged female children using data for 2007 and 2012. Column 
(2) shows estimation results using the ‘Low income’ control group and column 3 shows 
results using the ‘High income’ control group; all based on 2008 means-test threshold. 
Column (5) and (6) is based on the same analogy; however, based on 2012 means-test 
threshold. Results in columns (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) should not be very different; and 
as expected are not very different. For a secondary-school-aged female child, receiving the 
Child Support Grant increases the probability of enrolment by 13 percentage points, which is 
significant at 1 percent. This result supports hypothesis 4.2 in section 4.2.2, which says that 
the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged 
girls. 
On the other hand, for a male child, receiving the Child Support Grant increases the 
probability of enrolment by 9.7 percentage points, which is significant at 5 percent. This is a 
very important result considering that dropout rates for secondary school boys are higher than 
those for girls. This result supports hypothesis 4.3 in section 4.2.2, which says that the Child 
Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged boys. 
Comparing results from Table 4.9 and Table 4.10, it can be concluded that the chance of 
enrolment for female children who receive the grant is higher than the chance of enrolment 
for a male child who receive the grant; suggesting that the program had a higher impact on 
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the enrolment of female children than on the enrolment of male children. However, this is a 
bit surprising considering that dropout rates for boys in secondary school are higher than 
those of girls; one would have expected to see a higher impact among boys compared to girls. 
Generally, the program has a positive and significant impact on the enrolment of secondary 
school-aged children.  
Looking at the impact of the program by the highest grade completed reveals that 
there is an increase in the probability of enrolment by 6.8 percentage points for children who 
completed Grade 8 and who receive the Child Support Grant, which is significantly different 
from zero at the 5 percent level. Children who completed Grade 9 and receive the Child 
Support Grant see an increase in the probability of enrolment by 1.8 percentage points than 
those that did not receive the grant. Children who completed grade 10 and receive the grant 
have a 0.054 higher chance of being enrolled in school than those who do not receive the 
grant. The program has the greatest impact on children who completed grade 12. The 
probability of enrolment for a child who completed Grade 12 is 61.6 percentage points higher 
for a child who received the grant than one who did not, which is significant at 1 percent. 
This is a very important piece of evidence. Indirectly, this measures the impact of the Child 
Support Grant on pass rates and progression into post-secondary school education. This is an 
important finding given that only forty percent who start school pass the matric in grade 12; 
and only 12 percent achieve high enough marks to get into universities. The Child Support 
Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of children who completed grade 12. These 
results are shown in Table 4.11, which details results using the ‘High income’ control group. 
I also investigated the impact of the Child Support Grant using six yearly data from 
2007 to 2012; inclusive. The results of these regressions are detailed in Table 4.12 to Table 
4.16 in the Appendix. Table 4.12 shows results of the impact of the program on enrolment 
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using the full sample. Columns (1), (2), and (3) are based on 2008 means-test threshold. 
Column (1) shows results using both the ‘High income’ and ‘Low income’ control groups; 
column (2) using the ‘Low income’ control group only; and column (3) using the ‘High 
income’ control group only. Like before, the treatment group for columns (1) to (3) is 
comprised of secondary-school-aged children (13 to 18 years) from households whose 
income was greater than the threshold for single caregivers and less than the threshold for 
double income caregivers; greater that R 2 200 and less than R 4 400 based on 2008 means-
test threshold. Columns (4) to (6) uses the same analog, however, based on 2012 means-test 
threshold; R 2 800 for single caregivers and R 5 600 for double income caregivers.  
Using the ‘High income’ control group, based on 2008 means-test threshold, 
receiving the Child Support Grant increases the probability of enrolment by 9.3 percentage 
points. Based on 2012 means-test threshold, the treatment effect is estimated to be an increase 
in the probability of enrolment by 11.2 percentage points. Both are significant at 1 percent. 
Table 4.13 in the appendix shows estimation results of the impact of the program on the 
enrolment of female children using the six yearly data. The probability of enrolment for a girl 
child who receives the Child Support Grant is 11.1 percentage points higher than one who 
does not receive the grant; which is significant at 1 percent. The corresponding estimate of 
the treatment effect at 2012 means-test threshold is 13.4 percentage points, albeit significant 
at 5 percent.  
In general, the program had a higher and significant impact on the enrolment of 
female children than on male children. The probability of enrolment for a child who 
completed grade 12 and receives the grant is 72.0 percentage points higher than one who does 
not receive the Child Support Grant. The estimate is not different when using either the High 
income control group (72.0) or the ‘Low income’ control group (71.9) at 2008 means-test 
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threshold. All these estimates are significant at 1 percent. Although the year dummies are 
generally positive and significant for grade 8 and grade 9 regressions, the program did not 
have any significant impact on these grades as can be seen in estimation results detailed in 
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 in the appendix. 
To check for robustness, I used three different strategies. I devised two control 
groups; namely the ‘Low income’ and ‘High income’ control groups. The ‘Low income’ 
control group corresponds to single income caregivers at a particular means-test threshold. In 
all the cases, the treatment group comprised of children from double income households who 
are means-test eligible. The ‘High income’ control group is comprised of children from 
households whose income was means-test ineligible. Using this framework, I expected the 
results not to be very different; and I got consistent results. Slight differences that I found in 
some cases were very small and negligible. 
The second strategy in checking robustness involved considering two different 
means-test thresholds. The first means-test threshold was based on 2008 means-test threshold. 
This takes into cognizance the fact that the landmark change in policy was announced in 
2008. The second criterion is based on 2012 means-test threshold. This follows an 
appreciation that from 2008 the means-test threshold was to be 10 times the grant amount. I 
used this without any loss of generality. I also got consistent results. For example, using data 
for 2007 as base year and 2012 as the after year to assess the impact of the program on 
enrolment, the results predicted that a child who receives the Child Support Grant has a 11.1 
percentage points higher probability of being enrolled in school than one who does not; at the 
2008 means-test threshold using the ‘High income’ control group. On the other hand, using 
the 2012 means-test threshold the results predicted that the child would have a 12.9 
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percentage point higher probability of being enrolled. Both are significant at 1 percent. These 
estimates are not very different from each other. 
For the third strategy, I repeated the whole exercise using data for 2007 and 2011 as 
opposed to data for 2007 and 2012 and these results are presented in Table 4.17 to Table 4.21 
in the appendix. I also obtained consistent results. For example, using the ‘High income’ 
control group and data for 2007 and 2011 to assess the impact of the program on enrolment, 
the results predicted that a child who receives the grant see an increase in the probability of 
enrolment by 10.8 percentage points than one who does not receive the grant; at the 2011 
means-test threshold compared to an estimate of 12.9 percentage points when using 2007 and 
2012 data. Estimation results on the impact of the program on the enrolment of female 
children based on 2008 means-test threshold was 11.4 percentage points for results based on 
the ‘High income’ control group for regressions based on 2007 and 2011 data compared with 
13 percentage points for regressions based on 2007 and 2012 data. They were both significant 
at 1 percent. Although results based on 2012 means-test threshold are slightly higher than 
those based on the 2011 means-test threshold, the differences are negligible. The results were 
also consistent. 
Comparing estimation results based on the six yearly data from 2007 to 2012 
(inclusive) with the results based on 2007 and 2011 data also show the same level of 
conformity; 9.3 and 9.5 percentage points respectively for results based on 2008 means-test 
threshold, both of which are significant at 1 percent; and 10.8 percentage points compared 
with 11.2 percentage points for results based on 2011 and 2012 means-test threshold 
respectively. A female child who receives the grant is predicted to have 11.1 percentage 
points higher probability of being enrolled in school than one who does not when using the 
six yearly data compared with 11.4 percentage points result obtained when using 2007 and 
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2011 data; both of which are significant at 1 percent when using the 2008 means-test 
threshold. Assessing the impact of the program on enrolment by the highest grade completed 
is consistent using the three robustness checks. For example, using 2007 and 2011 data; the 
2008 means-test threshold; and the ‘High income’ control group, the results predict that a 
child who has completed grade 12 and receives the grant has a 66 percentage points higher 
probability of being enrolled than one who does not compared with 61.6 percentage points 
using 2007 and 2012 data; and 72 percentage points using the six yearly data. They are all 
significant at 1 percent. 
Generally, although the estimates for 2012 are slightly higher, the differences are 
small and the results are consistent. It is also important, however, to note that the age 
eligibility was increased to include all children under the age of 18 in 2012. The age 
eligibility was children under the age of 17 in 2011. Without any loss of generality, the 
strategy still provided a good measure of robustness check; for the differences were 
negligibly small and the results are consistent. It is also interesting to note that when I 
extended the number of years to include six yearly data, I am still getting very similar 
estimates with negligible differences and which are consistent. In general, therefore, the 
Difference-in-Differences estimation results confirm that the Child Support Grant has a 
significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children in South Africa. These 
results support the hypotheses (hypothesis 4.1; 4.2; and 4.3 in section 4.2.2) that the Child 
Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children; a 
significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged girls; and a significant impact 
on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged boys in South Africa. 
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4.5.2 Results based on Instrumental Variables (IV) Method 
Instrumental Variable estimations are based on the General Household Survey Data. 
Table 4.22 shows First Stage results which confirm that there is a significant effect of my 
instrument on the Child Support Grant. The instrument used in these regressions is ‘having an 
age-eligible child in the expanded years’.11 Table 4.23 shows IV estimation results of the 
impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children. 
Columns (1), (2), and (3) show results for the full sample; girls; and boys respectively based 
on 2007 and 2011 data whereas columns (4), (5), and (6) show results for the full sample; 
girls; and boys respectively based on 2007 and 2012 data. For a child of secondary school age, 
receiving the Child Support Grant increases in the probability of enrolment by 9.2 percentage 
points than one who does not, which is significant at 1 percent. A child whose father is alive 
see an increase in the probability of enrolment by 1.6 percentage points than one who does 
not, which is strongly significant. Another year reduces the probability of enrolment by 3.8 
percentage points, which is significant at 1 percent. These results are detailed in Column (1) 
of Table 4.23. For a girl child, of secondary school age, receiving the Child Support Grant 
increases the probability of enrolment by 11.8 percentage points, which is significant at 1 
percent. On the other hand, for a boy, receiving the Child Support Grant increases the 
probability of enrolment by 7.1 percentage points; albeit significant at 10 percent. 
Using data based on 2007 and 2012, the results are consistent with those using data 
based on 2007 and 2011. A child who receives the Child Support Grant has 12.1 percentage 
points higher in probability of being enrolled in school than one who does not, which is 
significant at 1 percent. For a girl child, receiving the Child Support Grant is predicted to 
                                       
11 The accompanying tests show that the Child Support Grant is indeed endogenous. The instrument is strong. For detailed 
specification tests see notes to Tables 4.22 and 4.23 in the appendix. 
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increase the probability of enrolment by 11.6 percentage points, which is significant at 1 
percent. In turn, the program effect for boys is an increase in the probability of enrolment by 
12.9 percentage points, which is also significant at 1 percent; as detailed in Table 4.23.  
Table 4.24 shows IV estimation results using six yearly data from 2007 to 2012. 
Column (1); Column (2); and column (3) show results on full sample; girls; and boys 
respectively. Like in Table 4.23, the instrument is ‘having an age-eligible child in the 
expanded year’. For a child of secondary school age, receiving the Child Support Grant 
increases the probability of enrolment by 11.9 percentage points, which is significant at 1 
percent. The program effect for girls is an increase in the probability of enrolment by 9.9 
percentage points, which is significant at 5 percent. On the other hand, for a male child, 
receiving the Child Support Grant increases the probability of enrolment by 13.9 percentage 
points, which is significant at 1 percent. 
Comparing the IV results with those of the Difference-in-Differences (DID) results 
above portrays an interesting picture. The comparison is done here because they are both 
based on GHS data. The estimates are more or less the same and are consistent. The DID 
estimate using 2007 and 2012 data and ‘High income’ control group is 11.1 percentage points 
and significant at 1 percent compares very well with the IV estimate of 12.1 percentage 
points which is also significant at 1 percent. The IV results are very similar with results in all 
the columns of the DID results in Table 4.8. Comparing Instrumental Variables (IV) results 
based on 2007 and 2011 data with DID results based on 2007 and 2011 data in Table 4.17 in 
the Appendix also show a similar picture of robustness. The IV estimate is 9.2 percentage 
points compared with the DID estimate (using the ‘High income’ control group) of 9.5 
percentage points; and both are significant at 1 percent. The program impact estimate for girls 
using the Instrumental Variables method of 11.8 percentage points (which is significant at 1 
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percent) using 2007 and 2011 data compares very well with the DID estimate of 11.4 
percentage points (also significant at 1 percent) using 2007 and 2011 data. Likewise, 
comparing Instrumental Variables estimation results with Difference-in-Differences 
estimation results of the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-
school-aged girls using 2007 and 2012 data reveals a similar picture. A program impact 
estimate of 11.6 percentage points (which is significant at 5 percent) using the Instrumental 
Variables method compares very well with an estimate of 13 percentage points (though 
significant at 1 percent) under the DID method.  
On the other hand, the program impact estimate for secondary-school-aged boys of 
7.1 percentage points (which is significant at 10 percent) using the Instrumental Variables 
method based on 2007 and 2011 data compares very well with an estimate of 8.2 percentage 
points (which is also significant at 10 percent) under the Difference-in-Differences method 
using 2007 and 2011 data. Using 2007 and 2012 data, the program impact estimate for 
secondary-school-aged boys is 12.9 percentage points (which is significant at 1 percent) 
based on IV method compared to an estimate of 9.7 percentage points (which is significant at 
5 percent) under the Difference-in-Differences framework using 2007 and 2012 data.  
The IV estimation results show that secondary-school-aged children who receive the 
Grant have a higher chance of being enrolled in school than those who do not receive the 
grant; confirming the DID estimation results that the program has a significant impact on the 
enrolment of secondary-school-aged children in South Africa. These results support 
hypotheses 4.1; 4.2; and 4.3 in section 4.2.2 that say that the Child Support Grant has a 
significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children; a significant impact 
on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged girls and a significant impact on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged boys, respectively. 
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4.5.3 Results Based on Panel Fixed Effects Estimations 
 Panel Fixed Effects estimations are based on the National Income Dynamics Study 
(NIDS) Wave 2 and Wave 3 data and the results are detailed in Table 4.25 and Table 4.26 in 
the appendix. The dependent variable is binary and equal to 1 if the child is enrolled in school 
and zero otherwise. Covariates controlled for are: Child Support Grant status, which is the 
variable of interest; 2012 year dummy; log of real income; binary variable indicating whether 
a child passed the previous year; binary variable indicating whether the child’s mother is 
alive; and a binary variable indicating whether a child’s father is alive. Variables such as 
gender dummy, geo-region dummies, and race dummies were excluded in the regressions 
because they are fixed over time. The difference in age between children does not change 
over time and was also excluded. Other supply-side characteristics that affect enrolment were 
also excluded because it is reasonable to assume them to be fixed over a two year period. 
 Table 4.25 shows Panel Fixed Effects estimation results of the impact of the Child 
Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children. Column (1) shows results 
based on the full sample of children that were aged 13 – 18 years in 2010; Column (2) shows 
results of the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged 
girls; and Column (3) shows results of the impact of the program on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged boys. For a child who is of secondary school age, receiving the Child 
Support Grant increases the probability of enrolment by 4.1 percentage points than one who 
does not, which is significant at 1 percent12. This result supports hypothesis 4.1 in section 
4.2.2, which states that the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of 
secondary school aged children. 
                                       
12 When I drop the variable ‘passed the previous year’ the program impact becomes 3.7 percentage points, which is 
significant at 5 percent. 
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The probability of enrolment for a child who passed the previous year is 8.8 
percentage points higher than one who did not pass the previous year, which is also 
significant at 1 percent.  A girl of secondary school age who receives the Child Support 
Grant see an increase in the probability of enrolment by 0.9 percentage points than one who 
does not receive the grant. However, the program impact for girls is not statistically different 
from zero. The semi-elasticity of income to enrolment for secondary-school-aged girls is 2.6 
percentage points, which is significant at 5 percent. Girls who passed the previous year have 
a 9.5 percentage points higher probability of being enrolled in school than those who did not 
pass; an estimate which is statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level.  
On the other hand, for a male child who is aged 13 – 18 years, receiving the Child 
Support Grant increases the probability of enrolment by 8.1 percentage points, which is 
significant at 1 percent13. This result supports hypothesis 4.3 in section 4.2.2 which states that 
the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of secondary school aged 
children. In turn, a boy of secondary school age who passed the previous year has an 8.2 
percentage points higher probability of being enrolled in school than one who did not pass the 
previous year, which is statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
 Table 4.26 in the appendix shows Panel Fixed Effects estimation results of the 
impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children based 
on geo-regions: formal urban areas; informal urban areas; tribal authority areas; and formal 
rural areas. According to the rural development framework (1997; cited in Local Government 
Budgets and Expenditure Review, 2011) rural areas are defined as having ‘sparsely populated 
areas in which people farm or depend on natural resources, including villages and small 
                                       
13 When I run the regressions without the variable ‘passed the previous year’, the program impact estimate for boys becomes 
11 percentage points and still significant at 1 percent. 
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towns that are dispersed through these areas’ as well as ‘areas that include large settlements 
in the former homelands, which depend on migratory labor and remittances as well as 
government social grants for their survival , and typically have traditional land tenure 
systems’. Characteristically14, rural areas are difficult to reach and face inadequate physical 
conditions with comparatively weak leaner performance. Getting a deeper understanding of 
the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary school aged children in 
these areas is insightful and important for policy considerations. 
For a child of secondary school age who lives in formal urban areas, receiving the 
Child Support Grant increases the probability of enrolment by 7.5 percentage points than one 
who does not receive the grant, which is significant at 1 percent15. A child living in urban 
areas and of secondary school age who passed the previous year has a 16.5 percentage point 
higher probability of being enrolled in school than one who did not pass; an estimate which is 
significant at 1 percent. A child who lives in the formal urban areas and is of secondary 
school age whose father is alive has a 12.8 percentage point higher probability of being 
enrolled in school than one whose father is not alive, which is significant at 10 percent. 
 It is important to gain a deeper understanding of the impact of the Child Support 
Grant on the enrolment of children living informal urban areas. Column (2) of Table 4.26 
shows Panel Fixed Effects estimation results of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged children living in informal urban areas of South Africa. For a child of 
secondary school age living in informal urban areas, receiving the Child Support Grant 
increases the probability of enrolment by 4.7 percentage points. However, the estimate is not 
                                       
14 Many rural schools still lack clean running water, electricity, libraries, laboratories and computers (Gardiner, 2008). 
15 Running regressions without the variable ‘passed the previous year’ does not change the program estimate of the impact 
of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children living in formal urban areas; with an 
estimate of 7.4 percentage points, albeit significant at 5 percent. 
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statistically different from zero. A child of secondary school age living in informal urban 
areas and who passed the previous year has an 18.6 percentage point higher probability of 
being enrolled in school than one who did not pass, which is significant at 5 percent. The 
effect of ‘whether mother is alive’ as well as the effect of ‘whether father is alive’ on the 
enrolment of secondary-school-aged children living in informal urban areas are both positive 
and insignificant16 (10.6 and 27.8  percentage points respectively). 
 Children living in Tribal Authority Areas and are of secondary school age who 
receive the Child Support Grant have a 2.3 percentage point higher probability of being 
enrolled in school than those who do not receive the grant; albeit not statistically different 
from zero. The semi-elasticity of real income on enrolment for children living in Tribal 
Authority Areas is 1.9, which is significant at 10 percent. The program does not have an 
impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children living in formal rural areas17. 
However, a child living in formal rural areas and is of secondary school age who passed the 
previous year has a 13 percentage points higher probability of being enrolled in school than 
one who did not pass the previous year, which is significant at 5 percent. 
 Using Panel Fixed Effects method, the Child Support Grant has a positive and 
significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children in South Africa; 
which is significant at 1 percent. This supports hypothesis 4.1 in section 4.2.2, which states 
that the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-
aged children. The Child Support grant has a positive and significant impact on the enrolment 
                                       
16 Dropping the variable ‘passed the previous year’ from my regressions leaves the estimate of impact of the Child Support 
Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children living in informal urban areas still not significant with a 
coefficient of 6.2 percentage points. However, the coefficient on ‘father alive’ becomes 40.9 percentage points and 
significant at 5 percent. 
17 The situation in rural areas might have an overbearing effect. As Gardiner (2008) noted, ‘villages and rural communities 
are difficult to reach, the physical conditions in schools are inadequate, and leaner performance in comparison to schools 
elsewhere is weak’. 
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of secondary-school-aged boys, which is significant at 1 percent; confirming hypothesis 4.3 
in section 4.2.2 that states that the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the 
enrolment of secondary-school-aged boys in South Africa. The program has a positive and 
significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children living in formal urban 
areas; which is also significant at 1 percent. These are very important conclusions considering 
that using Panel Fixed Effects enables me to solve the problem of selection bias and omitted 
variable bias emanating from potential unobserved time-invariant factors that are likely to be 
correlated with the Child Support Grant status and or other explanatory variables that affect 
the enrolment of children.  
The conclusion from Panel Fixed Effects estimations that the Child Support Grant 
has a significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children is an important 
conclusion considering the challenge South Africa is facing as far as secondary school 
education is concerned where drop-out rates are very high. A conclusion that the program has 
a significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged boys is also a very important 
piece of evidence considering that dropout rates for boys in secondary school are much 
higher than those of girls. It is also an important conclusion considering that the opportunity 
cost of attending school as a result of labor market activities is generally higher for boys than 
for girls. Overall, Panel Fixed Effects estimations predict that the Child Support Grant has a 
significant impact on the enrolment of secondary school aged children in South Africa; 
confirming the results obtained under the Difference-in-Differences and Instrumental 
Variables methods. 
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4.5.4 Cost Effectiveness Estimation 
For expositional purposes, I carried out a calculation of the cost-effectiveness of the 
Child Support Grant using results obtained above. The procedure entails calculating the total 
cost of the program and dividing it with the total impact. Using this procedure, I discovered 
that the Child Support Grant achieves 0.03 additional years of schooling for every $100 
spend as detailed in Table 4.27 in the appendix. Comparing this estimate to the cost-
effectiveness figures obtained in some African countries portrays an interesting picture. For 
example, in the case of an unconditional cash transfer for girls in Malawi, the program was 
discovered to increase schooling by 0.02 years for every $100 spent. The fact that the Child 
Support Grant has been largely unconditional since its inception makes it very comparable to 
the situation in Malawi but suggesting that the Child Support Grant is somewhat more cost-
effective although the difference is not very large. When compared to programs in Malawi, 
the Child Support Grant is far much larger in terms of coverage where it is reaching more 
than 11 million children whereas the program in Malawi only reaches a few thousand 
beneficiaries. This might suggest that scale, among other factors, might be an important 
factor in accounting for the difference between the cost-effectiveness of the unconditional 
cash transfer program in Malawi when compared to the Child Support Grant.  
Another explanation as to why the estimate of the cost-effectiveness of the Child 
Support Grant is slightly higher than the unconditional program in Malawi could be as a 
result of the life of the two programs. Although the estimates are not alarmingly different, it 
is noteworthy to consider that the Child Support Grant has been there for a comparatively 
longer period than the unconditional program in Malawi. This suggests that longer term 
impacts maybe bigger and relatedly administrative and information costs tend to go down 
over time. 
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However, the estimate of 0.03 additional years of schooling for every $100 spent 
obtained for the Child Support Grant is also comparatively lower when compared to an 
estimate of 0.09 additional years of schooling for every $100 spent on a conditional cash 
transfer for girls’ attendance in Malawi18. This suggests that a complete introduction and 
enforcement of conditions for the Child Support Grant can generate relatively higher cost 
effectiveness. The difference in cost effectiveness between the two programs can be 
attributed to the difference in program design and enforcement. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The three empirical methods used in this chapter were not meant to compete amongst 
themselves but rather to gain a deeper understanding of and unravel the impact of the Child 
Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children in South Africa. 
Reconciling the results of the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged children from the Difference-in-Differences, Instrumental Variables, 
and Panel Fixed Effects methods reveals a very interesting and reassuring picture. Using 
different methodologies and different data, the impact of the Child Support Grant on the 
enrolment of secondary-school-aged children is positive (with a coefficient of 11.1; 9.2; and 
4.1 percentage points using Difference-in-Differences; Instrument Variables; and Panel Fixed 
Effects, respectively) and significant at 1 percent in all the three estimation results: 
Difference-in-Differences, Instrumental Variables, and Panel Fixed Effects estimation results. 
In general, the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-
school-aged children. The fact that the estimate of the program impact under the Panel Fixed 
Effects is slightly lower than in the other empirical methods saves to confirm that there are 
                                       
18 For a detailed approach on cost-effectiveness analysis, see Dhaliwal et al. (2012). 
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potentially some fixed and unobserved characteristics that I was able to difference away; and 
the consistence of the results in all the three methodologies is reassuring. 
The Child Support Grant has a positive and significant impact on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged boys; with an estimate of 9.7 percentage points under the Difference-
in-Differences method, which is significant at 5 percent; an estimate of 12.9 percentage 
points under the Instrumental Variables method, which is significant at 1 percent; and an 
estimate of 8.1 percentage points under the Panel Fixed Effects which is significant at 1 
percent. This is an important conclusion considering that drop-out rates for secondary school 
boys are much higher for boys than those of female children. It is comforting to realize that 
the Child Support Grant has a significant impact for this group of children given the 
challenges South Africa is experiencing as far as secondary school education is concerned for 
boys; and where 23 percent of male drop-outs cited financial constraints as their main reason 
of dropping out of school. This is also a very important conclusion considering that the 
opportunity cost of attending school due to labor activities was much higher for boys 
compared to that of girls. 
Although the estimate of the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged girls is strongly significant (with a coefficient of 13 percentage points 
which is significant at 1 percent) under the Difference-in-Differences method and significant 
under the Instrumental Variables method (with a coefficient of 11.6 which is significant at 1 
percent), the estimate is small and statistically not different from zero under the Panel Fixed 
Effects method. I therefore conclude that my result on the impact of the Child Support Grant 
on the enrolment of secondary school aged girls is inconclusive. 
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The Child Support Grant has a positive and significant impact on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged children living in formal urban areas, which is significant at 1 percent. 
The program impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children living in informal 
urban areas and in Tribal Authority Areas is positive. The program has no impact on the 
enrolment of secondary-school-aged children living in formal rural areas. This conclusion is 
derived from Panel Fixed Effects results 19 . This is also an important observation. 
Characteristically, rural areas face many short-comings with inadequate physical conditions 
in schools (which are also difficult to reach) and comparatively weak learner performance 
suggesting that supply-side factors are still important for policy consideration. 
The Child Support Grant has had important and significant impact on schooling for 
secondary-school-aged children in South Africa. This is a very important conclusion. Given 
the challenges that South Africa has as far as secondary school education is concerned; with 
high drop-out rates reaching as high as 40 percent by the time children reach grade 10 and as 
high as 50 percent by the time children reach grade 12 coupled with relatively lower 
enrolment rates (and poor pass rates), here is a social protection program for children which 
in general has a significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged groups of 
children.  
 
 
 
                                       
19 It was not possible to disaggregate my sample into geo-regions on whether rural or urban using the General Household 
Survey (GHS) which I used for my Difference-in-Differences and Instrumental Variables estimations because the General 
Household Survey (GHS) data for 2007 (which was my base year data) does not have a variable for geo-region although the 
years after that the data now has a variable on geo-region. On the other hand, the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) 
data which I used for my Panel Fixed Effects estimations has a variable for geo-region and as a result I was able to 
disaggregate my sample into formal urban, informal urban, tribal authority areas, and formal rural areas. 
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CHAPTER 5 
AN IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE CHILD SUPPORT GRANT ON THE 
HEALTH OF CHILDREN IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Child health is an important pillar of human capital development. There is mounting 
evidence pointing to the fact that healthy children are more likely to become healthy adults. 
In recent years, there has been an increased attention on improving children’s health. 
Development practitioners and policy-makers, in particular, have invested a lot in trying to 
gain a better understanding into programs that promote child health and help break 
intergenerational poverty. One such development tool that has received a lot of interest is 
cash transfer programs; with many of such programs being conditional on a parent or 
caregiver taking a child to a health facility.  
This chapter assesses the impact of the Child Support Grant, a cash transfer program 
for children in South Africa, on health. The Child Support Grant is a means-tested social 
protection program given to every child under the age of 18. The outcome variables of 
interest are height-for-age z-score, which is a measure of accumulation of nutritional status 
since birth (Duflo, 2003); weight-for-age z-score. I used a sudden change in policy governing 
the Child Support Grant as a natural experiment for my identification strategy. I hypothesize 
that the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on height-for-age and weight-for-age 
for children living in South Africa; and that the Child Support Grant does not increase the 
chances of obesity among children in South Africa. 
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 covers a brief literature 
review; Section 5.3 covers testable hypotheses; Section 5.4 presents a description of the data 
and statistics; Section 5.5 dwells on the methodology used in this chapter; in Section 5.6, I 
present my findings; and Section 5.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Brief Literature Review 
Experiences from Latin American countries will always save as a referral to cash 
transfer evaluations. A number of researches in this area have also looked at health and 
development outcomes in young children (Fernald and Hidrobo, 2011; Morris et al., 2004a, 
2004b; Galasso, 2011; Attanasio and Mesnard, 2005; Barham, 2005 and 2009; Gertler, 2000 
and 2004; Arraiz and Rozo, 2010); to mention but a few. As noted by Bleakley (2008), the 
early years are particularly important; for most of a person’s human-capital and physiological 
development happens in childhood. 
Ranganathan and Lagarde (2011) provided an overview of conditional cash transfer 
programs in low and middle income countries (excluding South Africa); mostly in Latin 
America, and presented the evidence to date on their contribution to improvements in health 
and the encouragement of healthy behaviors. They concluded that conditional cash transfers 
have been effective in increasing the use of preventive services, improving immunization 
coverage, certain health outcomes and in encouraging healthy behaviors. In a related 
approach, albeit at a grander scale, Manley et al., (2013) reviewed 30,000 articles relating 
cash transfer programs and specifically height for age (finding 21 papers on 17 programs). 
They concluded that the programs’ average impact on height-for-age is positive, small and 
statistically not significant. 
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Cash transfer programs are highly regarded as powerful instruments to improve 
health outcomes in low and middle income countries (ibid). Attanasio et al., (2005) and 
Gertler (2004) concluded that indeed cash transfer programs reduced the magnitude of 
stunting and the proportion of underweight in children aged 0 to 5 years old. They can lead to 
remarkable decline in infant mortality in some instances. Barham (2011), for example, 
discovered that Progresa led to a 17 percent decline in rural infant mortality among the 
treated; although it did not reduce neonatal mortality on average. 
Most cash transfer programs are conditional and very few are unconditional. Some of 
the examples of impact evaluations of unconditional cash transfers on health outcomes 
include Duflo (2003) in South Africa; Leon and Younger (2007), Ecuador; Paxson and 
Schady (2007); Ecuador; Shinha and Yoong (2009), India. Important conclusions reached by 
Manley et al., (2013) were that conditional programs statistically accomplish the same as 
unconditional; conditionalities not related to health or education strongly inhibit child growth; 
and girls benefit more than boys as well as disadvantaged areas benefit more. 
Although a lot of documented experience on cash transfers on health outcomes 
comes from Latin America, this developmental tool is now receiving prominence in Africa as 
well. Alderman (2007), for example, assessed the impact of a large scale community growth 
promotion program in Uganda and discovered a significant improvement of child nutrition 
for the youngest children in the treatment group compared to the same age cohort in the 
control communities. Robertson et al., (2013) investigated the effects of unconditional cash 
transfers and conditional cash transfers on birth registration, vaccination uptake, and school 
attendance in children in Zimbabwe. They found out that, among other results on birth 
registration and school attendance, the proportions of children aged 0 - 4 years with complete 
vaccination records was 3.1 percent greater in the unconditional cash transfer group and 1.8 
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percent greater in the conditional cash transfer group than in the control group. In Rwanda, 
Basinga et al., (2011) discovered that facilities in the intervention group had a 23 percent 
increase in the number of institutional deliveries and increases in the number of preventive 
care visits by children aged 23 months or younger and aged 24 months and 59 months; 
although no improvements were registered for children receiving full immunization schedules. 
In South Africa, Duflo (2003) showed that girls whose grandmothers receive 
transfers have large improvements of 1.2 standard deviations in weight and height. Also 
writing on nutrition, Aguero, Carter and Woolard (2010) analyzed the impact of grants on 
child height-for-age and found significant impacts. However, Aguero and Carter used a panel 
data from one province of South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal) whereas in my case I used a 
nationally representative panel data covering all the nine provinces of South Africa. Woolard 
et al. (2005) and Aguero et al. (2007) limited their analysis to children 0-3 years (a limitation 
that comes from their data). I expand on that by looking at children aged 1 – 4 years; 5 – 9 
years; and 10 – 14 years using a totally different and nationally representative data covering 
all the nine provinces of South Africa. In general, however, as Manley et al. (2013) also 
noted, previous studies of cash transfer programs’ effects on child nutritional status are 
limited and come to varying conclusions. This dissertation seeks to contribute to a rather 
limited body of literature on cash transfers in Africa and expand on and bridge gaps on the 
impact of the Child Support Grant on the health of children living in South Africa. 
 
5.3 Testable hypotheses 
The main objectives of this chapter are: to find out the impact of the Child Support 
Grant on height-for-age and weight-for-age for children in South Africa; and to show whether 
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the Child Support Grant increases the chances of obesity among children in South Africa. In 
order to meet these objectives, the research seeks to answer questions as to whether the Child 
Support Grant has a significant impact on height-for-age and weight-for-age for children aged 
1 – 4 years; 5 – 9 years; 10 – 14 years; and all children below 15 years; and whether the Child 
Support Grant increases the chances of obesity among children in South Africa. The 
following hypotheses are worth testing: 
Hypothesis 5.1: The Child Support Grant has a significant impact on height-for-age for 
children living in South Africa. 
Hypothesis 5.2: The Child Support Grant has a significant impact on weight-for-age for 
children living in South Africa.  
South Africa is a country with a complex mix of under- and over- nutrition. 
Understanding whether the Child Support Grant does not increase the chances of obesity 
among children is also very important. Obesity is a serious challenge for many countries and 
particularly so for South Africa. In particular, about 70 percent of adult women and 40 
percent of adult males in South Africa are obese; and about 25 percent of girls and 20 percent 
of boys in South Africa are obese (The Economist, June 14, 2014). Obesity exposes children 
to risks of suffering from diabetes and heart diseases; among others. Getting a deeper 
understanding on whether the program increases the chances of obesity or not among 
children is therefore of paramount importance when assessing the impact of the Child 
Support Grant on the health of children in South Africa. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
advance the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5.3: The Child Support Grant does not increase the chances of obesity among 
children. 
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5.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
5.4.1 Data 
In the history of South Africa, for the first time, through a Presidential decree, the 
country commissioned a national panel survey; the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS). 
The first wave was available in 2008, the second wave was held in 2010 and became 
available in May 2012, and Wave 3 was published in September 2013. This, no doubt, is 
essential in getting a deeper understanding of the social dynamics of cash transfers, among 
others and policies and social forces driving them. I used the National Income Dynamics 
Study (NIDS) over the three waves; namely 2008, 2010 and 2012. The NIDS data has added 
more, new and rich information about socioeconomic change over time at the individual level.  
It is unique in the case of South Africa in that it is the only nationally representative 
household survey which measures longitudinal change among the same individuals20. The 
panel study was implemented in all the nine provinces of South Africa. It used a combination 
of household and individual level questionnaires. The data provides information on 
geography, Occupation, Industry, Employment Status, Income, Expenditure and Wealth; 
among others. Information about children was collected from caregivers. The Child 
questionnaire focused on educational history, education, anthropometrics and access to grants. 
Wave 1 (2013 version of the first wave) comprises of 28,255 households, 16,885 adults, and 
9,616 children; Wave 2 comprises of 9,134 households, 21,880 individuals, and 11,094 
children; and Wave 3 comprises of 10,236 households, 22,481 adults21, and 12,235 children. 
                                       
20National Income Dynamics Study, 2012 Wave 2 Overview. 
21 A person is defined as an adult if they were 15 years old or older on the day of the interview; see the National Income 
Dynamics Study Wave 3 User Manual. 
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For the purpose of my research, where I am interested in the drastic change in policy 
governing the Child Support Grant which came into effect on 22 August 2008, care was 
exercised by dropping all observations who were interviewed after July 2008 since the drastic 
change in policy was announced on 22 August 2008. So drastic was the change in policy that 
it is reasonable to conclude that no household would ever have anticipated this kind of 
change22 (I will come back to this point under identification strategy in the next section). Out 
of the 9,616 children whose households were interviewed in 2008 only 545 children’s 
households were interviewed after July 2008. Nothing much, if at all, was lost by excluding 
these 545 children from my analysis and at the same time making Difference-in-Differences 
framework suitable for the analysis.  
For anthropometric information, data provides three measures for height, weight and 
waist. Two measures were taken for each and then a third if the first two measures were more 
than one centimeter apart for height and when the first two measures were more than one 
kilogram apart for weight. The two measures were important in the calculation of z-scores 
where the average of the two was used. In cases where these two measures differed by more 
than one centimeter for height and one kilogram for weight, the third measure was used. The 
z-scores for children under the age of 5 for height-for-age and weight-for-age were calculated 
using the WHO international child growth standards as the reference23 (ibid). The WHO 
growth standards for school-aged children and adolescents were used as a reference in the 
calculation of z-scores for height-for-age, and weight-for-age; for children older than 5 years. 
                                       
22A study of the Social Assistance Act Government Notices from 1998 shows no precedency of such a kind of policy shift. I 
reviewed all the government notices from 1998 to 2008. 
23 In calculating height z-scores, it was assumed that the child was measured in the recumbent position if the child is below 
24 months. If the child is aged 24 months and above, it was assumed that the measured height is standing height. Age in days 
was used to calculate the z-scores (ibid). 
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The outcome variables of interest in assessing the impact of the Child Support Grant 
on health in this chapter are height-for-age z-score and weight-for-age z-score. Generally, 
height-for-age is regarded as a chronic measure (Alderman, 2007). Weight-for-age is an 
important indicator for poverty and hunger eradication as stipulated by the first millennium 
development goal (Kazianga et al., 2014). In general, children who are more than two 
standard deviations below the average are regarded to be underweight. On the other hand, 
children who are more than three standard deviations are considered to be severely 
underweight. 
 
5.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 in appendix shows descriptive statistics for children aged below 15 years 
and for children aged 10 – 14 years; for the three waves. Panel A includes statistics for some 
of the control variables used in the regressions and Panel B details statistics on outcome 
variables used in the analysis. The average household size is 7 in all the years. There was a 
marked increase in household real income which was R 2,394; R 2,880; and R 3,174 in 2008, 
2010, and 2012 respectively. Real expenditure on food averaged R 864; R 885; and R 840 
respectively. Children who received the Child Support Grant increased from 72.4 percent to 
76.6 percent in 2010 and 77.7 percent by 2012. Fifty-one percent of the children are boys in 
all the waves and slightly half of all the children are from Tribal Authority Areas. Six percent 
of all the children are from Urban Informal Areas and 8.4 percent from Rural Formal Areas; 
remainder proportion of children is from the Formal Urban Areas. 
The average height-for-age z-score was -0.913, -1.007, and -1.003 in 2008, 2010 and 
2012 respectively for the full sample. Correspondingly, the average height-for-age for 
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children aged 5 – 9 years is -0.79, -0.845, -0.795 for the three waves respectively; and for 
children aged 1 – 4 years is -1.216, -1.19, and -1.091 respectively. Summary statistics for 
weight-for-age z-score are detailed in Panel B of Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. Weight-for-age z-
score averaged -0.347, -0.252, and -0.33 in 2008, 2010, and 2012 respectively for the full 
sample. There is a noticeable trend in all the age subgroups (namely: full sample of children 
below 15 years, children aged 10 – 14 years, aged 5 – 9 years and aged 1 – 4 years); the z-
scores increased in 2010 and then fell in 2012.  
 Table 5.3 shows descriptive statistics on height and weight for children aged 1 – 4 
years; 5 – 9 years; and 10 – 14 years in 2008, 2010 and 2012. The average height for children 
aged 1 – 4 years was 89.73; 94.6; and 101.1 centimeters in the three years respectively. The 
average weight for the same age group was 14.67; 17.16; and 16.81 kilograms in each time 
period respectively. On the other hand, the average height for children aged 5 – 9 years was 
118.7; 117.5; and 119.1 centimeters and average weight was 23.54; 24.46; and 23.75 
kilograms in 2008, 2010 and 2012, respectively. As for children aged 10 – 14 years, the 
average height was 133.5; 136.8; and 144.1 centimeters and average weight was 31.11; 36.02; 
and 39.92 kilograms in the three time periods respectively. There is a noticeable trend, 
however. There is a marked increase in average height in each time period for children   
aged 1 – 4 years. Furthermore, average height in 2012 is generally higher for all age 
subgroups (1 – 4 years; 5 – 9 years; and 10 – 14 years) as compared to averages in 2008 and 
2010. However, this is not the case for average weight except for children aged 10 – 14 years 
where average weight increases in each time period. Table 5.4 shows descriptive statistics of 
take-up of the Child Support Grant by treatment and control groups based on both 2008 and 
2012 means-test thresholds in the three time periods; 2008, 2010, and 2012. Take-up rates 
were 63.1 percent in 2008 and reached 80.7 percent by 2012 in the treatment group based on 
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2008 means-test threshold and correspondingly started off at 51.6 percent in 2008 and 
levelling off at 78.7 percent by 2012 in the treatment group based on 2012 means-test 
threshold. In both cases take-up rates remained fairly constant in control groups based on 
2008 and 2012 means-test thresholds as detailed in Table 5.4 in the appendix24.  
 One of the most important premises for using the Difference-in-Differences 
framework is to make sure that the treatment and control groups are similar in characteristics 
in the baseline (the ‘before’ year). Table 5.5 to Table 5.8 show summary statistics categorized 
into treatment and control groups using different control groups. The tables confirm that both 
the treatment and control groups are similar in characteristics in the baseline. Table 5.5, for 
example, shows summary statistics for treatment and control group based on both the ‘Low 
income’ and the ‘High income’ control groups together. The mean height-for-age z-score   
is -0.916 and -0.985 in the control and treatment groups respectively; which are statistically 
not different (p-value = 0.353). The average weight-for-age z-score is -0.366 and -0.329 in 
the control and treatment groups respectively and a p-value of 0.614 for the difference in 
means. The means for the two groups are statistically not different from each other for age, 
proportion of children whose mothers are alive, proportion of children whose fathers are alive, 
proportion of children in good health, proportion of children in fair health, proportion of 
children whose birth place is a clinic, proportion of children who visited a health facility once 
in year, and the proportion of children who visited a facility at least more than once in a year; 
just to mention but a few characteristics. 
 In my regressions, I used two different control groups namely: (1) comprised of 
children from households who were both means-test eligible (Low income group) and means-
                                       
24 Reasons for not taking up the Child Support Grant are detailed in section 2.2. 
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test ineligible (high income group) who did not receive the Child Support Grant; and (2) 
comprised of children from households who were both means-test eligible (Low income 
group) and means-test ineligible (high income group) both who received and did not receive 
the grant. It is important therefore to determine whether these groups were different in 
characteristics before the change in policy and whether this could lead to any bias in 
estimates. In Tables 5.9 and 5.10 I compare observable characteristics of those who did not 
receive the Child Support Grant and those who received the Child Support Grant before the 
change in policy based on 2008 and 2012 means-test thresholds respectively. My conclusion 
from both tables is that they were similar in characteristics before the change in policy. 
 For example, in Table 5.10 average height-for-age was -0.987 and 0.916 in the two 
groups respectively. These averages are not statistically different from each other        
(with p-value = 0.316). Average weight-for-age was -0.29 for the group that did not receive 
the Child Support Grant in the base year compared with an average of -0.37 for the group that 
received the grant before the change in policy, which are also not statistically different from 
each other (with a p-value = 0.265). The two groups had an almost equal number of boys as 
girls on average and both are not statistically different from each other in the two groups 
(with p-value = 0.955 in both cases). The proportion of children whose fathers were alive 
before the change in policy were 88.2 percent and 89.7 percent (p-value = 0.223) in the two 
groups respectively. Other characteristics detailed in the table are: household head’s 
education, proportion of children in good health, proportion of children in fair health, 
proportion of children born in a clinic, illness history, and health check-up frequency. All 
these observable characteristics are statistically not different from each other in the two 
groups before the change in policy as evidenced by the insignificant p-values which measure 
the difference in means. This detailed analysis suggests that the two groups are not different 
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and importantly the incomplete take-up of the Child Support Grant does not bias my 
estimates. It is also important to note that these two groups are comprised of both children 
from households that were means-test eligible and means-test ineligible. 
 In general, the health of children is also determined by, among other factors, the 
nutritional intake of a balanced diet. An understanding of nutritional intake can be derived 
from the type of food consumed and indirectly from the amount spend on each type of food. 
Expenditure on food, although widely used as a measure of consumption, it is silent on how 
much is really consumed and how much is wasted; how much of the food purchased was 
consumed by members of the household and how much was consumed by visitors; and how 
much was consumed by adults and how much was indeed consumed by children. However, it 
is a widely used proxy for nutritional intake.  
Table 5.11 shows summary statistics based on type and expenditure on food consumed 
for a selected types of food in 2008 and 2010. Columns (1) and (2) show the proportion of 
households consuming the type of food named and columns (3) and (4) detail the real 
expenditure amount on each type of food. There has been a generally marked increase in the 
proportion of households consuming each type of food. The proportion of households 
consuming red meat increased from 55.6 percent in 2008 to 64.3 percent in 2010. Likewise, 
23.8 percent of households consumed fish in 2010 compared with 18.9 percent in 2008. 
Seventy-seven percent of households consumed eggs in 2010 compared with 68.3 percent in 
2008; and 67.8 percent of households consumed dairy products in 2010 compared with 60.8 
percent in 2008. The real expenditure amounts on each type of food also increased in 2010 
compared to 2008. This dimension of analysis is important because nutritional intake have a 
direct bearing on my outcome variables. This analysis confirms that food expenditure and 
food consumption were important in the time periods reviewed.  
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5.5 Methodology 
 
5.5.1 Difference-in-Differences 
The Difference-in-Differences method is well suited to estimating the effect of sharp 
changes in government policy (Angrist and Krueger, 1999) and is itself a version of fixed-
effects estimation using aggregate data (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), although it does not 
necessarily require a balanced panel (Ravallion, 2008) and still be robust to selective attrition. 
The model specification that I worked with is as follows: 
ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛿0𝑑2 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿1𝑑2.𝑑𝑑 + 𝑋′𝛽𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖   
This entails creating time and group dummies (i.e. control and treatment groups). In this case 
β0 captures the control group in the pre-treatment period and the sum of β0 and δ0 captures the 
effect to the control group in the after treatment period. The coefficient, δ0, is the difference 
between after and before for the control group. It is the counterfactual measure of the 
treatment group in the post- and pre-treatment periods; reflecting what the treatment group 
would have been in the absence of the program. The sum of δ0 and δ1 is the difference in the 
treatment group between the two years. The coefficient of interest is δ1 which measures the 
true impact of the program. It is the Difference-in-Differences estimator. h is the health 
outcome variable; height-for-age, and weight-for-age z-scores. 𝑋′  is a vector of other 
covariates. Although I am using the Difference-in-Differences framework, I am also 
controlling for a host of other covariates just to increase the precision of my estimates and to 
be rest assured that I do not suffer from any potential confoundedness. However, this should 
not be of concern given my identification strategy. 
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Identification Strategy 
With effect from 22 August 2008, for the first time in the history of the Child 
Support Grant, means-test eligibility took into account double income caregivers. From this 
date, the means-test eligibility criteria for those in spousal relationship was to be calculated as 
half the sum of the total income for the two, which should be less than the means-test cutoff 
threshold. Effectively, this works out to be double the means-test threshold for single income 
caregivers. This sharp change in policy has made some households that were otherwise 
means-test ineligible before the change to be suddenly means-test eligible. Before the change 
in policy, double income caregivers were ‘disadvantaged’ because in determining their 
eligibility total household income was considered and then there was no distinction between 
single income and double income caregivers; they were all subjected to the same means-test 
threshold. The sharp change in policy presents a natural experiment. This allows for a 
treatment-control strategy.  
For the first time as well, with effect from 22 August 2008, the means-test threshold 
was to be calculated as 10 times the grant amount. These two sudden changes in policy, 
which came into effect the same day, provide the scope for a natural experiment. It is difficult 
to believe that one might have anticipated such sudden change in policy; given the history of 
the Child Support Grant. This had no precedence and is exogenous. For the purpose of my 
analysis, I designed two control groups: (1) children who did not receive the grant (both 
means-test eligible and not eligible); (2) children who received the grant and those who did 
not receive the grant (both means-test eligible and not eligible). My treatment group is 
defined as children from households who were means-test ineligible before the change in 
policy but who found themselves means-test eligible after the change in policy; interacted 
with the grant.  
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5.5.2 Panel Fixed Effects 
The fact that the National Income Dynamics Study has repeated observations on 
individuals allows me to employ Panel Fixed Effects method to analyze the impact of the 
Child Support Grant on health. The motivation is that there are potentially unobserved child 
and family characteristics (such as innate healthiness; a higher food conversion efficiency for 
a particular child; parental tastes for healthy children, for example) that do not vary over time; 
and I would want to wish away; helping me deal with omitted variable bias when they are 
correlated with observed child health outcomes. This is important for controlling not only for 
the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity but also for heterogeneity in observed 
characteristics over time. The general model that I worked with is of the form: 
𝐻𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + λ𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖𝑖  
This emanates from, as motivated by Angrist and Pischke (2009): 
E[𝐻𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝑖 ,𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝,𝐷𝑖𝑖] = 𝛼 + λ𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝐴𝑖′𝛾 + 𝑋𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽 , where  
𝜇𝑖𝑖 ≡ 𝐻0𝑖𝑖 − 𝐸[𝐻0𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝑖 ,𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝]; 
𝛼𝑖 ≡ 𝛼 + 𝐴𝑖′𝛾;  
Where 𝐻𝑖𝑖 is health outcome variable for child i at time t; 𝛼𝑖 is a fixed effect for child i; 
𝐷𝑖𝑖 denotes the Child Support Grant status for child i at time t; and 𝑋𝑖𝑖′  is a vector which 
captures a range of time-varying covariates of children characteristics, household 
characteristics and parents or caregiver characteristics; among others. 𝐴𝑖  is a vector of 
unobserved but fixed confounders. The unobserved effect contains such factors as child, 
family background and such other fixed effect characteristics, which I am also assuming to be 
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constant over the time periods. Once the unobserved effect is taken out the explanatory 
variables become strictly exogenous. 
The parameter of interest is δ, which measures the true effect of the program and 
represents the impact of the grant on health outcomes. The main assumption here is that the 
idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated with the explanatory variable in each time period. By 
treating the fixed effects as an independent variable has the same effect as estimating 
deviations from means. It is understandable to assume that increased resources through the 
Child Support Grant will improve child health outcomes. The challenge, however, will come 
if families who are able to earn more money are more likely to raise healthy children. With 
Panel Fixed Effects, this worry is minimized (or even eliminated) if this characteristic is fixed 
over time (which is plausible to assume) so that it can be differenced away. Panel Fixed 
Effects importantly addresses the challenge of selection bias in program participation. If 
households who choose to take-up the Child Support Grant possess some characteristics that 
make them participate, and if these characteristics are fixed over time, the methodology is 
suitable to deal with the challenge. As a result, my explanatory variables will be strictly 
exogenous and the program impact estimate will be a true reflection of the impact of the 
Child Support Grant on the health of children living in South Africa.  
In order to assess the impact of the Child Support Grant on the health (in particular, 
height-for-age and weight-for-age and uncovering whether the Child Support Grant does not 
increase the chances of obesity) of children living in South Africa, therefore, I employed the 
Difference-in-Differences framework and Panel Fixed Effects methods and the results are 
detailed in the next section. 
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5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Difference-in-Differences Results 
The sharp change in policy governing the Child Support Grant presents a case of 
‘natural experiment’ which facilitates the employment of a Difference-in-Differences 
framework to assess the impact of the program on health. Due to the change affecting double 
income households, some families found themselves means-test eligible for the Child Support 
Grant; who otherwise would not be in the absence of the sudden and unprecedented change in 
policy. This enables the construction of control and treatment groups that can be compared 
before and after the change in government policy.  
For the purpose of my analysis, I designed two control groups: (1) children who did not 
receive the grant (both means-test eligible and not eligible); (2) children who received the 
grant and those who did not receive the grant (both means-test eligible and not eligible)25. My 
treatment group is defined as children from households who were means-test ineligible before 
the change in policy but who found themselves means-test eligible after the change in policy. 
These are households with incomes greater or equal to R 2 200 and less than R 4 400 in 
200826). I interacted this group with receiving the Child Support Grant. 
                                       
25 I checked whether these two control groups were similar in characteristics before the change in policy and discovered 
that they were similar as evidenced by the insignificant p-values that measure the difference in means as detailed in section 
5.4.2 and Tables 5.9 and 5.10 in the appendix. 
26 I conveniently called this group ‘middle income group’ to distinguish it from households with an income less than or 
equal to R 2 200 (‘low income’ group) which was the single income household cut-off threshold, and those with an income 
greater than R 4 400 (‘high income group’) who were means-test ineligible. The grant amount was R 220 on 1 October 2008 
and following the policy announcement of 22 August 2008 that the means-test threshold will be 10 times the grant amount, 
this puts the means-test threshold for single caregivers at R 2 200 and at R 4 400 for double income caregivers following a 
policy change of 22 August 2008 affecting those in spousal relationships; which stipulates that their cut-off threshold should 
be determined as: half their total income should be less than the means-test threshold for single income caregivers. This is 
mathematically the same as that their total income should be less than double the means-test threshold for single income 
caregivers. 
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Designing these different control and treatment groups provide an opportunity to check 
the robustness of the results. Also, because these classifications are based on household 
income, I subjected the results to three different income measurements: (1) self-reported 
household income; (2) imputed household income; and (3) imputed household income less 
government grant income (by running regressions with each one of them separately as a 
control variable). This sensitivity analysis approach is motivated by the fact that income is 
self-reported and measurement error is always a concern. I also took advantage of the fact 
that the means-test threshold is now calculated as 10 times the grant amount; meaning that 
the means-test thresholds were different in 2008 and 2012.  
Although I used the Difference-in-Differences framework, I also controlled for a host of 
other covariates27. I controlled for these covariates even though my treatment and control 
groups had similar characteristics before the change in policy as detailed in section 5.4.2 and 
in Table 5.5 to Table 5.8 in the appendix. This way, I intend to increase the precision of my 
estimates and get an assurance that my results do not suffer from any confoundedness coming 
from these covariates in anyway. 
 
5.6.1.1 Results based on 2008 means-test threshold 
Table 5.12 shows Difference-in-Differences estimation results of the impact of the Child 
Support Grant on height-for-age. The treatment group for these results is comprised of 
children from households who are in ‘middle income group’ and who received the Child 
Support Grant. In turn, the control group is comprised of children from households who did 
                                       
27 Covariates controlled for are: 2010 and 2012 year dummies; log of real income; log of real expenditure on food; 
household size; dummies to indicate whether formal rural areas, tribal authority areas, urban informal areas and the base 
geo-area was formal urban areas; dummy to indicate whether father of child is alive; household head’s education; race 
dummies; child’s age; gender dummy; dummies on health status; dummies to indicate number of times a health professional 
was visited in the previous 12 months; and dummies to indicate place of birth. 
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not receive the grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible). Log of real income included in 
these regressions is household income less government grants. Column (1) of Table 5.12 
shows estimation results of the impact on height-for-age z-score for children below the age of 
15. The program effect is an increase in height-for-age by 0.299 standard deviations; which is 
significant at 10 percent. This result confirms hypothesis 5.1 in section 5.3 which says the 
Child Support Grant has a significant impact on height-for-age for children living in South 
Africa. Controlling for total household income including government grants; and self-
reported household income, do not affect the results (0.288 and 0.32 standard deviations 
respectively, both significant at 10 percent28).  
Further disaggregating the sample into the following age groups: (1) 10 – 14 years;    
(2) 5 – 9 years; and (3) 1 – 4 years, is very important and insightful in gaining a better 
understanding of the impact of the program on different age groups. It is well documented 
elsewhere in the literature that the effect of nutritional deficiencies experienced in early 
stages of a child’s life might be difficult to reverse. Inferring the impact of the Child Support 
Grant on health for children aged between 1 – 4 years is therefore important. The effect of the 
Child Support Grant is an increase in height-for-age by 0.107; 0.253; and 0.337 standard 
deviations on children aged 10 – 14 years; 5 – 9 years; and 1 – 4 years respectively, which are 
all not statistically different from zero29.  
An important aspect of the Difference-in-Differences framework is that the control 
groups and treatment groups should be the same in characteristics before the intervention. To 
this effect, disaggregating the sample into rural and urban is very important and insightful. I 
                                       
28 Summaries of these results are detailed in Table 5.20 and Table 5.21 in the appendix. 
29 Estimation results controlling for total household income (including government grants) and controlling for another self-
reported household income do not yield different results: 0.04, 0.274, 0.354 and 0.094, 0.291, 0.40 for children aged 10 – 14, 
5 – 9, and 1 – 4 years respectively. 
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therefore separately estimated the impact of the Child Support Grant on the health of children 
aged below 15 years; aged 10 – 14 years; aged 5 – 9 years; and aged 1 – 4 years, living in 
formal urban areas; informal urban areas; formal rural areas; and tribal authority areas. Health 
outcomes are affected by environmental factors and these tend to be very distinct between 
urban and rural areas. Important factors include sanitary conditions, water source, dwelling 
type, ablution facilities, and access to health facilities; among others, which tend to vary 
greatly between urban and rural areas. Rural areas are also characteristic of access barriers 
including vast distances, high travel costs, high out of pocket costs and long queues30. 
Children living in formal urban areas who receive the Child Support Grant see an 
increase in height-for-age by 0.601 standard deviations than those who do not receive the 
grant. The estimate is significant at 5 percent; as detailed in results in Table 5.13, which show 
estimation results of the impact of the Child Support Grant on height-for-age for children 
living in urban formal areas. Applying a sensitivity analysis to the results by using household 
income including government grants as a control variable does not change the results (0.587 
which is significant at 5 percent); and neither do they change for another measure of self-
reported household income (0.588 standard deviations, which is also significant at 5 percent). 
For children aged 10 – 14 years, the estimate is negative but not statistically different 
from zero. The effect of the program is an increase in height-for-age by 0.853 standard 
deviations for children aged 5 – 9 years living in formal urban areas who receive the grant 
compared to those who do not receive, which is significant at 5 percent31. The estimate for 
                                       
30 See Harris et al. (2011) and Visagie et al. (2014). 
31 I also get similar results when I control for household income including government grants (0.835 standard deviations, 
significant at 5 percent); and when I control for another self-reported household income (0.833 standard deviations, 
significant at 5 percent). 
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the program impact on height-for-age for children aged 1 – 4 years who live in urban areas is 
positive (0.165 standard deviations) but not significant.  
Receiving the grant is associated with an increase of 0.249 standard deviations in height-
for-age for children living in tribal authority areas relative to those who do not receive the 
grant; though not significant. These results are detailed in Table 5.14. For children aged 5 – 9 
years living in tribal authority areas, receiving the Child Support Grant increases height-for-
age by 0.044 (with robust standard error of 0.393) standard deviations32 relative to those who 
do not receive the grant; and an increase in height-for-age by 1.09 standard deviations for 
children aged 1 – 4 years, albeit not significant. It is important to gain an insight into the 
effect of the Child Support Grant on health for children living in urban informal areas. 
However, none of the coefficients for the program impact is significantly different from zero. 
For children living in formal rural areas, the program effect on height-for-age is negative and 
insignificant. This might be an indication that supply-side considerations have an overbearing 
effect for children living in rural areas. 
The effect of the program on girls is an increase in height-for-age by 0.37 standard 
deviations which is weakly significant, as detailed in Table 5.15. The estimate does not 
change when I control for household income including government grants; and neither does it 
change when I use another self-reported household income (0.383 and 0.425 standard 
deviations, which are both significant at 10 percent as well). On the other hand, the effect on 
boys is an increase in height-for-age by 0.201 standard deviations (0.173 and 0.208 standard 
deviations respectively, when I apply the sensitivity check of controlling for household 
                                       
32 The coefficient becomes relatively larger when total household income including government grants is used as a control 
as opposed to one excluding government grants (0.074 standard deviations) as well as when another self-reported measure of 
household income is used (0.113 standard deviations). 
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income including government grants and another self-reported household income); though 
not significantly different from zero. 
The effect of the Child Support Grant is an increase by 0.114; 0.272; and a decrease by 
0.491 standard deviations in weight-for-age for children aged below 15 years, 5 – 9 years, 
and 1 – 4 years respectively; which are all not significantly different from zero, as detailed in 
Table 5.15 in the appendix. Children aged below the age of 15 and living in formal urban 
areas who receive the Child Support Grant see an increase in weight-for-age by 0.849 
standard deviations than those who do not receive the grant; which is statistically different 
from zero at the 1 percent level. Applying a sensitivity analysis to the results by using 
household income including government grants as a control variable does not change the 
results (0.849, which is significant at 1 percent); and neither do they change for another 
measure of self-reported household income (0.845 standard deviations, significant at 1 
percent) as detailed in Table 5.20 and Table 5.21. The effect of the program for children aged 
5 – 9 years is an increase in weight-for-age by 1.281 standard deviations, which is significant 
at 1 percent33. However, the estimate for children aged 1 – 4 years is negative; though 
insignificant. None of the estimates is positive and significant for children living informal 
urban areas, in formal rural areas, and in tribal authority areas except for children aged 1 – 4 
years where the program impact is an increase in weight-for-age by 0.615 standard deviations, 
which is, however, not significant. Table 5.19 shows Difference-in-Differences estimation 
results of the impact of the Child Support Grant by gender. The effect of the program on girls 
is an increase in weight-for-age by 0.125 standard deviations; albeit not statistically different 
                                       
33 The coefficient seems to be large. However, this is not unusual in the case of South Africa. Duflo (2003) working on the 
impact of the Old Age Pension on children’s health outcomes discovered an impact of 1.2 standard deviations on height and 
weight; although her sample was limited to children under the age of 5 years.  
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from zero. On the other hand, the effect on boys is an increase in weight-for-age by 0.101 
standard deviations, which is also not significant.  
 
5.6.1.2 Results based on 2012 Means-Test Threshold 
With effect from 22 August 2008, the means-test threshold for ‘single income caregivers’ 
is to be calculated as 10 times the grant amount. For those in spousal relationship (double 
income caregivers), the means-test threshold is to be calculated so that half their combined 
income should be less than or equal to 10 times the grant amount. In 2012, the grant amount 
was pegged at R 280 per month per age-eligible child. This means that the cutoff threshold 
was R 2 800 for single income caregivers and R 5 600 for double income caregivers. 
Extending the identification strategy to 2012 means-test thresholds, there are families who 
were means-test ineligible before the change in policy but who now found themselves 
eligible for the grant in 2012.  
I designed a new treatment group comprised of children from households whose income 
is greater than R 2 800 and less than or equal to R 5 600 who received the grant34. My control 
group is comprised of children from households whose income is less than or equal to      
R 2 800 and greater than R 5 600 who did not receive the grant (both means-test eligible and 
ineligible).  Table 5.22 shows summaries of the program impact on height-for-age, and 
weight-for-age for results based on 2012 means-test threshold. Covariates used in these 
regressions are the same as those used in the regressions above: 2010 and 2012 year dummies, 
                                       
34 I dropped observations whose household income was between R 2 800 and R 5 600 who received the grant in 2008; this 
could be as a result of reporting error. 
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log of real income35 (real income is less of government grants), log of real expenditure on 
food, household size, father alive, household head’s education, race dummies, gender dummy, 
child’s age, health status, place of birth, and number of times a health professional was 
consulted in the year.  
Using the 2012 means-test threshold yields very similar results as when I used the 2008   
means-test threshold, although the coefficients are slightly larger. This is reassuring. The 
program effect for children below the age of 15 is an increase in height-for-age by 0.384 
standard deviations, which is significant at 5 percent36. The impact of the program for girls is 
an increase in height-for-age by 0.44 standard deviations (which compares very well with an 
estimate of 0.372 standard deviations in the results based on 2008 means-test threshold); 
which is also significant at 10 percent37. On the other hand, program impact for boys on 
height-for-age is an increase by 0.26 standard deviations; though not significant. The 
estimates of the impact of the program on height-for-age for children aged 10 – 14 years,    
5 – 9 years, and 1 – 4 years are all positive (0.237; 0.366; and 0.366 standard deviations, 
respectively) but not significant.  
The program is estimated to have a significant impact for children in the formal urban 
areas. The program effect for children living in formal urban areas who are aged below 15 
years is an increase in height-for-age by 0.658 standard deviations; and significant at 5 
percent. For children aged 10 – 14 years, the estimate is positive but not significant (0.039 
standard deviations). The effect of the Child Support Grant on children aged 5 – 9 years 
                                       
35 I subtracted government grants from household income. 
36 Controlling for household income including government grants and another self-reported measure of household income 
does not change the results (0.365 and 0.404 standard deviations, also significant at 5 percent) for height-for-age. In the 
urban areas the estimate is 0.635 standard deviations for both results which are also significant at 5 percent. The results are 
very similar and consistent as detailed in Tables 5.23 and 5.24 in appendix. 
37 When I control for another self-reported measure of household income, the estimate becomes significant at 5 percent. 
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living in formal urban areas is an increase in height-for-age by 1.033 standard deviations, 
which is significant at 5 percent. However, the estimate of the impact of the program on 
height-for-age for children aged 1 – 4 years and living in formal urban areas is negative and 
not significant. In the tribal authority areas, the program had a positive impact on height-for-
age for all age sub-groups as detailed in Table 5.22 (0.369; 0.381; 0.122; and 1.339 standard 
deviation for children aged below 15 years; 10 – 14 years; 5 – 9 years and 1 – 4 years 
respectively). The program effect is an increase in height-for-age by 1.339 standard 
deviations for children aged 1 – 4 years living in tribal authority areas, which is weakly 
significant. The estimates of the impact of the program on height-for-age for children living 
in informal urban areas and formal rural areas are negative and not significant.  
On another hand, the program impact on weight-for-age is positive but not significant 
(0.22; 0.159; 0.271; and 0.353 for children aged below 15 years; girls; boys; and children 
aged 5 – 9 years, respectively). The estimate for children aged 1 – 4 years is negative and 
insignificant. The program is also estimated to have a significant impact on weight-for-age 
for children in the formal urban areas; an increase in weight-for-age by 0.674 standard 
deviations for children aged below 15 years, which is significant at 5 percent. The effect of 
the Child Support Grant on children aged 5 – 9 years living in formal urban areas is an 
increase in weight-for-age by 1.278 standard deviations, which is significant at 1 percent. The 
estimate of the impact of the program on weight-for-age for children aged 1 – 4 years and 
living in formal urban areas is negative, however, not significantly different from zero. In the 
tribal authority areas, the program had a positive, albeit not significant, impact on weight-for-
age for children aged below 15 years and for children aged 1 – 4 years (0.085 and 1.19 
standard deviations, respectively); weakly significant for children aged 1 – 4 years when I 
control for household income including grants and another self-reported income. 
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5.6.1.3 Robustness Check 
To check internal validity of results and put the identification strategy to test, I designed 
another control group which is different for the results presented in the last section. In the last 
section, the results are based on a control group comprising of children who did not receive 
the grant (both from means-test eligible and ineligible households). In this section, the control 
group comprises of children who received the grant and those who did not receive the grant 
(from means-test eligible and ineligible households). This also has the advantage of 
increasing the number of observations remarkably. Like in the last section, treatment group 
comprises of children from households whose income fell between R 2 200 and R 4 400 (was 
greater than R 2 200 and less than or equal to R 4 400); to comply with my identification 
strategy. 
Covariates used in these regressions are the same as those in the previous section. I 
controlled for 2010 and 2012 year dummies. Real income does not include government 
grants38. The general expectation is that children from bigger households will have lower 
health outcomes especially in developing countries; so I controlled for this. Other covariates 
are log of real expenditure on food, geographical classification, whether father is alive or not, 
household head’s education, population group, child’s age, gender dummy, health status, 
place of birth, health check-up status39. Table 5.25 shows summaries of results of the impact 
of the Child Support Grant on height-for-age and weight-for-age. The results compare very 
well with those presented in the previous section and they are consistent in almost all the sub-
                                       
38 I also ran separate regressions in which I controlled for total household income including government grants as well as 
another set of regressions in which I controlled for a third self-reported measure of household income; and the summaries of 
the results are detailed in Tables 5.26 and 5.27. 
39 Health status is dummy with base = ‘excellent’. As in the previous section, ‘very good’ was re-classified to ‘good’ and all 
the other lower classification to ‘fair’. Place of birth is binary with base = ‘hospital’. Health check-up refers to number of 
times a health professional was visited in the past 12 months; and the base = ‘never’. 
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groups although they are slightly lower. The slight differences are negligible. The program 
effect for children below the age of 15 is an increase in height-for-age by 0.215 standard 
deviations; which is also significant at 10 percent40; and an increase in weight-for-age by 
0.086 standard deviations, which is not significant. Breaking the sample by gender does not 
change the results with a program effect of an increase in height-for-age by 0.231 standard 
deviations for girls and 0.168 standard deviations for boys. 
These results also show that the program had a significant impact on health outcomes for 
children living in urban areas. In particular, the program impact for children aged below 15 
years and living in urban areas is an increase in height-for-age by 0.373 standard deviations. 
Although it is significant, it is weakly significant and much lower compared to the results 
using a control group comprised of children who did not receive the grant only. However, 
using log of real income that includes government grants as a control variable as opposed to 
one that does not, improves the significance of the results to significantly different form zero 
at the 5 percent level with a coefficient of 0.387 standard deviations41. On the other hand, the 
program increased weight-for-age by 0.573 standard deviations for children receiving the 
grant, which is significant at 5 percent. Furthermore, the program impact for children    
aged 5 – 9 years living in urban areas is an increase in height-for-age by 0.689 standard 
deviations, which is significant at 5 percent; and an increase in weight-for-age by 0.77 
standard deviations, which is also significant at 1 percent just like in the results presented in 
the previous section. 
                                       
40 However, when I use log of real income (which includes government grants) the program effect becomes significant at 5 
percent with a coefficient of 0.239 standard deviations. When I use the third measure of self-reported household income in 
the data, the program effect also becomes significant at 5 percent with a coefficient of 0.244 standard deviations. The 
estimate for the impact on height-for-age for children living in formal urban areas also becomes significant at 5 percent; as 
detailed in Table 5.26 and Table 5.27 in appendix. 
41 The third measure of self-reported household income yields an impact estimate of 0.389 standard deviations, which is 
significant at 5 percent. 
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I also ran regressions based on 2012 means-test threshold using a control group of 
children both who received the grant and those who did not; who are from households whose 
incomes are less than or equal to R 2 800 and greater than R 5 600 (i.e. both means-test 
eligible and ineligible). The results are not very different from the ones presented in the 
previous section. Generally, the estimates are slightly lower but the differences are not 
alarming. Table 5.28 presents summaries of results of the impact of the program on height-
for-age and weight-for-age. The effect of the program is an increase in height-for-age by 
0.308 standard deviations for children below the age of 15 years, which is significant at 5 
percent42. The program impact is also positive (0.341 standard deviations) for girls and 
significant at 10 percent.  
The coefficients of the impact of the program on weight-for-age for the full sample are 
all positive but not significant for all the age sub-groups except for children aged 1 – 4 years 
(which is negative but also not significant) and they compare very well with the once 
presented in the previous section. The effect of the Child Support Grant is an increase in 
height-for-age by 0.431 standard deviations for children aged below 15 years living in formal 
urban areas and 0.74 standard deviations for children aged 10 – 14 years. However, the 
estimates are weakly significant compared to the ones in Table 5.22. For weight-for-age, the 
estimate loses significance completely. The program effect is an increase in height-for-age by 
0.844 standard deviations for children aged 5 – 9 years living in formal urban areas; and an 
increase in weight-for-age by 0.719 standard deviations. They are both significant at 5 
percent. 
                                       
42 The results do not change when I control for total household income including government grants and when I used 
another measure of self-reported household income (0.322 standard deviations; also significant at 5 percent); see Tables 5.29 
and 5.30. 
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5.6.2 Panel Fixed Effects Results 
Table 5.31 shows Fixed Effects estimation results of the impact of the Child Support 
Grant on height-for-age. I further disaggregated the sample to smaller age groups of 10 – 14 
years, 5 – 9 years, and 1 – 4 years old. This classification is important. Generally, nutritional 
deficiencies experienced at an early stage of life tend to have a long-term impact on a child’s 
z-score. Column (1) shows results on height-for-age for children below the age of 15; column 
(2), for children aged 10 – 14 years; column (3), for children aged 5 – 9 years; and column 
(4), for children aged 1 – 4 years. It is estimated that the program effect is an increase in 
height-for-age by 0.118 standard deviations, which is significant at 5 percent. This result 
supports hypothesis 5.1 in section 5.3, which says that the Child Support Grant has a 
significant impact on height-for-age for children in South Africa. Children who have had 
more than twice medical consultation with a health professional in the year have 0.135 
standard deviations below the mean height-for-age compared to those who never consulted; 
which is also significant at 1 percent. Children from bigger households have 0.023 standard 
deviations below the mean weight-for-age; which is statistically different from zero at the 5 
percent level.  
A child who receives the Child Support Grant and aged 10 – 14 years sees an 
increase in height-for-age by 0.294 standard deviations, which is significant at 5 percent. 
Estimations for children aged 5 – 9 years do not yield a significant result although it is 
positive (0.129 standard deviations); neither do results for children aged 1 – 4 years (0.159 
standard deviations). 
Limiting the sample according to whether children are from formal urban areas, 
informal urban areas, formal rural areas and tribal authority areas is important and insightful. 
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Assuming that children (or households) do not move from one category to another between 
waves (which is a reasonable assumption given a 2 year difference between each wave), then 
Panel Fixed Effects is suited to address this by treating them as fixed effects and difference 
them away. No wonder why they are not included as covariates in regression results 
presented in Tables 5.31 to 5.41. Variables such as population group (black, white, coloured 
and Indian), household characteristics (such as dwelling conditions, water source, and toilet 
type), and gender as well as age were left out for similar reasons. However, it is generally 
known that rural areas differ greatly from urban areas in terms of access to health facilities, 
livelihoods (and presumably take-up rates). All this should not be a problem because I 
employed Panel Fixed Effects. All the same, I provided results of the effect of the Child 
Support Grant on health outcomes after limiting my sample according to the four geo-
classifications; results of which are presented in Tables 5.32 to 5.35. 
The effect of the program is an increase in height-for-age by 0.084 standard 
deviations for children below the age of 15 years living in urban formal areas, which is, 
however, not significant. A child aged between 10 and 14 years who lives in the formal urban 
areas and receives the Child Support Grant has a 0.298 standard deviation above the mean 
height-for-age than one who does not; which is significant at 5 percent. The estimates for 
children aged 5 – 9 years and 1 – 4 years are both positive but not significant; 0.135 and 
0.128 standard deviations, respectively. For children living in informal urban areas, the 
program impact is an increase in height-for-age by 0.089 and 0.174 standard deviations for 
those aged below 15 years and 10 – 14 years, respectively; both not statistically different 
from zero. The estimates for children aged 5 – 9 years and 1 – 4 years are also insignificant.  
None of the estimates for children living in formal rural areas are significant. This 
might be an indication that although supply side considerations are reasonably assumed to 
108 
 
fixed overtime, they might still have an overbearing effect for children living in the rural 
areas. Table 5.34 shows results of the impact of the Child Support Grant on height-for-age for 
children living in rural formal areas. For children living in tribal authority areas, the effect of 
the program on height-for-age is positive. Children aged below 15 years living in tribal 
authority areas see an increase in height-for-age by 0.155 standard deviations, which is 
significant at 10 percent. The effect of the program is an increase by 0.375; 0.341; and 0.282 
standard deviations in height-for-age for children aged 10 – 14 years; 5 – 9 years; and 1 – 4 
years living in tribal authority areas. The estimate for children aged 5 – 9 years is significant 
at 10 percent. These results are detailed in Table 5.35 in the appendix. 
On the other hand, the impact of the Child Support Grant on weight-for-age is also 
positive in all the age subgroups as detailed in Table 5.36. The effect of the program is an 
increase in weight-for-age by 0.05; 0.102; and 0.256 standard deviations for children aged 
below 15 years; 5 – 9 years; and 1 – 4 years, respectively. However, none of the estimates is 
significant. The program is estimated to increase weight-for-age by 0.416 standard deviations 
for children aged 1 – 4 years and living in urban formal areas, which is weakly significant. 
The estimates for children aged below 15 years and 5 – 9 years are insignificant. These 
results are detailed in Table 5.37. All the estimates for children aged below 15 years; 5 – 9 
years; and 1 – 4 years living in formal rural areas are negative and insignificant except for 
children aged below 15 years, which is significant at 5 percent. 
Table 3.40 shows Fixed Effects estimation results of the impact of the Child Support 
Grant on weight-for-age for children living tribal authority areas. The effect of the program is 
an increase by 0.09; 0.151; and 0.032 standard deviations in weight-for-age for children aged 
below 15 years; 5 – 9 years; and 1 – 4 years living in tribal authority areas, respectively. 
However, all the estimates are statistically not different from zero. Further disaggregating the 
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sample according to gender shows that the variable of interest, the Child Support Grant, is not 
statistically different from zero for all the outcome variables for female children and male 
children; though positive. Table 5.41 shows Fixed Effects estimation results of the impact of 
the Child Support Grant on height-for-age and weight-for-age for girls and boys. The effect 
of the program is an increase by 0.122 and 0.112 standard deviations in height-for-age for 
girls and boys respectively; and an increase by 0.023 and 0.067 standard deviations in 
weight-for-age for girls and boys respectively. 
 
5.6.3 Results on the effect of the program on obesity, overweight and underweight 
Having considered the impact of the Child Support Grant on height-for-age and 
weight-for-age, the next natural question is to ask whether the program does not increase the 
chances of obesity among children in South Africa. South Africa is a country with a complex 
mix of under- and over-nutrition. Many countries are grappling with the challenge of obesity 
in the world. This is particularly so in South Africa given that 70 percent of adult females and 
40 percent of adult males in South Africa are obese. The problem is also prevalent among 
children; with 25 percent of girls and 20 percent of boys in South Africa being obese (ibid). 
Obesity exposes children to the risks of suffering from diabetes and heart diseases. Is the 
Child Support Grant contributing to the problem of obesity in South Africa?  
To answer this question, I estimated the effect of the Child Support Grant on obesity 
for children aged 5 – 14 years. My outcome variable is binary, which equals one when a child 
has a body mass index z-score43 greater than 2. Table 5.42 in the appendix shows a summary 
                                       
43 According to the World Health Organization (WHO) 2007 growth reference, a child aged between 5 – 19 years is obese 
if his or her Body Mass Index z-score is greater than 2 standard deviations. Children with a body mass index z-score < -2 
are classified as being thin and those with a z-score between +1 and +2 standard deviations as overweight. 
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of estimation results of the Child Support Grant on obesity for children aged 5 – 14 years. 
Column (1) shows Fixed Effects results and Column (3) shows Difference-in-Differences 
results44. A child aged 5 – 14 years who receives the Child Support Grant has 0.02 lower 
chance of being obese than one who does not; based on the Fixed Effects results. Using the 
Difference-in-Differences estimation method, a child aged 5 – 14 years who receives the 
grant has a 0.013 lower chance of being obese. However, both estimates are not statistically 
different from zero. The most important conclusion from these results is that the Child 
Support Grant does not seem to contribute to the problem of obesity among children in South 
Africa. This result supports hypothesis 5.3 in section 5.3, which says that the Child Support 
Grant does not increase the chances of obesity among children in South Africa. This is a very 
important conclusion considering that obesity is a serious challenge in South Africa where 70 
percent of all adult females and 40 percent of all adult males are obese; and where 25 percent 
of all girls and 20 percent of all boys are obese. The Child Support Grant does not increase 
the chances of obesity among children in South Africa. 
I further estimated the effect of the Child Support Grant on overweight, normal 
weight, and underweight (thinness) and the results are detailed in Tables 5.43 and 5.44 in the 
appendix. In the case of underweight (thinness), my dependent variable is equal to 1 if a 
child’s body mass index z-score is less than -2. The results on underweight are detailed in 
Table 4.43. Column (1) shows results based on Panel fixed Effects and Column (3) shows 
results based on Differences-in-Differences estimations. The Child Support Grant reduces the 
                                       
44 Covariates used in Panel Fixed Effects estimations are: 2010 and 2012 year dummies, log of real income, log of real 
expenditure on food, household size, father alive (which is binary), heath status; self-reported and binary with base = 
‘excellent’, health check-up; number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months and the base = ‘never’. 
Covariates used in Differences-in-Differences estimations are: 2010 and 2012 year dummies, log of real income (less 
government grants), log of real expenditure on food, household size, father alive, household head’s education, race dummies, 
gender dummy, child’s age, and health check-up status. 
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chance of being underweight for children living South Africa. A child who receives the grant 
has a lower chance of being underweight than one who does not received. 
For overweight, my dependent variable is equal to 1 if a child’s body mass index is 
between 1 and 2. A child who receives the Child Support Grant has 0.011 and 0.041 lower 
chance of being overweight under the two methods respectively than one who does not 
receive the grant. These results are shown in Table 5.44. For normal weight my dependent 
variable is binary which equals 1 if a child’s body mass index z-score is between -2 and 1. 
Using Panel Fixed Effects, a child who receives the Child Support Grant has a 0.042 higher 
chance of having normal weight than one who does not, which is significant at 5 percent. On 
the hand, under Difference-in-Differences is 0.077, which is also significant at 5 percent. 
Children who receive the Child Support Grant have a higher chance of having normal weight 
and a lower chance of being over- and under-weight and importantly too the Child Support 
Grant does not increase the chances of being obese for children living in South Africa. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
Reconciling Difference-in-Differences results with Panel Fixed Effects results is 
important. The two methods were used in this chapter not to compete but to facilitate a 
thorough investigation and assessment of the impact of the Child Support Grant on health. 
The fact that Panel Fixed Effects results show relatively smaller coefficients might be an 
indication that indeed there were fixed characteristics that I was able to wish away. The 
consistence of the results under two different methodologies for most of the population sub-
groups and age cohorts is reassuring. The results estimate a positive and significant impact on 
height-for-age for children below the age of 15 years (full sample) in Panel Fixed Effects 
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results and in all the different Difference-in-Differences scenarios used in this chapter. The 
impact on girls, although weakly significant under the Difference-in-Differences 
methodology, becomes insignificant under the Panel Fixed Effects methodology. The impact 
of the program for children aged 10 – 14 years (full sample) is strongly significant under the 
Panel Fixed Effects method. 
The estimations of the impact of the program on weight-for-age for children aged 
below 15 years (full sample), girls, boys, and aged 5 – 9 years are all positive in Panel Fixed 
Effects results and in all Difference-in-Differences scenarios. The results estimate a positive 
impact on height-for-age for children aged below 15 years, aged 10 – 14 years, 5 – 9 years, 
and 1 – 4 years living in tribal authority areas; picking weak significance under Panel Fixed 
Effects for the full sample and for children aged 5 – 9 years. The impact on weight-for-age is 
also positive but insignificant for full sample living in tribal authority areas and for children 
aged 1 – 4 years (based on 2012 means-test threshold results and Panel Fixed Effects). The 
results estimate positive impact on height-for-age for children living in urban areas with 
Difference-in-Differences predicting results significant for the full sample and for children 
aged 5 – 9 years and Panel Fixed Effects results predicting significant results for children 
aged 10 – 14 years. In general, the Difference-in-Differences results show weakly significant 
and positive impact of the program on height-for-age to children aged 1 – 4 years in almost 
all the regressions. 
The Child Support Grant has had an important impact on children’s health. It has had 
a significant impact on height-for-age for children below the age of 15 years. It has also had a 
positive impact on weight-for-age in almost all the different age cohorts and population 
subgroups. The program has had a significant impact on the health of children living in 
formal urban areas. The Difference-in-Differences estimates of the impact of the program on 
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height-for-age z-scores for children aged below 15 years and aged 5 – 9 years are significant 
at 5 percent; and the program effect on weight-for-age is strongly significant. By extension, it 
can be concluded that the change in policy governing means-test eligibility criteria for those 
in spousal relationship (double income caregivers) had a significant impact on formal urban 
households and children. 
It is always important to get a deeper understanding of the impact of social protection 
programs to children in their early years of life. Of particular importance is an understanding 
of the impact of the Child Support Grant on the health of children aged 1 – 4 years. 
Nutritional deficiencies experienced in a child’s early years have long-term implications. 
Although most of the estimates of the program impact on height-for-age and weight-for-age 
for children aged 1 – 4 years are positive and in some cases weakly significant, they are not 
strongly significant. One possible explanation for this is a cascading effect from the low 
uptake of the Child Support Grant by caregivers for children below the age of 1 year. The 
uptake of the Child Support Grant is lowest among children below the age of 1 year. 
Relatedly, rural areas in South Africa still face challenges such as post-natal feeding support, 
social determinants of health such as low educational levels, poor housing and sanitation, 
insufficient health surveillance and information systems as well as a shortage of healthcare 
service providers. Supply-side factors still have an overbearing effect for children living in 
rural areas.  
In general, however, the Child Support Grant has had a significant impact on height-
for-age. One of the most important pieces of evidence in this chapter is the conclusion that 
the Child Support Grant reduces the chances of both thinness and obesity among children; an 
important conclusion given that South Africa is a society with a complex mix of under- and 
over-weight.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
There is so much interest in gaining a better understanding of programs that are 
capable of breaking intergenerational poverty among the poor and cash transfer programs, 
particularly those that pay particular attention to child poverty and human capital 
development are widely regarded as a development tool capable of achieving this objective. 
Cash transfers can be conditional or unconditional. Conditional cash transfer programs are 
prominent in many Latin American countries and quite a number of researchers have worked 
on analyzing the impact of these transfers on educational and health outcomes. Although 
much of the experience on the impact of cash transfers is from Latin American experiences, 
there is a renewed interest in understanding cash transfer programs in Africa with many 
programs in pilot stages. 
The Child Support Grant in South Africa presents an interesting case study to better 
understand the impact of cash transfers on education and health for children living in Africa 
in general and on unconditional cash transfers in particular owing to the fact that the program 
has been largely unconditional for the greater part of its life. It is arguably the largest cash 
transfer program for children in Africa in terms of coverage; reaching to over 11 million 
children in a country with 18.6 million children. The program accounts for 40 percent of 
reported incomes in poor households and gives an eligible child R 320 per month (US$80 at 
PPP) and up to six age-eligible children per caregiver in a country where the poverty datum 
line is put at R 515 per month per person and where 50 percent of the population lives below 
the poverty line; this goes to show how important the Child Support Grant is in terms of 
fighting poverty. 
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There is some prior work on the impact of the Child Support Grant on education and 
health outcomes for children. In particular, however, there are few rigorous empirical studies 
that assess the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged 
children. Given the challenge South Africa is experiencing as far as secondary school 
education is concerned where drop-out rates are very high in secondary school reaching 
almost 50 percent by the time children sit for their matric examination which is taken in grade 
12 (coupled with poor pass rates), this study bridges this gap by providing evidence to answer 
the question as to whether the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the enrolment 
of secondary-school-aged children. 
The study also looked at the impact of the Child Support Grant on the health of 
children living in South Africa. When discussing child poverty and human capital 
development, it is important to talk about education but is equally important to talk about 
health too, for the obvious reasons (from the literature) that a healthier child is more like to 
do well in school; and a healthier child is more likely to be a healthier adult and contribute to 
the development of a country. The findings from this analysis provide evidence to answer a 
question as to whether the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on the health of 
children living in South Africa. South Africa is a country with a complex mix of under- and 
over-nutrition. Although there is prior work on children’s health outcomes in South Africa, 
none that I know of paid particular attention to find out whether the Child Support Grant 
contributes to the problem of obesity among children living in South Africa. This study fills 
this gap by providing evidence to a question that answers whether the Child Support Grant 
contributes to the problem of obesity among children. This is important, particularly so given 
that in South Africa about 70 percent of all female adults and 40 percent of all male adults are 
obese; and 25 percent of all girls and 20 percent of all boys in South Africa are obese. 
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Gaining a deeper understanding of whether the Child Support Grant increases the chances of 
obesity among children is therefore important because if so, then the program would expose 
children to serious health problems such as diabetes and heart diseases. 
In assessing the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of secondary-
school-aged children I used the South African General Household Survey (GHS) data from 
2007 to 2012; and Wave 2 and Wave 3 of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), 
which is the first nationally representative panel data in South Africa that came into being 
through a Presidential Decree. On the other hand, in assessing the impact of the Child 
Support Grant on children’s health outcomes I used Wave 1, Wave 2, and Wave 3 of the 
National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS). This study, therefore, assesses the impact of the 
Child Support Grant on human capital development: particularly on education and health for 
children living in South Africa. This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 6.1 summarizes the 
related literature on cash transfers in general and on the Child Support Grant in particular, 
and the empirical findings from the investigation of the impact of the Child Support Grant on 
the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children as well as empirical findings from the 
investigation of the impact of the Child Support Grant on children’s health outcomes in South 
Africa; drawing from these findings, Section 6.2 concludes the chapter with policy 
implications. 
 
6.1 Summary of findings 
The Child Support Grant is an important source of income for poor families living in 
South Africa. In recent years, the age eligibility criterion has been adjusted to include 
virtually all children under the age of eighteen years. It has been undergoing a marked 
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transformation and transition over the years; both in terms of age eligibility and grant 
amounts as detailed in Chapter 2. The review of the literature in Chapter 3 reveals that much 
of the work on the impact of cash transfers on education and health is based on Latin 
American experiences. By and large, these experiences are on Conditional Cash Transfers. 
Chapter 3 extensively reviewed the literature on conditional versus unconditional cash 
transfers and several arguments are advanced for and against conditions. This dissertation 
contributes to the limited literature on cash transfers in Africa in general, and add a better 
understanding of the impact of unconditional cash transfers in particular; owing to the fact 
that the Child Support Grant has largely been unconditional for its entire life although there is 
so much debate and attempts to make it conditional on health and education. There is 
renewed interest in understanding the impact of unconditional cash transfers in Africa with a 
lot of programs in their pilot stages in East and Southern Africa (Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe). Now, more than ever before, it is timely to gain a better understanding of the 
impact of cash transfers on human capital development in the context of African experiences 
to better inform policy-makers in this region. 
Chapter 3 also looks at the existing literature on the Child Support Grant in general 
and linking the literature on the impact of the Child Support Grant on education and health in 
particular. Although prior work on the impact of the Child Support Grant on education shows 
significant impact on enrolment, none of this work paid particular attention to secondary-
school-aged children. Most of this work looks at primary-school-aged children and this 
Dissertation fills this gap in literature by paying particular attention to secondary-school-aged 
children. Earlier work on the impact of cash transfers on children’s health outcomes in South 
Africa is on the impact of the Old Age Pension on children’s health outcomes; where positive 
impacts are registered. In a few cases where earlier work on children’s health outcomes 
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focused on the Child Support Grant, this research expanded on that by bringing in a 
nationally representative and longitudinal data as opposed to data from one province in some 
cases and cross sectional data in other cases as well as expanding the analysis to children 
under the age of 15 grouping them into different age cohorts to further interrogate the subject. 
In addressing the gaps identified in the literature, I presented my own empirical 
findings in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 provided an impact evaluation of the Child Support 
Grant on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children in South Africa. South Africa has 
a serious challenge as far as secondary school education is concerned; with high drop-out 
rates reaching as high as 50 percent by the time children sit for their matric examination taken 
in grade 12. The finding from the three empirical methods employed; namely: Difference-in-
Differences framework; Instrumental Variables Method; and Panel Fixed Effects Estimations 
shows that the Child Support Grant has a positive and significant (significant at 1 percent in 
all the three empirical methods used) impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged 
children. This is a very important conclusion given the challenges that South Africa is 
experiencing as far as secondary school education is concerned; here is a program which has 
a significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children.  
The Child Support Grant has a positive and significant (significant at 1 percent under 
the Instrumental Variables method and Panel Fixed Effects; and at 5 percent under the 
Difference-in-Differences framework) impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged 
boys. This is a very important conclusion too, considering that drop-out rates for boys are 
much higher than those of girls for all grades in secondary school. It is an important 
conclusion too considering that the opportunity cost of attending school from labor activities 
used to be higher for boys than that of girls. 
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The program has a positive and significant (significant at 1 percent) impact on the 
enrolment of secondary-school-aged children living in formal urban areas; and a positive but 
not significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children living in urban 
informal areas and in Tribal Authority Areas. The Child Support Grant has no impact on the 
enrolment of secondary-school-aged children living in formal rural areas. This is an 
important observation. Rural areas are characteristic of inadequate physical conditions which 
might have an overbearing effect on the enrolment of secondary school aged children and are 
therefore important for policy consideration. 
Given the challenges South Africa is experiencing as far as secondary school 
education is concerned with high drop-out rates, here is a program that has a significant 
impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children. The Child Support Grant has a 
significant impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children particularly for boys; 
and it is also comparatively cost-effective when compared to other programs in the region. 
The cost-effectiveness analysis shows that the Child Support Grant is able to buy 0.03 years 
of additional schooling for every US$100 spend. This is comparable and slightly higher when 
compared to 0.02 additional years of schooling achieved by an unconditional cash transfer in 
Malawi. Scale, among other factors, is important; the Child Support Grant is reaching to over 
11 million children whereas programs in Malawi are reaching to a few thousand beneficiaries. 
However, the cost effectiveness estimate of 0.03 additional years of schooling for every 
US$100 spend achieved by the Child Support Grant is lower than an estimate of 0.09 
achieved by a conditional cash transfer in Malawi suggesting that there is room for the Child 
Support Grant to be more cost effective if conditionalities are fully introduced and enforced. 
Chapter 5 provided an impact evaluation of the Child Support Grant on the health of 
children living in South Africa. It answers whether the Child Support Grant has a significant 
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impact on height-for-age and weight-for-age of children living in South Africa; and whether 
the Child Support Grant contributes to the problem of obesity among children that is so 
prevalent in South Africa. The findings show that the Child Support Grant has a positive and 
significant impact on height-for-age for children below the age of 15 years living in South 
Africa. The program has a positive and significant impact on height-for-age for children 
living in formal urban areas. On the other hand, the program has a positive impact on weight-
for-age for children living in South Africa. The program has a positive impact on weight-for-
age for children living in formal urban areas. However, the program does not have an impact 
on height-for-age and weight-for-age for children living formal rural areas. Rural areas in 
South Africa still face challenges such as post-natal feeding support, social determinants of 
health such as low educational levels, poor housing and sanitation, insufficient health 
surveillance and information systems as well as a shortage of healthcare service providers. 
Chapter 5 also paid special attention to children in their early years of life (aged 1 – 4 
years) for the obvious reason that nutritional deficiencies experienced at this stage in life are 
very difficult to reverse and have a long-term effect on a child’s well-being. Although the 
program impact estimates on height-for-age and weight-for-age for this age group are 
positive; and in some cases weakly significant, they are, however, not strongly significant. 
This might be as a result of a cascading effect from a low uptake of the Child Support Grant 
by caregivers for children below the age of 1 year. The uptake of the Child Support Grant is 
lowest among children below the age of 1 year. 
I also looked at whether the Child Support Grant contributes to the problem of 
obesity among children. Obesity is a serious problem the world over and exposes children to 
serious problems of diabetes and heart diseases. This is particularly so in South Africa, where 
70 percent of all adult females and 40 percent of all adult males are obese; and where 25 
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percent of all girls and 20 percent of all boys are obese. South Africa is a country with a 
complex mix of under- and over-nutrition. The finding from this empirical investigation 
shows that the Child Support Grant does not increase the chances of obesity among children 
in South Africa. This is a very important conclusion. In conclusion in Chapter 5, overall, the 
Child Support Grant has a significant impact on children’s health outcomes in South Africa 
and does not contribute to the problem of obesity that is so prevalent in South Africa. 
In conclusion, given the challenges that South Africa is experiencing as far as 
secondary school education is concerned, the Child Support Grant has a significant impact on 
the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children. In terms of breaking intergenerational 
poverty through human capital development, indeed the Child Support Grant has a significant 
impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children and a significant impact on the 
health of children living in South Africa; and does not contribute to the problem of obesity 
among children. 
 
6.2 Policy Implications 
The investigation of the impact of the Child Support Grant on the enrolment of 
secondary-school-aged children; and on height-for-age and weight-for-age for children living 
in South Africa reveals important policy implications. The Child Support Grant does not have 
an impact on the enrolment of secondary-school-aged children living in formal rural areas. 
Rural areas are characteristic of inadequate physical conditions in schools, poor accessibility 
and comparatively weak learner performance. Critically too, the Child Support Grant does 
not have an impact on height-for-age and weight-for-age for children living in formal rural 
areas. Rural areas in South Africa still face challenges such as post-natal feeding support, 
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social determinants of health such as low educational levels, poor housing and sanitation, 
insufficient health surveillance and information systems as well as a shortage of healthcare 
service providers. Supply-side factors still have an overbearing effect for children living in 
rural areas. This finding has important policy implications. It is of paramount importance for 
policy makers to pay particular attention to children living in rural areas. 
It cannot be overemphasized that nutritional deficiencies experienced in the early 
years of a child’s life are difficult to reverse and have a long-term effect on a child’s well-
being. It is of particular importance to note that, although the program impact on height-for-
age and weight-for-age for children aged 1 – 4 years are positive, and in some cases weakly 
significant, it is not strongly significant. This is a critical age group. Health outcomes for this 
age group are very important. A special attention to this age group is warranted if the 
objective of breaking intergenerational poverty is to be achieved. Healthier children are more 
likely to do well in school; and healthier children are more likely to be healthier adults and be 
able to contribute to the development of a country. At policy level, it is therefore important to 
pay special attention to children living in rural areas and children aged 1 – 4 years and to 
further encourage the uptake of the Child Support Grant among children below the age of 1 
year (making documentation easier to get) so that the human capital development for these 
groups of children is also enhanced just like other groups of children in South Africa.  
The investigation also revealed that there is room to improve the cost-effectiveness 
of the Child Support Grant by implementing and enforcing conditionalities, for example. 
When compared to conditional programs in the region the program is less cost-effective but 
when compared to unconditional programs it is slightly cost-effective. The Child Support 
Grant remains an interesting case study and potential areas of further research include an 
empirical investigation of the impact of the Child Support Grant on poverty outcomes. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 2.1: Beneficiaries, Eligibility and Grant Amount over years 
                
                
       Child Support Grant    Care Dependency  Foster Grant 
Year Beneficiaries Age threshold Nominal  Beneficiaries Nominal  Beneficiaries Nominal 
      grant value   
grant 
value   
grant 
value 
1999 21,997 < 7 years R 100 16,835 R 520 46,496 R 374 
2000 150,366 < 7 years R 100 22,789 R 540 49,843 R 390 
2001 856,402 < 7 years R 110 33,574 R 570 66,967 R 410 
2002 1,277,396 < 7 years R 140 34,978 R 640 67,817 R 460 
2003 3,947,073 < 9 years R 160 42,355 R 700 83,574 R 500 
2004 4,446,230 < 11 years R 170 76,494 R 740 120,571 R 530 
2005 5,465,545 < 14 years R 180 86,917 R 780 195,454 R 560 
2006 7,075,266 < 14 years R 190 90,112 R 820 317,434 R 590 
2007 7,892,869 < 14 years R 200 98,631 R 870 400,503 R 620 
2008 8,189,975 < 14 years R 220 102,292 R 960 454,199 R 650 
2009 8,765,354 < 15 years R 240 107,065 R 1010 474,759 R 680 
2010 9,570,287 < 16 years R 250 110,731 R 1080 510,760 R 710 
2011 10,336,000 < 17 years R 260 121,000 R 1080 554,000 R 710 
2012 10,977,000 < 18 years R 280 128,000 R 1140 613,000 R 740 
Notes: R stands for South African Rand; R 100 is approximately equivalent to US $12.50 using average 
foreign exchange rate for 2012.  
Source: South African Human Rights Commission/UNICEF (2011). 
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Table 2.2: Number of Children receiving the Child Support Grant in South Africa by province, 1999 – 2009 
   
             Number of Beneficiaries         
Province 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Eastern Cape 4,131 26,342 122,214 187,256 630,157 747,838 1,032,201 1,379,325 1,482,450 1,481,128 1,575,528 
Free State 1,183 7,195 54,140 83,379 226,497 249,439 328,350 405,321 436,192 454,150 473,141 
Gauteng 2,721 24,762 114,125 156,639 496,867 558,358 696,991 843,745 912,920 959,139 1,031,785 
KwaZulu-Natal 5,778 27,982 203,948 291,329 945,417 1,085,447 1,287,851 1,651,827 1,942,365 2,102,775 2,297,520 
Limpopo 1,674 21,847 135,473 204,461 684,675 740,937 955,630 1,175,221 1,249,443 1,274,823 1,364,184 
Mpumalanga 539 14,780 75,179 100,465 329,096 371,463 468,987 598,787 641,068 657,534 696,614 
North West 1,206 14,375 81,215 120,929 312,468 351,867 457,953 581,014 648,558 631,499 666,259 
Northern Cape 2,052 6,646 17,482 25,937 67,818 71,703 94,830 116,887 128,658 182,225 202,630 
Western Cape 2,713 6,437 52,626 107,001 254,078 269,178 344,327 418,437 451,215 474,385 525,014 
South Africa 21,997 150,366 856,402 1,277,396 3,947,073 4,446,230 5,667,120 7,170,564 7,892,869 8,217,658 8,832,675 
Notes: These figures are taken from end of April for each year and are compiled from South African Social Security (SASSA) SOPEN monthly reports.  
Source: Children’s Institute, University of Cape Town. 
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Table 2.3: Number of Beneficiaries of the Child Support Grant by age and province as at 30 June 2011 
   
                      
Age EC FS GAU KZN LIM MPU NW NC WC Total 
(0-1 yrs) 74 455 30 236 66 160 113 815 73 040 37 870 28 969 11 708 35 164 471 417 
(1-2 yrs) 99 812 39 511 92 978 156 402 95 599 57 607 45 572 16 622 52 055 656 158 
(2-3 yrs) 108 824 41 170 98 238 168 819 99 788 62 838 51 131 17 886 58 215 706 909 
(3-4 yrs) 119 287 43 414 100 194 181 963 104 137 66 804 54 203 17 933 58 527 746 462 
(4-5 yrs) 119 881 41 994 96 833 180 604 100 542 65 476 54 576 17 387 56 106 733 399 
(5-6 yrs) 123 790 41 794 96 986 187 620 99 603 66 617 53 979 17 332 54 931 742 652 
(6-7 yrs) 119 996 41 303 93 689 177 739 94 276 65 991 53 580 16 848 51 396 714 818 
Total 0-7 766 045 279 422 645 078 1 166 962 666 985 423 203 342 010 115 716 366 394 4 771 815 
(7-8 yrs) 112 890 38 618 89 497 166 128 84 294 61 731 50 470 16 253 48 355 668 236 
(8-9 yrs) 103 266 34 828 81 714 155 893 77 518 56 869 46 246 15 509 44 852 616 695 
Total 7-9 216 156 73 446 171 211 322 021 161 812 118 600 96 716 31 762 93 207 1 284 931 
Notes: EC = Eastern Cape Province, FS = Free State, GP = Gauteng Province, KZN = KwaZulu Natal, LP = Limpopo Province, MP = Mpumalanga Province, 
NW = North West, NC = Northern Cape, WC = Western Cape and SA = South Africa. 
Source: Tiberti et al. (2013). 
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Table 2.4: Number of Beneficiaries of the Child Support Grant by age and province as at 30 June 2011 
 
                      
Age EC FS GAU KZN LIM MPU NW NC WC Total 
(9-10 yrs) 98 578 33 822 77 787 159 740 75 727 54 849 44 767 14 760 43 140 603 170 
(10-11 yrs) 95 621 32 806 73 977 152 548 76 129 56 081 43 898 14 200 43 364 588 624 
Total 10-11 194 199 66 628 151 764 312 288 151 856 110 930 88 665 28 960 86 504 1 191 794 
(11-12 yrs) 99 546 31 806 70 234 155 238 76 031 55 910 42 453 14 646 42 083 587 947 
(12-13 yrs) 103 749 29 324 65 761 149 619 74 922 53 359 40 013 13 825 39 741 570 313 
(13-14 yrs) 103 480 28 646 62 864 143 549 75 175 53 799 38 285 13 274 37 942 557 014 
Total 11-14 306 775 89 776 198 859 448 406 226 128 163 068 120 751 41 745 119 766 1 715 274 
(14-15 yrs) 103 388 29 398 63 840 139 666 76 481 53 763 38 870 13 320 38 606 557 332 
(15-16 yrs) 103 458 29 461 60 137 135 218 77 318 52 387 38 049 12 792 35 752 544 572 
(16-17 yrs) 94 057 26 366 51 721 116 285 74 904 48 049 33 679 11 399 29 503 485 963 
(17-18 yrs) 44 272 13 718 21 709 61 419 44 040 24 919 13 508 5 311 12 185 241 081 
Total 14-18 345 175 98 943 197 407 452 588 272 743 179 118 124 106 42 822 116 046 1 828 948 
Notes: EC = Eastern Cape Province, FS = Free State, GP = Gauteng Province, KZN = KwaZulu Natal, LP = Limpopo Province, MP = Mpumalanga Province, 
NW = North West, NC = Northern Cape, WC = Western Cape and SA = South Africa. 
Source: Tiberti et al. (2013). 
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Table 2.5: Social Grants Expenditure by Type of Grant and Province, 2003/04 to 
2009/10 
  
      Social grants expenditure by type of grant and province, 2003/04 to 
2009/10 
  2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 
% 
growth 
                (average 
R million               annual) 
Old age 17146 18504 19527 21590 22782 24405 26106 7.3 
War veterans 34 36 28 25 21 18 14 -13.7 
Disability 10329 12570 14099 14707 15728 16991 18347 10 
Foster care 1142 1563 1996 2464 3404 4091 4886 27.4 
Care Dependency 639 760 916 998 1127 1240 1357 13.4 
Child Support 7690 11431 14143 17936 19176 20888 22327 19.4 
Total 36982 44885 50708 57720 62238 67633 73037 12 
Province                 
Eastern Cape 7553 9006 9732 11085 11826 12855 13953 10.8 
Free State 2379 3049 3352 3919 4214 4667 5166 13.8 
Gauteng 4454 5411 6130 6938 7114 7682 8223 10.8 
KwaZulu-Natal 8165 10275 11898 13362 15249 16610 17855 13.9 
Limpopo 4899 5802 6815 7722 8464 9144 9899 12.4 
Mpumalanga 2421 2981 3476 3888 4140 4484 4818 12.2 
Northern Cape 936 1065 1177 1344 1429 1543 1660 10 
North West 3064 3795 4186 4861 4963 5403 5823 11.3 
Western Cape 3111 3500 3942 4601 4839 5245 5640 10.4 
Total 36982 44885 50708 57720 62238 67633 73037 12 
Notes: Data for 2008/09 and 2009/10 is based on National Medium Term Expenditure Estimates. War 
Veterans grant is payable to veterans from World War II or Korean War 
Source: National Treasury, National Budget 2007, Social Development Vote 17. 
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Table 2.6: Social Assistance Expenditure by Grant, 2009/10 to 2015/16 
                     
                          
Subprogramme         Expen-             
          Average diture/       
Avera
ge Expen-   
          growth total:     growth   
    Audited outcome Adjusted rate Average Medium-term expenditure rate total:   
R in 1000s       appro. (%) (%)   estimate   (%) Average   
  2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2009/10- 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2012/13 - 2015/16     
Old Age 29 826 420 33 750 600 37 129 812 39 323 119 9.70% 38.10% 44 328 024 47 913 265 51 464 236 9.40% 39.00%   
War Veteran 16 644 13 976 11 848 12 902 -8.10% -  8 167 6 840 5 659 -24.00% -   
Disability 16 566 681 16 840 182 17 375 021 19 062 534 4.80% 19.00% 18 775 972 19 754 371 20 659 406 2.70% 16.70%   
Foster Care 4 434 346 4 616 442 5 010 915 5 951 842 10.30% 5.40% 5 576 084 6 176 403 6 719 023 4.10% 5.20%   
Care D 1 434 143 1 586 452 1 736 431 1 856 901 9.00% 1.80% 2 058 799 2 252 870 2 444 150 9.60% 1.80%   
Child Support 26 669 761 30 341 465 34 319 636 38 237 293 12.80% 35.20% 41 793 203 44 854 945 47 619 211 7.60% 36.80%   
Grant-in-Aid 146 295 170 052 204 026 188 144 8.70% 0.20% 247 336 274 195 303 421 17.30% 0.20%   
Social Relief 165 458 173 737 185 298 255 181 15.50% 20.0% 219 256 249 212 278 172 2.90% 0.20%   
Total 79 259 748 87 492 906 95 972 987 104 887 916 9.80% 100.00% 113 006 841 121 482 101 129 493 278 7.30% 100.00%   
Change to 2012 Budget estimate         (200 000) (500 000) 1 900 000       
 
Notes: Social Relief of Distress is payable for a maximum of 3 months to any person that is not benefiting from another social grant and who is under dire 
economic distress. 
Source: National Treasury, National Budget 2013 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics, General Household Survey (2007 – 2012)  
 
(Sample – 13 to 18 year olds) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Enrolment 0.908 0.912 0.905 0.904 0.915 0.929 
 (0.289) (0.283) (0.293) (0.294) (0.279) (0.257) 
Child Support Grant 0.0881 0.113 0.186 0.289 0.393 0.508 
 (0.284) (0.316) (0.389) (0.453) (0.488) (0.500) 
Head’s Age 51.61 50.94 52.37 52.05 52.24 49.95 
 (14.74) (15.16) (14.52) (14.82) (14.64) (11.37) 
Parent Education 6.944 7.399 7.063 7.119 7.423 8.231 
 (5.642) (5.702) (6.138) (5.961) (6.282) (6.154) 
Household Size 6.189 6.116 6.084 6.104 6.041 6.089 
 (2.713) (2.796) (2.697) (2.870) (2.838) (3.031) 
Siblings  3.491 3.138 3.397 3.404 3.333 3.311 
 (1.927) (1.870) (1.977) (2.029) (2.007) (2.165) 
Household income 2,153 2,222 3,809 3,983 4,302 4,965 
 (53,050) (21,457) (4,353) (4,461) (4,787) (5,158) 
Child’s Age 15.45 15.44 15.47 15.51 15.51 15.50 
 (1.707) (1.680) (1.722) (1.721) (1.682) (1.678) 
Dual income 0.0866 0.0772 0.0753 0.0738 0.0677 0.101 
 (0.281) (0.267) (0.264) (0.261) (0.251) (0.302) 
Father alive 0.721 0.713 0.686 0.700 0.689 0.770 
 (0.448) (0.453) (0.464) (0.458) (0.463) (0.421) 
Father resident 0.320 0.316 0.311 0.291 0.288 0.406 
 (0.466) (0.465) (0.463) (0.454) (0.453) (0.491) 
Male child 0.500 0.506 0.510 0.508 0.500 0.490 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
White 0.0244 0.0192 0.0215 0.0192 0.0236 0.0332 
 (0.154) (0.137) (0.145) (0.137) (0.152) (0.179) 
Coloured  0.116 0.0935 0.0903 0.0885 0.0959 0.115 
 (0.320) (0.291) (0.287) (0.284) (0.295) (0.320) 
Indian  0.0120 0.0160 0.0155 0.0145 0.0126 0.0146 
 (0.109) (0.125) (0.123) (0.120) (0.111) (0.120) 
Mother alive 0.861 0.856 0.846 0.846 0.839  
 (0.346) (0.351) (0.361) (0.361) (0.367)  
Mother resident 0.638 0.639 0.627 0.614 0.610  
 (0.481) (0.480) (0.484) (0.487) (0.488)  
No. of Obs. 14,533 11,962 10,418 11,349 10,589 5,971 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics, General Household Survey (2007 – 2012) by age 
 
Panel A – 15 year olds 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Enrolment  0.944 0.966 0.962 0.965 0.972 0.970 
 (0.230) (0.182) (0.190) (0.183) (0.166) (0.171) 
Child Support Grant  0.0220 0.0294 0.0461 0.382 0.509 0.565 
 (0.147) (0.169) (0.210) (0.486) (0.500) (0.496) 
Male child  0.481 0.521 0.514 0.515 0.518 0.491 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
No. of Obs. 2,407 2,006 1,994 2,025 1,984 1,896 
 
Panel B – 16 year olds 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Enrolment  0.922 0.920 0.929 0.929 0.931 0.944 
 (0.269) (0.271) (0.257) (0.257) (0.254) (0.231) 
Child Support Grant 0.00806 0.0129 0.0194 0.128 0.393 0.513 
 (0.0894) (0.113) (0.138) (0.334) (0.489) (0.500) 
Male child 0.497 0.514 0.499 0.501 0.499 0.489 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
No. of Obs. 2,730 2,251 1,959 2,184 2,048 1,914 
 
Panel C – 17 year olds 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Enrolment  0.866 0.874 0.859 0.859 0.874 0.887 
 (0.340) (0.332) (0.348) (0.349) (0.332) (0.317) 
Child Support Grant 0.00616 0.00998 0.00932 0.0291 0.162 0.353 
 (0.0782) (0.0994) (0.0961) (0.168) (0.369) (0.478) 
Male child 0.503 0.512 0.525 0.506 0.488 0.484 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.499) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
No. of Obs. 2,599 2,205 2,147 2,163 2,088 1,895 
Notes: Standard Deviations are in parenthesis 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics, General Household Survey (2007 – 2012) by groups  
 
Panel A – Treatment group based on 2008 means-test threshold (age 13 -18) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Enrolment  0.888 0.901 0.896 0.908 0.902 0.918 
 (0.316) (0.298) (0.305) (0.288) (0.297) (0.275) 
Observations 1,008 933 2,873 3,224 3,122 3,166 
 
 
Panel B – Low income control group based on 2008 means-test threshold (age 13 -18) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Enrolment  0.897 0.897 0.888 0.852 0.855 0.843 
 (0.304) (0.304) (0.315) (0.355) (0.352) (0.364) 
Observations 12,045 9,599 4,346 3,983 2,804 1,922 
 
 
Panel C – Treatment group based on 2012 means-test threshold (age 13 -18) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Enrolment  0.904 0.930 0.895 0.908 0.912 0.918 
 (0.295) (0.256) (0.306) (0.290) (0.284) (0.274) 
Observations 986 922 2,464 2,707 2,563 2,757 
 
 
Panel D – Low income control group based on 2012 means-test threshold (age 13 -18) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Enrolment  0.896 0.895 0.883 0.854 0.849 0.845 
 (0.305) (0.306) (0.321) (0.353) (0.359) (0.362) 
Observations 12,328 9,892 5,240 4,783 3,434 2,442 
Notes: Standard Deviations are in parenthesis 
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment and Control groups in the base year, General 
Household Survey 2007  
     (Children aged 13 – 18 years) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS IN THE BASE YEAR – 2007                
                  Control Group          Treatment Group     Difference in Means    
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD p-value  
       
Enrolment 0.897 0.304 0.885 0.319 0.267  
 
Child’s Age 
 
 
15.70 
 
 
1.635 
 
 
15.68 
 
 
1.641 
 
 
0.834 
 
 
 
 
Boys 0.501 0.500 0.499 0.500 0.916  
       
Girls 0.499 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.916  
       
White 0.025 0.156 0.018 0.133 0.177  
       
Children under 17 years 0.639 0.480 0.636 0.481 0.846  
       
Children in:  Grade 7 0.163 0.369 0.183 0.387 0.108  
       
          Grade 8 0.178 0.384 0.188 0.391 0.513  
       
          Grade 10 0.126 0.332 0.124 0.330 0.876  
       
No. of Siblings: Three 0.207 0.405 0.217 0.412 0.49  
       
            Four 0.179 0.383 0.159 0.366 0.114  
       
Household Size: Four 0.153 0.360 0.165 0.371 0.327  
       
             Five 0.164 0.370 0.176 0.381 0.355  
       
Head’s education:  0.058 0.234 0.071 0.256 0.124  
       
Head’s age: 30 to 40 yrs 0.169 0.375 0.173 0.379 0.708  
       
Province:  Free State  0.068 0.251 0.069 0.254 0.834  
       
North West  0.06 0.237 0.07 0.254 0.22  
       
Mpumalanga 0.084 0.277 0.086 0.281 0.782  
       
Notes: Number of Observations: Treatment Group = 951; Control Group = 12 052 for all variables 
except for enrolment which was = 12 045 children. Head’s education is 10 years of schooling. 
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics of Take-up rates, General Household Survey (2007 – 2012) by 
groups 
 
Panel A: Treatment group based on 2008 means-test threshold 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Child Support Grant 0.0612 0.0795 0.204 0.343 0.457 0.537 
 (0.240) (0.271) (0.403) (0.475) (0.498) (0.499) 
       
No. of Obs. 1,013 931 2,853 3,232 3,136 3,185 
 
Panel B: High income control group based on 2008 means-test threshold 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Child Support Grant  0.0264 0.0473 0.0790 0.127 0.189 0.250 
 (0.160) (0.212) (0.270) (0.334) (0.391) (0.433) 
       
No. of Obs. 1,555 1,542 4,002 3,938 3,748 3,851 
 
Panel C: Treatment group based on 2012 means-test threshold 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Child Support Grant 0.0436 0.0718 0.178 0.306 0.408 0.514 
 (0.204) (0.258) (0.382) (0.461) (0.492) (0.500) 
       
No. of Obs. 986 919 2,440 2,716 2,573 2,760 
 
Panel D: High income control group based on 2012 means-test threshold 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Child Support Grant  0.0259 0.0457 0.0608 0.0959 0.150 0.200 
 (0.159) (0.209) (0.239) (0.294) (0.357) (0.400) 
       
No. of Obs. 1,272 1,247 3,271 3,182 3,047 3,128 
Notes: Standard Deviations are in parenthesis. 
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Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics, General Household Survey (2007 – 2012) by gender 
Panel A: Enrolment rates for Girls aged 13 – 18 years 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Enrolment  0.904 0.907 0.901 0.893 0.910 0.916 
 (0.294) (0.291) (0.299) (0.309) (0.286) (0.278) 
       
No. of Obs. 7,930 6,602 6,112 6,386 5,934 5,587 
 
Panel B: Enrolment rates for Boys aged 13 – 18 years 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Enrolment  0.912 0.915 0.912 0.912 0.921 0.928 
 (0.283) (0.279) (0.283) (0.283) (0.270) (0.259) 
       
No. of Obs. 7,909 6,749 6,317 6,629 5,963 5,492 
 
Panel C – Enrolment rates by Treatment group and gender based on 2008 means-test threshold  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Enrolment: Girls 0.882 0.907 0.881 0.889 0.898 0.906 
 (0.323) (0.290) (0.324) (0.314) (0.303) (0.291) 
         Obs. 507 486 1,440 1,612 1,610 1,625 
       
Enrolment: Boys 0.895 0.895 0.909 0.928 0.908 0.930 
 (0.307) (0.307) (0.288) (0.259) (0.290) (0.255) 
Obs. 506 457 1,450 1,617 1,517 1,555 
 
 
Panel D – Low income control group and gender based on 2008 means-test threshold  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Enrolment: Girls 0.891 0.890 0.879 0.840 0.843 0.823 
 (0.312) (0.313) (0.327) (0.367) (0.364) (0.381) 
         Obs. 5,972 4,683 2,092 1,961 1,359 946 
       
Enrolment: Boys 0.903 0.902 0.897 0.863 0.867 0.862 
 (0.296) (0.297) (0.304) (0.344) (0.340) (0.345) 
Obs. 6,002 4,841 2,198 2,019 1,438 972 
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Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics, NIDS Wave 2 (2010) and Wave 3 (2012) 
 
                              (Data – NIDS Wave 2 and Wave 3) 
 2010 2012 
 mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) 
   
Enrolment  0.931 0.887 
 (0.254) (0.316) 
Child Support Grant  0.320 0.381 
 (0.467) (0.486) 
Household Size  6.663 6.385 
 (3.442) (3.447) 
Age 15.26 16.90 
 (1.685) (1.677) 
Coloured  0.103 0.105 
 (0.305) (0.306) 
Indian  0.00793 0.00675 
 (0.0887) (0.0819) 
White  0.0125 0.0124 
 (0.111) (0.111) 
Rural Areas 0.0744 0.0690 
 (0.262) (0.253) 
Tribal Authority Areas 0.544 0.528 
 (0.498) (0.499) 
Urban Informal Areas 0.0585 0.0626 
 (0.235) (0.242) 
Real Income 4,723 4,970 
 (7,668) (7,224) 
Male child 0.492 0.496 
 (0.500) (0.500) 
Passed previous year 0.914 0.778 
 (0.280) (0.416) 
Mother Alive 0.855 0.821 
 (0.353) (0.384) 
Father Alive 0.738 0.673 
 (0.440) (0.469) 
   
Observations 2,649 2,668 
Notes: Standard Deviations are in Parenthesis. Sample is limited to children aged 13 – 18 years in 
2010. 
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Table 4.8: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Enrolment 
 
(Data – General Household Survey 2012 and 2007.Sample: Children aged 13 – 18) 
           Based on 2008 means-test Threshold      Based on 2012 Means-test Threshold 
Control group:  High & Low  Low Income  High Income  High & Low  Low Income  High 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Program impact 10.50*** 10.78*** 11.06*** 12.26*** 12.54*** 12.94*** 
 (3.08) (3.19) (3.10) (4.30) (4.37) (4.26) 
Treatment  -4.91 -3.70 -1.27 -6.68 -5.89 -4.33 
 (3.01) (3.07) (3.07) (4.26) (4.30) (4.23) 
Dummy 2012 -2.00** -2.16* -3.76*** -1.99** -2.12* -3.48*** 
 (0.81) (1.19) (0.94) (0.82) (1.12) (0.94) 
Head’s Age 9.26*** 8.60*** 7.01*** 9.22*** 8.58*** 5.43** 
 (1.98) (2.22) (2.69) (1.99) (2.16) (2.71) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.73*** -0.66*** -0.59** -0.73*** -0.66*** -0.44* 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.24) (0.18) (0.19) (0.25) 
Parent Education 4.69*** 5.04*** 2.27*** 4.63*** 4.93*** 2.49*** 
 (0.61) (0.89) (0.74) (0.60) (0.84) (0.68) 
Household Size -1.57 0.23 -5.28 -1.95 -0.19 -4.77 
 (2.59) (3.14) (3.24) (2.63) (3.07) (3.29) 
Siblings  -1.44 -2.63 -4.02 -0.78 -2.31 -2.20 
 (3.58) (4.23) (4.74) (3.62) (4.16) (4.77) 
Child’s Age -4.53*** -4.97*** -3.61*** -4.55*** -5.04*** -3.40*** 
 (0.18) (0.23) (0.22) (0.18) (0.22) (0.24) 
Dual income 1.32 1.61 -6.47 1.64 1.27 -6.92 
 (8.83) (13.24) (9.46) (8.82) (12.37) (9.41) 
Father alive 2.42*** 2.52** 2.17* 2.38*** 2.53** 2.41* 
 (0.88) (0.98) (1.18) (0.89) (0.99) (1.25) 
Father resident 0.08 -4.25 9.78 0.57 -1.05 11.54 
 (7.43) (9.01) (9.23) (7.51) (8.86) (9.43) 
Mother resident  3.44*** 4.38*** 3.77** 3.45*** 4.08*** 3.21* 
 (1.03) (1.18) (1.81) (1.03) (1.15) (1.83) 
Male child 0.98* 1.58** 0.46 0.92 1.34* -0.22 
 (0.57) (0.72) (0.67) (0.58) (0.70) (0.69) 
White  -3.75*** -10.96** -5.51*** -3.74*** -10.18** -4.87*** 
 (1.35) (5.58) (1.49) (1.35) (4.74) (1.47) 
Coloured  -10.45*** -12.71*** -6.83*** -10.57*** -12.34*** -6.98*** 
 (1.01) (1.32) (1.16) (1.02) (1.25) (1.19) 
Indian  -8.05*** -8.11* -7.59*** -8.03*** -9.38** -7.51*** 
 (2.54) (4.68) (2.65) (2.53) (4.69) (2.65) 
Log income 1.04*** -0.44 4.44*** 1.05*** -0.06 3.77*** 
 (0.30) (0.48) (0.73) (0.30) (0.44) (0.77) 
_cons 120.20*** 136.49*** 88.76*** 120.53*** 135.88*** 95.16*** 
 (6.05) (7.59) (9.46) (6.07) (7.33) (9.60) 
R2 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 
No. of Obs. 10,241 7,493 5,411 10,071 7,781 4,755 
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Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as 
percentage points). Program impact = Treatment interacted with 2012 year dummy. Column (1) shows 
results using both the ‘High income’ control group and the ‘Low income’ control group using means-test 
thresholds for 2008. Column (2) shows results using the ‘Low income’ control group only; at 2008 
means-test thresholds. ‘High income’ control group for columns (1) and (2) = Children from households 
whose income was greater than R 4 400; means-test ineligible and did not receive the Child Support 
Grant. Low income control group = Children from households whose income was less than R 2 200. 
Treatment group for columns (1), (2) and (3) is comprised of children from households whose income 
were between R 2 200 and R 4 400 who received the Child Support Grant. Column (4) shows 
Difference-in-Differences results using the ‘High income’ and ‘Low income’ control groups at means-test 
threshold of 2012. Column (5) shows DID results using ‘Low income’ control group at means-test 
threshold for 2012 and Column (6) shows results using the High Income control group at 2012 means-
test threshold. The means-test threshold was R 2 200 for single caregivers and R 4 400 for double 
income caregivers in 2008 and R 2 800 for single caregivers and R 5 600 for double caregivers in 2012. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
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Table 4.9: DID Results of the Impact of Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Girls 
 
(Data – General Household Survey 2012 and 2007. Sample: Female Children aged 13 – 18 years) 
            Based on 2008 means-test Threshold     Based on 2012 Means-test Threshold 
Control group:  High & Low  Low Income   High Income  High & Low  Low Income  High 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Program impact 12.63*** 13.39*** 12.97*** 15.12** 15.84** 15.30** 
 (4.39) (4.51) (4.43) (6.60) (6.69) (6.54) 
Treatment  -6.94 -6.58 -2.88 -9.19 -9.10 -6.91 
 (4.24) (4.30) (4.34) (6.52) (6.59) (6.47) 
Dummy 2012 -2.27** -2.44 -3.89*** -2.25** -2.49 -3.13** 
 (1.13) (1.67) (1.29) (1.13) (1.56) (1.27) 
Head’s Age 10.30*** 9.85*** 3.68 10.23*** 10.13*** 0.99 
 (2.65) (3.01) (3.27) (2.69) (2.97) (3.07) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.84*** -0.78*** -0.33 -0.84*** -0.81*** -0.08 
 (0.24) (0.27) (0.30) (0.25) (0.27) (0.28) 
Head’s Education 4.79*** 5.30*** 1.87* 4.73*** 5.10*** 2.67*** 
 (0.84) (1.22) (1.05) (0.84) (1.17) (1.00) 
Household Size -1.32 0.62 -6.02 -1.42 -0.33 -3.42 
 (3.63) (4.37) (4.63) (3.68) (4.28) (4.60) 
Siblings  -5.23 -6.76 -5.80 -4.93 -6.08 -6.27 
 (4.99) (5.91) (6.44) (5.05) (5.79) (6.39) 
Child’s Age -5.02*** -5.77*** -3.96*** -5.03*** -5.74*** -3.57*** 
 (0.26) (0.33) (0.32) (0.26) (0.32) (0.33) 
Dual income -4.80 -10.88 -1.46 -5.49 -11.56 -4.83 
 (12.35) (19.13) (12.52) (12.31) (17.76) (12.32) 
Father alive 2.49** 3.06** 1.99 2.37* 2.89** 1.69 
 (1.23) (1.39) (1.68) (1.25) (1.39) (1.73) 
Father resident -0.33 -7.92 6.48 0.94 -3.01 13.40 
 (10.48) (12.89) (12.86) (10.62) (12.66) (13.01) 
Mother resident  3.08** 4.11** 2.81 3.05** 3.68** 2.15 
 (1.38) (1.60) (2.19) (1.38) (1.56) (2.27) 
White  -4.01** -14.43* -5.76*** -3.95** -9.38* -4.95** 
 (1.83) (7.53) (2.01) (1.83) (5.45) (1.96) 
Coloured  -8.12*** -9.65*** -5.85*** -8.12*** -9.22*** -5.99*** 
 (1.35) (1.75) (1.59) (1.36) (1.66) (1.61) 
Indian  -8.18** -14.20** -4.95 -8.17** -16.77** -4.90 
 (3.34) (6.56) (3.05) (3.34) (6.52) (3.03) 
Log income 1.33*** -0.11 5.06*** 1.34*** 0.36 3.52*** 
 (0.42) (0.68) (1.05) (0.42) (0.62) (1.11) 
_cons 124.43*** 144.65*** 101.22*** 124.72*** 141.45*** 114.01*** 
 (8.25) (10.62) (12.35) (8.32) (10.18) (12.09) 
R2 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 
No. of Obs. 5,222 3,823 2,778 5,113 3,939 2,431 
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Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as 
percentage points). Program impact = Treatment interacted with 2012 year dummy. Column (1) shows 
results using both the ‘High income’ control group and the ‘Low income’ control group using 2008 
means-test threshold. Column (2) shows results using the ‘Low income’ control group only; at means-
test thresholds of 2008. ‘High income’ control group for columns (1) and (3) = Children from households 
whose income was greater than R 4 400; who were means-test ineligible and did not receive the Child 
Support Grant. Low income control group = Children from households whose income was less than R 2 
200. Treatment group for columns (1), (2) and (3) is comprised of children from households whose 
incomes were between R 2 200 and R 4 400 who received the Child Support Grant. Column (4) shows 
DID results using the ‘High income’ and ‘Low income’ control groups at means-test threshold of 2012. 
Column (5) shows DID results using the ‘Low income’ control group only at means-test threshold for 
2012. The means-test threshold was     R 2 200 for single caregivers and R 4 400 for double 
income caregivers in 2008 and R 2 800 for single caregivers and R 5 600 for double caregivers in 2012. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
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Table 4.10: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Boys 
 
(Data – General Household Survey 2012 and 2007.Sample: Male Children aged 13 – 18 years) 
          Based on 2008 means-test Threshold       Based on 2012 Means-test Threshold 
Control group:  High & Low  Low Income   High Income  High & Low  Low Income  High 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Program impact 9.16** 9.33** 9.65** 10.28* 10.43* 11.24** 
 (4.34) (4.52) (4.38) (5.63) (5.75) (5.59) 
Treatment  -3.55 -1.75 -0.08 -5.03 -3.77 -2.48 
 (4.26) (4.40) (4.40) (5.58) (5.68) (5.59) 
Dummy 2012 -1.74 -1.95 -3.66*** -1.73 -1.84 -3.87*** 
 (1.12) (1.62) (1.29) (1.12) (1.53) (1.34) 
Head’s Age 8.05*** 7.35** 10.18*** 8.08*** 7.05** 9.52** 
 (2.66) (2.94) (3.93) (2.65) (2.84) (4.00) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.61** -0.54** -0.83** -0.61** -0.51** -0.78** 
 (0.24) (0.26) (0.35) (0.24) (0.25) (0.35) 
Head’s Education 4.53*** 4.64*** 2.57*** 4.48*** 4.65*** 2.18*** 
 (0.81) (1.18) (0.93) (0.80) (1.11) (0.84) 
Household Size -1.87 0.00 -4.34 -2.56 -0.31 -6.11 
 (3.52) (4.31) (4.11) (3.57) (4.19) (4.38) 
Siblings  2.61 1.23 -1.57 3.61 1.55 2.54 
 (4.78) (5.67) (6.17) (4.85) (5.59) (6.31) 
Child’s Age -4.04*** -4.16*** -3.23*** -4.06*** -4.37*** -3.22*** 
 (0.26) (0.31) (0.32) (0.26) (0.31) (0.35) 
Dual income 8.30 13.71 -11.60 9.51 12.82 -8.91 
 (12.09) (17.93) (13.48) (12.10) (16.88) (13.67) 
Father alive 2.35* 1.94 2.34 2.39* 2.15 3.21* 
 (1.23) (1.37) (1.74) (1.26) (1.38) (1.83) 
Father resident 0.32 -0.25 12.48 -0.14 1.00 8.71 
 (10.18) (12.26) (12.71) (10.26) (12.02) (13.22) 
Mother resident  3.85*** 4.62*** 4.76* 3.89*** 4.43*** 4.24* 
 (1.42) (1.61) (2.43) (1.43) (1.56) (2.53) 
White  -3.55* -8.25 -5.02** -3.60* -11.14 -4.79** 
 (1.97) (7.95) (2.13) (1.97) (7.61) (2.14) 
Coloured  -12.76*** -15.83*** -7.68*** -13.00*** -15.42*** -7.91*** 
 (1.48) (1.96) (1.66) (1.49) (1.84) (1.73) 
Indian  -8.11** -0.28 -10.21*** -8.08** -1.93 -10.08*** 
 (3.35) (5.21) (3.70) (3.32) (4.78) (3.72) 
Log income 0.79** -0.73 3.85*** 0.79** -0.42 4.05*** 
 (0.40) (0.63) (0.89) (0.40) (0.59) (1.00) 
_cons 116.85*** 129.94*** 76.59*** 117.25*** 131.99*** 76.75*** 
 (8.18) (9.95) (13.53) (8.19) (9.69) (14.35) 
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
No. of Obs. 5,019 3,670 2,633 4,958 3,842 2,324 
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Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as 
percentage points). Program impact = Treatment interacted with 2012 year dummy. Column (1) shows 
results using both the ‘High income’ control group and the ‘Low income’ control group using means-test 
thresholds for 2008. Column (2) shows results using the ‘Low income’ control group only; at 2008 
means-test threshold. ‘High income’ control group for columns (1) and (3) = Children from households 
whose income was greater than    R 4 400; who were means-test ineligible and did not receive the 
Child Support Grant. Low income control group = Children from households whose income was less 
than R 2 200. Treatment group for columns (1), (2) and (3) is comprised of children from households 
whose incomes were between     R 2 200 and R 4 400 who received the Child Support Grant. 
Column (4) shows DID results using the ‘High income’ and ‘Low income’ control groups at means-test 
threshold of 2012. Column (5) shows DID results using the ‘Low income’ control group only at means-
test threshold for 2012. The means-test threshold was R 2 200 for single caregivers and R 4 400 for 
double income caregivers in 2008 and   R 2 800 for single caregivers and R 5 600 for double 
caregivers in 2012. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at 
the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4.11: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Children by Highest Grade Completed 
 
(Data – General Household Survey 2012 and 2007. Using the ‘High income’ Control group) 
                      Based on 2008 Means-test Threshold            
  GRADE 8 
(1) 
GRADE 9 
(2) 
GRADE 10 
(3) 
GRADE 12 
(4) 
Program impact 6.83** 1.77 5.39 61.57*** 
 (3.44) (4.18) (3.43) (7.42) 
Treatment  2.00 4.06 -3.26 -86.30*** 
 (3.05) (3.86) (3.06) (4.40) 
Dummy 2012 -0.35 2.11 3.94 -61.75*** 
 (1.75) (2.01) (2.45) (6.37) 
Head’s Age 10.33* 4.21 8.53 3.27 
 (5.47) (4.87) (7.24) (11.15) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.95* -0.46 -0.72 -0.66 
 (0.50) (0.44) (0.66) (1.13) 
Head’s Education 0.34 1.00 2.53** 1.34 
 (1.07) (1.33) (1.26) (3.78) 
Household Size -3.54 -7.70 -1.04 9.70 
 (5.84) (6.25) (6.56) (13.52) 
Siblings  -4.30 0.82 0.24 -18.63 
 (8.32) (9.05) (10.20) (17.40) 
Child’s Age -5.45*** -4.96*** -5.16*** -1.69 
 (0.78) (0.75) (0.96) (1.25) 
Dual income -18.36 -5.72 -18.29 -25.46 
 (16.40) (19.15) (23.08) (26.57) 
Father alive 4.80** 0.11 -2.72 -6.93 
 (2.38) (2.25) (2.42) (6.40) 
Father resident 5.89 -9.29 42.08* -3.05 
 (15.32) (19.06) (22.12) (51.20) 
Mother resident 0.33 4.86 0.09 8.85* 
 (2.90) (3.21) (2.65) (5.23) 
Male child 0.71 4.38*** 1.00 0.18 
 (1.26) (1.47) (1.52) (3.12) 
White  -4.23** -1.07 -8.92** -0.34 
 (1.85) (1.41) (4.21) (5.53) 
Coloured  -8.39*** -9.98*** -8.41*** 1.15 
 (2.21) (2.78) (2.75) (3.44) 
Indian  -4.42 -5.50 -13.06** 7.91 
 (4.50) (4.47) (5.22) (9.25) 
Log income 3.02*** 2.66* -0.48 4.56** 
 (1.12) (1.40) (1.44) (2.02) 
_cons 122.18*** 137.00*** 157.87*** 81.87** 
 (17.73) (19.73) (24.92) (35.52) 
R2 0.20 0.13 0.09 0.51 
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No of Obs. 1,001 976 869 315 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as 
percentage points). DID results in this table show estimations using the ‘High income’ control group 
based on 2008 means-test threshold. Program Impact = Treatment interacted with 2012 year dummy. 
‘High income’ control group = Children from households whose income was greater than R 4 400. Low 
income control group = Children from households whose income was less than R 2 200. Treatment 
group is comprised of children from households whose income were between R 2 200 and R 4 400 who 
received the Child Support Grant. The means-test threshold was R 2 200 for single caregivers and R 4 
400 for double income caregivers in 2008. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 
percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4.12: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Children (using six yearly GHS Data from 2007 to 2012)             
 
(Data – General Household Survey 2007 to 2012: Full Sample aged 13 – 18 years)         
          Based on 2008 means-test Threshold       Based on 2012 Means-test Threshold 
Control group: High & Low  Low Income   High Income  High & Low  Low Income  High 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Program Impact 8.10*** 7.39** 9.30*** 9.60** 9.01** 11.24*** 
 (2.92) (2.96) (2.94) (4.14) (4.19) (4.13) 
Treatment -5.76** -4.68 -4.76 -7.56* -6.85 -7.68* 
 (2.91) (2.95) (2.94) (4.13) (4.18) (4.13) 
Dummy 2008 0.33 0.21 0.22 0.34 0.24 0.51 
 (0.56) (0.73) (0.81) (0.60) (0.70) (0.80) 
Dummy 2009 -0.15 1.42** -2.58*** -0.16 0.99 -3.40*** 
 (0.50) (0.67) (0.76) (0.55) (0.65) (0.77) 
Dummy 2010 -0.87* 0.33 -2.26*** -0.80 0.25 -2.90*** 
 (0.53) (0.71) (0.76) (0.57) (0.68) (0.77) 
Dummy 2011 -0.25 0.25 -1.87** -0.31 0.21 -1.92** 
 (0.54) (0.75) (0.77) (0.60) (0.73) (0.77) 
Dummy 2012 -0.29 -0.13 -1.71** -0.26 -0.30 -1.62** 
 (0.64) (0.89) (0.81) (0.69) (0.87) (0.81) 
Head’s Age 5.34*** 5.26*** 4.69*** 5.37*** 5.61*** 4.87*** 
 (0.72) (0.91) (1.14) (0.85) (0.91) (1.23) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.37*** -0.35*** -0.32*** -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.34*** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) 
Head’s Education 3.69*** 4.38*** 2.77*** 3.69*** 4.43*** 2.69*** 
 (0.28) (0.46) (0.36) (0.32) (0.45) (0.36) 
Household Size -3.48*** -1.24 -6.51*** -3.55** -1.43 -6.49*** 
 (1.16) (1.60) (1.67) (1.39) (1.58) (1.80) 
Siblings -0.09 -2.96 3.10 0.08 -2.63 4.23 
 (1.61) (2.26) (2.38) (1.98) (2.25) (2.58) 
Child’s Age -4.92*** -5.16*** -4.45*** -4.98*** -5.26*** -4.36*** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) 
Dual income 4.66 1.24 1.99 4.64 2.90 1.39 
 (4.82) (8.32) (5.59) (5.24) (7.79) (5.59) 
Father alive 1.42*** 1.99*** -0.01 1.41*** 1.84*** -0.47 
 (0.39) (0.48) (0.55) (0.44) (0.48) (0.60) 
Father resident -0.96 -7.37 8.47 -0.56 -5.65 12.64** 
 (3.82) (5.12) (5.19) (4.35) (5.06) (5.46) 
Mother resident 1.42*** 1.75*** 0.72 1.46*** 1.77*** 0.66 
 (0.37) (0.49) (0.54) (0.43) (0.48) (0.59) 
Male child 1.29*** 1.82*** 0.86** 1.31*** 1.66*** 0.46 
 (0.29) (0.39) (0.38) (0.33) (0.38) (0.40) 
White -4.54*** -9.29*** -5.02*** -4.58*** -9.67*** -4.70*** 
 (0.79) (3.28) (0.95) (0.90) (2.74) (0.96) 
Coloured -11.55*** -13.25*** -9.24*** -11.76*** -13.45*** -9.06*** 
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 (0.57) (0.87) (0.77) (0.69) (0.85) (0.80) 
Indian -8.35*** -7.83*** -7.59*** -8.44*** -9.39*** -7.64*** 
 (1.20) (2.26) (1.41) (1.32) (2.16) (1.43) 
Log income 0.97*** 0.15 2.76*** 0.97*** 0.38 2.34*** 
 (0.16) (0.27) (0.36) (0.17) (0.25) (0.39) 
_cons 140.60*** 147.94*** 123.41*** 141.29*** 147.17*** 125.79*** 
 (2.54) (3.55) (4.49) (2.87) (3.42) (4.88) 
R2 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 
No. of Obs. 40,923 29,879 23,301 39,964 31,156 19,403 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as 
percentage points). Program Impact = Treatment interacted with 2012 year dummy. Column 1 shows 
results using both the ‘High income’ control group and the ‘Low income’ control group using means-test 
thresholds for 2008. Column 2 shows results using the ‘Low income’ control group only; and column 3 
shows results for High Income Control group only. ‘High income’ control group for columns (1) and (3) = 
Children from households whose income was greater than R 4 400; who were means-test ineligible and 
did not receive the Child Support Grant. Low income control group for column (2) = Children from 
households whose income was less than   R 2 200. Treatment group for columns (1), (2) and (3) is 
comprised of children from households whose incomes were between R 2 200 and R 4 400 who 
received the Child Support Grant. Column (4) shows Difference-in-Differences results using both the 
‘High income’ and ‘Low income’ control groups at means-test threshold of 2012. Column (5) shows DID 
results using the ‘Low income’ control group only at means-test threshold for 2012; and column (6) 
shows results using the High income Control group only at the 2012 means-test threshold. The means-
test threshold was R 2 200 for single caregivers and R 4 400 for double income caregivers in 2008 and 
R 2 800 for single caregivers and R 5 600 for double caregivers in 2012. ***Significant at the 1 percent 
level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
160 
 
Table 4.13: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Girls (using six yearly GHS Data from 2007 to 2012) 
 
(Data – General Household Survey 2007 to 2012.Sample: Female Children aged 13 – 18) 
          Based on 2008 means-test Threshold       Based on 2012 Means-test Threshold 
Control group: High & Low  Low Income  High Income  High & Low  Low Income   High 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Program Impact 9.99** 9.53** 11.09*** 11.99* 11.54* 13.38** 
 (4.17) (4.19) (4.27) (6.37) (6.39) (6.47) 
Treatment -7.84* -6.99* -6.40 -10.21 -9.78 -10.06 
 (4.15) (4.17) (4.27) (6.36) (6.38) (6.46) 
Dummy 2008 0.27 0.47 -0.22 0.27 0.34 -0.04 
 (0.82) (1.00) (1.07) (0.82) (0.96) (1.06) 
Dummy 2009 -0.48 1.25 -3.25*** -0.48 0.66 -4.01*** 
 (0.75) (0.92) (0.99) (0.75) (0.89) (1.01) 
Dummy 2010 -1.18 0.07 -3.01*** -1.12 -0.14 -3.68*** 
 (0.77) (0.96) (0.99) (0.78) (0.93) (1.02) 
Dummy 2011 -0.46 0.14 -2.28** -0.49 0.23 -2.24** 
 (0.80) (1.03) (0.99) (0.81) (0.99) (1.01) 
Dummy 2012 -0.32 -0.14 -1.98* -0.21 -0.27 -1.57 
 (0.93) (1.24) (1.08) (0.95) (1.21) (1.08) 
Head’s Age 4.62*** 4.91*** 3.20** 4.70*** 5.12*** 3.58** 
 (1.13) (1.26) (1.49) (1.16) (1.25) (1.59) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.31*** -0.34*** -0.19 -0.32*** -0.35*** -0.23 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) 
Parent Education 3.50*** 4.19*** 2.65*** 3.50*** 4.13*** 2.58*** 
 (0.44) (0.64) (0.50) (0.45) (0.62) (0.50) 
Household Size -2.46 -0.05 -6.28*** -2.42 -0.64 -6.27*** 
 (1.85) (2.23) (2.21) (1.89) (2.21) (2.33) 
Siblings -3.51 -7.44** 1.87 -3.55 -7.05** 3.75 
 (2.60) (3.09) (3.08) (2.66) (3.06) (3.26) 
Child’s Age -5.51*** -5.90*** -4.90*** -5.58*** -5.97*** -4.70*** 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.19) 
Dual income 3.77 -0.15 3.41 4.00 -0.53 2.61 
 (7.27) (11.68) (7.70) (7.30) (10.92) (7.73) 
Father alive 0.99* 1.71** -0.34 0.89 1.45** -0.94 
 (0.60) (0.67) (0.76) (0.61) (0.67) (0.81) 
Father resident -3.59 -11.63 5.78 -3.28 -9.00 8.84 
 (5.98) (7.21) (7.29) (6.09) (7.12) (7.62) 
Mother resident 1.14* 1.56** -0.11 1.19** 1.47** 0.04 
 (0.59) (0.69) (0.75) (0.60) (0.68) (0.81) 
White  -2.94*** -3.93 -3.88*** -2.96*** -5.05 -3.33*** 
 (1.09) (3.90) (1.16) (1.09) (3.14) (1.16) 
Coloured  -10.06*** -11.40*** -8.58*** -10.20*** -11.53*** -8.55*** 
 (0.89) (1.14) (1.03) (0.90) (1.11) (1.07) 
Indian  -7.21*** -9.53*** -5.12*** -7.31*** -10.67*** -5.24*** 
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 (1.70) (3.03) (1.73) (1.71) (2.90) (1.79) 
Log income 1.20*** 0.28 3.27*** 1.19*** 0.68** 2.51*** 
 (0.24) (0.38) (0.51) (0.24) (0.35) (0.57) 
_cons 151.45*** 161.25*** 131.85*** 152.33*** 159.77*** 134.79*** 
 (3.95) (4.98) (6.13) (4.00) (4.80) (6.68) 
R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 
No. of Obs. 20,403 14,943 11,663 19,909 15,549 9,716 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as 
percentage points). Program Impact = Treatment interacted with 2012 year dummy. Column 1 shows 
results using both the ‘High income’ control group and the ‘Low income’ control group using means-test 
thresholds for 2008. Column 2 shows results using the ‘Low income’ control group only; and column 3 
shows results for High Income Control group only. ‘High income’ control group for columns (1) and (3) = 
Children from households whose income was greater than R 4 400; who were means-test ineligible and 
did not receive the Child Support Grant. Low income control group for column (2) = Children from 
households whose income was less than R 2 200. Treatment group for columns (1), (2) and (3) is 
comprised of children from households whose incomes were between R 2 200 and R 4 400 who 
received the Child Support Grant. Column (4) shows Difference-in-Differences results using both the 
‘High income’ and ‘Low income’ control groups at means-test threshold of 2012. Column (5) shows DID 
results using the ‘Low income’ control group only at means-test threshold for 2012; and column (6) 
shows results using the High income Control group only at the 2012 means-test threshold. The means-
test threshold was R 2 200 for single caregivers and R 4 400 for double income caregivers in 2008 and 
R 2 800 for single caregivers and R 5 600 for double caregivers in 2012. ***Significant at the 1 percent 
level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4.14: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Boys (using six yearly GHS Data from 2007 to 2012) 
 
(Data – General Household Survey 2007 to 2012.Sample: Male Children aged 13 – 18 years) 
           Based on 2008 means-test Threshold      Based on 2012 Means-test Threshold 
Control group:  High & Low  Low Income   High Income  High & Low  Low Income   High 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Program Impact 6.62 5.85 7.74* 7.78 7.25 9.47* 
 (4.08) (4.17) (4.07) (5.38) (5.50) (5.31) 
Treatment -4.19 -3.06 -3.43 -5.59 -4.80 -5.74 
 (4.07) (4.17) (4.09) (5.37) (5.50) (5.32) 
Dummy 2008 0.39 -0.13 0.65 0.39 0.11 1.03 
 (0.83) (1.02) (1.13) (0.83) (0.97) (1.12) 
Dummy 2009 0.13 1.57* -2.02* 0.13 1.33 -2.87*** 
 (0.75) (0.92) (1.05) (0.76) (0.89) (1.09) 
Dummy 2010 -0.54 0.59 -1.55 -0.46 0.67 -2.17** 
 (0.78) (0.96) (1.04) (0.79) (0.93) (1.06) 
Dummy 2011 -0.04 0.34 -1.48 -0.14 0.16 -1.64 
 (0.82) (1.03) (1.06) (0.83) (1.00) (1.07) 
Dummy 2012 -0.20 -0.09 -1.43 -0.27 -0.34 -1.71 
 (0.92) (1.21) (1.12) (0.94) (1.19) (1.15) 
Head’s Age 5.97*** 5.57*** 6.08*** 5.92*** 6.02*** 6.01*** 
 (1.16) (1.24) (1.66) (1.17) (1.26) (1.81) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.42*** -0.36*** -0.44*** -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.43*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.16) 
Head’s Education 3.83*** 4.52*** 2.84*** 3.83*** 4.66*** 2.73*** 
 (0.43) (0.62) (0.48) (0.43) (0.59) (0.48) 
Household Size -4.64** -2.65 -6.78*** -4.82** -2.48 -6.67*** 
 (1.89) (2.14) (2.37) (1.91) (2.09) (2.58) 
Siblings 3.73 1.91 4.68 4.17 2.28 4.87 
 (2.61) (2.99) (3.27) (2.67) (2.98) (3.58) 
Child’s Age -4.34*** -4.43*** -3.98*** -4.38*** -4.54*** -4.01*** 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.19) 
Dual income 5.69 2.18 0.72 5.42 5.94 0.13 
 (7.13) (11.46) (7.63) (7.15) (10.69) (7.72) 
Father alive 1.83*** 2.21*** 0.31 1.91*** 2.18*** -0.03 
 (0.60) (0.66) (0.77) (0.61) (0.66) (0.86) 
Father resident 1.85 -2.88 11.33 2.21 -2.32 16.38** 
 (5.85) (7.08) (7.04) (5.97) (6.94) (7.50) 
Mother resident 1.71*** 1.93*** 1.57** 1.74*** 2.08*** 1.30 
 (0.57) (0.66) (0.73) (0.58) (0.66) (0.80) 
White  -6.08*** -14.07*** -6.12*** -6.13*** -13.70*** -5.99*** 
 (1.31) (5.13) (1.37) (1.31) (4.13) (1.40) 
Coloured  -13.00*** -15.10*** -9.82*** -13.28*** -15.34*** -9.46*** 
 (0.97) (1.24) (1.08) (0.99) (1.19) (1.13) 
Indian  -9.57*** -6.07* -10.11*** -9.61*** -8.33*** -10.03*** 
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 (1.91) (3.39) (2.01) (1.90) (3.15) (2.02) 
Log income 0.76*** 0.04 2.27*** 0.76*** 0.11 2.20*** 
 (0.23) (0.37) (0.48) (0.24) (0.34) (0.53) 
_cons 131.22*** 136.58*** 115.86*** 131.81*** 136.34*** 117.57*** 
 (3.87) (4.75) (6.28) (3.91) (4.60) (6.87) 
R2 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 
No. of Obs. 20,520 14,936 11,638 20,055 15,607 9,687 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as 
percentage points). Program Impact = Treatment interacted with 2012 year dummy. Column 1 shows 
results using both the ‘High income’ control group and the ‘Low income’ control group using means-
test thresholds for 2008. Column 2 shows results using the ‘Low income’ control group only; and 
column 3 shows results for High Income Control group only. ‘High income’ control group for columns 
(1) and (3) = Children from households whose income was greater than R 4 400; who were means-
test ineligible and did not receive the Child Support Grant. Low income control group for column (2) = 
Children from households whose income was less than R 2 200. Treatment group for columns (1), (2) 
and (3) is comprised of children from households whose incomes were between R 2 200 and R 4 400 
and received the Child Support Grant. Column (4) shows Difference-in-Differences results using both 
the ‘High income’ and ‘Low income’ control groups at means-test threshold of 2012. Column (5) shows 
DID results using the ‘Low income’ control group only at means-test threshold for 2012; and column (6) 
shows results using the High income Control group only at the 2012 means-test threshold. The 
means-test threshold was R 2 200 for single caregivers and R 4 400 for double income caregivers in 
2008 and R 2 800 for single caregivers and R 5 600 for double income caregivers in 2012. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
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Table 4.15: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Children by Highest Grade Completed (using six yearly GHS Data, 2007 to 2012) 
 
(Data: General Household Survey 2007 to 2012 – Using the ‘High income’ control group) 
                  Based on 2008 Means-test Threshold            
  GRADE 8 
(1) 
GRADE 9 
(2) 
GRADE 10 
(3) 
GRADE 12 
(4) 
Program Impact 2.80 3.07 5.28** 72.03*** 
 (3.89) (3.05) (2.18) (7.55) 
Treatment 0.12 1.86 -0.76 -87.81*** 
 (3.84) (2.96) (1.87) (3.39) 
Dummy 2008 0.21 0.89 1.43 -1.98 
 (1.36) (1.57) (1.40) (2.11) 
Dummy 2009 2.32* 2.95* 0.82 -58.71*** 
 (1.32) (1.52) (1.66) (4.52) 
Dummy 2010 3.26** 4.03*** 2.60 -60.58*** 
 (1.32) (1.48) (1.63) (3.63) 
Dummy 2011 2.43* 3.41** 2.27 -67.39*** 
 (1.35) (1.60) (1.67) (4.32) 
Dummy 2012 1.46 2.63 2.09 -59.04*** 
 (1.44) (1.69) (1.90) (6.25) 
Head’s Age 3.22* 5.29** 6.82* -2.74 
 (1.84) (2.55) (3.65) (7.72) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.25 -0.40* -0.51 0.35 
 (0.16) (0.22) (0.33) (0.70) 
Head’s Education 1.18** 1.87*** 2.82*** 9.82*** 
 (0.58) (0.71) (0.71) (2.53) 
Household Size -7.65*** -6.97** 1.02 -3.18 
 (2.85) (3.25) (3.26) (9.13) 
Siblings 5.41 3.31 -4.66 -8.18 
 (4.05) (4.64) (5.04) (12.70) 
Child’s Age -5.69*** -5.12*** -4.43*** -1.18 
 (0.41) (0.42) (0.50) (1.34) 
Dual income 9.07 5.19 -16.95 -5.25 
 (9.67) (10.96) (12.74) (28.11) 
Father alive -0.60 -1.29 -0.41 1.55 
 (1.02) (1.10) (1.27) (3.55) 
Father resident 1.75 -5.83 22.39* 18.60 
 (9.15) (10.47) (11.45) (30.61) 
Mother resident 1.50 1.10 1.78 -0.28 
 (0.97) (1.09) (1.23) (3.22) 
Male child 1.68** 2.71*** 1.15 -0.26 
 (0.72) (0.80) (0.85) (2.37) 
White -4.49** -4.86*** -8.60*** -4.63 
 (1.92) (1.37) (2.42) (4.47) 
Coloured -12.22*** -13.03*** -10.30*** -2.43 
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 (1.59) (1.71) (1.73) (3.25) 
Indian -5.38*** -8.81*** -7.51*** -1.42 
 (1.88) (2.70) (2.83) (4.95) 
Log income 0.97 2.49*** 1.08 4.88*** 
 (0.66) (0.66) (0.78) (1.79) 
_cons 163.01*** 137.46*** 133.60*** 68.56** 
 (9.72) (10.40) (12.12) (33.75) 
R2 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.46 
No. of Obs. 4,224 4,007 3,242 1,065 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
variable = 1 if the child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as percentage points). 
DID results in this table show estimations using the ‘High income’ control group based on 2008 means-
test threshold. ‘High income’ control group = Children from households whose income was greater than 
R 4 400 and did not receive the Child Support Grant. Treatment group is comprised of children from 
households whose income were between R 2 200 and R 4 400 and received the Child Support Grant. 
***Significant 1 percent **Significant at the 5 percent level * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
166 
 
Table 4.16: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Children by Highest Grade Completed (using six yearly GHS Data, 2007 to 2012) 
 
(Data: General Household Survey 2007 to 2012 – Using the ‘Low income’ control group) 
                   Based on 2008 Means-test Threshold            
  GRADE 8 
(1) 
GRADE 9 
(2) 
GRADE 
10 
(3) 
GRADE 
12 
(4) 
Program Impact 1.45 -1.05 7.82*** 71.94*** 
 (4.49) (3.84) (2.22) (7.81) 
Treatment 1.24 2.91 -3.66* -86.18*** 
 (4.41) (3.74) (1.96) (3.34) 
Dummy 2008 -0.66 2.33 -0.39 -0.79 
 (1.50) (1.45) (1.37) (2.50) 
Dummy 2009 5.85*** 7.65*** 1.85 -61.23*** 
 (1.30) (1.42) (1.51) (4.67) 
Dummy 2010 4.38*** 8.72*** 2.88* -64.80*** 
 (1.39) (1.47) (1.51) (3.66) 
Dummy 2011 2.65* 7.98*** 2.10 -65.80*** 
 (1.53) (1.61) (1.62) (4.50) 
Dummy 2012 3.25* 7.09*** 2.04 -68.96*** 
 (1.78) (1.88) (2.15) (6.14) 
Head’s Age 5.94*** 4.11** -0.51 0.87 
 (1.65) (1.77) (1.98) (5.70) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.46*** -0.26* 0.12 -0.02 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.51) 
Head’s Education 2.39*** 2.19** 1.12 6.78*** 
 (0.76) (0.95) (1.00) (2.55) 
Household Size 1.38 -2.94 2.66 -13.71 
 (3.00) (3.00) (3.31) (8.79) 
Siblings -4.05 2.65 -7.75 11.09 
 (4.03) (4.29) (4.79) (12.31) 
Child’s Age -6.38*** -6.37*** -4.97*** -3.54*** 
 (0.35) (0.37) (0.46) (1.37) 
Dual income -12.29 1.04 -18.51 31.88 
 (16.53) (18.17) (19.19) (45.55) 
Father alive 1.33 0.69 2.29** 4.98* 
 (0.90) (0.92) (1.09) (2.90) 
Father resident -6.85 0.23 0.54 -8.10 
 (9.65) (9.79) (11.33) (28.00) 
Mother resident 0.57 1.54* 2.51** 0.51 
 (0.89) (0.92) (1.10) (2.79) 
Male child 3.62*** 4.12*** 4.40*** 3.66* 
 (0.75) (0.76) (0.86) (2.22) 
White -18.24* -5.85 -25.35*** -1.72 
 (9.71) (5.70) (9.30) (11.26) 
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Coloured -15.91*** -16.85*** -15.03*** -2.88 
 (1.74) (1.80) (2.05) (3.10) 
Indian -6.68** -5.91* -4.56 2.79 
 (2.92) (3.43) (3.24) (7.39) 
Log income -0.09 0.15 0.55 -0.55 
 (0.51) (0.53) (0.56) (1.24) 
_cons 168.49*** 171.49*** 165.45*** 144.90*** 
 (7.35) (8.27) (9.70) (28.69) 
R2 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.47 
No. of Observations 5,422 5,617 4,133 1,118 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable = 1 if a child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as percentage points). 
Program Impact = Treatment interacted with 2012 year dummy. DID results in this table show 
estimations using the ‘Low income’ control group on means-test thresholds of 2008. Low income 
control group = Children from households whose income was less than R 2 200 and did not receive the 
Child Support Grant. Treatment group is comprised of children from households whose incomes were 
between R 2 200 and R 4 400 and received the Child Support Grant. ***Significant at the 1 percent 
level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4.17: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Children (using 2007 and 2011 GHS Data) 
 
(Data – General Household Survey 2011 and 2007.Sample: Children aged 13 – 18 years) 
          Based on 2008 means-test Threshold       Based on 2011 Means-test Threshold 
Control group: High & Low  Low Income   High Income  High & Low  Low Income   High 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Program Impact 8.83*** 8.11*** 9.51*** 10.00** 9.34** 10.76** 
 (2.98) (3.03) (3.01) (4.20) (4.25) (4.19) 
Treatment  -5.72* -4.08 -3.68 -7.50* -6.16 -6.48 
 (2.93) (2.99) (3.00) (4.16) (4.22) (4.18) 
Dummy 2012 -0.43 0.42 -2.01** -0.41 0.29 -1.88** 
 (0.66) (0.88) (0.83) (0.66) (0.84) (0.85) 
Head’s Age 4.64*** 3.89*** 4.43** 4.66*** 4.31*** 4.01** 
 (1.27) (1.42) (1.74) (1.30) (1.41) (1.84) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.28** -0.20 -0.25* -0.27** -0.23* -0.21 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) 
Head’s Education 4.37*** 5.22*** 2.46*** 4.39*** 5.38*** 2.05*** 
 (0.50) (0.70) (0.61) (0.51) (0.69) (0.63) 
Household Size -2.09 -0.72 -5.98** -2.07 -0.99 -6.54** 
 (2.13) (2.57) (2.68) (2.16) (2.54) (2.82) 
Siblings  -3.18 -4.79 -1.52 -3.14 -4.91 0.33 
 (3.10) (3.62) (4.10) (3.17) (3.62) (4.36) 
Child’s Age -4.80*** -5.17*** -4.17*** -4.84*** -5.21*** -4.09*** 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.21) (0.16) (0.19) (0.22) 
Dual income 12.21 5.83 12.05 12.14 7.71 8.89 
 (8.30) (12.90) (8.72) (8.33) (12.36) (8.89) 
Father alive 2.22*** 2.91*** 1.20 2.11*** 2.58*** 0.48 
 (0.69) (0.78) (0.91) (0.70) (0.78) (0.95) 
Father resident -1.81 -6.16 4.41 -0.49 -2.22 7.33 
 (6.69) (8.11) (8.35) (6.82) (8.10) (8.76) 
Mother resident  1.31** 1.73** 0.79 1.36** 1.55** 1.30 
 (0.64) (0.75) (0.85) (0.65) (0.75) (0.91) 
Male child 1.11** 1.71*** 0.32 1.07** 1.33** 0.06 
 (0.50) (0.61) (0.60) (0.51) (0.61) (0.62) 
White  -6.95*** -11.60** -8.04*** -7.03*** -10.92*** -7.53*** 
 (1.46) (4.71) (1.56) (1.46) (4.09) (1.56) 
Coloured  -11.40*** -13.67*** -9.01*** -11.58*** -13.51*** -9.15*** 
 (0.96) (1.24) (1.18) (0.97) (1.21) (1.23) 
Indian  -8.02*** -4.32 -8.56*** -8.17*** -6.55* -8.46*** 
 (2.22) (3.33) (2.48) (2.24) (3.44) (2.50) 
Log income 0.99*** -0.52 3.85*** 0.99*** -0.15 3.62*** 
 (0.26) (0.42) (0.62) (0.26) (0.39) (0.68) 
_cons 138.61*** 154.50*** 109.88*** 139.19*** 152.10*** 112.45*** 
 (4.41) (5.61) (7.11) (4.46) (5.45) (7.66) 
R2 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 
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No. of Obs. 14,092 10,500 7,607 13,802 10,701 6,637 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as 
percentage points). Program Impact = Treatment interacted with 2011 year dummy. Column (1) shows 
results using both the ‘High income’ control group and the ‘Low income’ control group using means-test 
thresholds of 2008. Column (2) shows results using the ‘Low income’ control group only; at means-test 
thresholds of 2008. ‘High income’ control group for columns (1) and (2) = Children from households 
whose income was greater than R 4 400; who were means-test ineligible and did receive the Child 
Support Grant. Low income control group = Children from households whose income was less than R 2 
200. Treatment group for columns (1), (2) and (3) is comprised of children from households whose 
income were between R 2 200 and R 4 400 who received the Child Support Grant. Column (4) shows 
Difference-in-Differences results using the ‘High income’ and ‘Low income’ control groups at means-test 
threshold of 2011. Column (5) shows DID results using ‘Low income’ control group at means-test 
threshold for 2011 and Column (6) shows results using the High Income control group at 2012 means-
test threshold. The means-test threshold was R 2 200 for single caregivers and R 4 400 for double 
income caregivers in 2008 and   R 2 600 for single caregivers and R 5 200 for double caregivers in 
2011. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 4.18: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Girls (using 2007 and 2011 GHS Data) 
 
(Data – General Household Survey 2011 and 2007.Sample: Female Children aged 13 – 18 years) 
          Based on 2008 means-test Threshold       Based on 2011 Means-test Threshold 
Control group:  High & Low  Low Income  High Income  High & Low  Low Income  High 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Program Impact 10.92*** 10.47** 11.38*** 12.08** 11.49* 13.10** 
 (4.22) (4.31) (4.32) (5.87) (5.98) (5.92) 
Treatment  -7.45* -6.28 -5.53 -8.99 -8.21 -8.51 
 (4.13) (4.23) (4.28) (5.82) (5.94) (5.87) 
Dummy 2012 -0.55 0.32 -2.13** -0.53 0.34 -2.53** 
 (0.88) (1.19) (1.08) (0.89) (1.13) (1.10) 
Head’s Age 5.14*** 4.71** 2.50 5.35*** 5.48*** 2.54 
 (1.73) (1.94) (2.16) (1.76) (1.93) (2.34) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.33** -0.28 -0.10 -0.34** -0.35** -0.10 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.20) 
Head’s Education 4.30*** 5.56*** 1.93** 4.28*** 5.62*** 1.54* 
 (0.67) (0.92) (0.81) (0.68) (0.90) (0.85) 
Household Size -1.51 0.92 -8.07** -1.46 0.51 -8.84** 
 (2.93) (3.58) (3.73) (2.98) (3.52) (3.86) 
Siblings  -6.74 -10.56** -1.09 -6.93 -10.68** 1.49 
 (4.22) (4.96) (5.40) (4.30) (4.91) (5.64) 
Child’s Age -5.29*** -5.83*** -4.53*** -5.34*** -5.82*** -4.35*** 
 (0.23) (0.28) (0.29) (0.23) (0.27) (0.30) 
Dual income 4.33 -11.43 16.24 3.97 -9.20 11.38 
 (11.67) (18.84) (11.68) (11.75) (17.91) (11.84) 
Father alive 1.61* 2.53** 1.18 1.42 2.07* -0.39 
 (0.97) (1.11) (1.27) (0.99) (1.11) (1.31) 
Father resident -3.95 -5.52 -0.62 -2.57 -0.17 4.77 
 (9.49) (11.58) (11.79) (9.68) (11.49) (12.47) 
Mother resident  1.90** 2.31** 0.89 1.98** 2.08** 1.35 
 (0.89) (1.05) (1.16) (0.91) (1.05) (1.24) 
White  -4.66*** -7.68 -6.11*** -4.74*** -6.99 -5.23*** 
 (1.80) (6.02) (1.97) (1.80) (4.71) (1.93) 
Coloured  -8.00*** -10.41*** -6.22*** -8.15*** -10.21*** -6.43*** 
 (1.27) (1.65) (1.57) (1.28) (1.59) (1.63) 
Indian  -8.79*** -5.70 -7.73** -9.04*** -7.98* -8.15** 
 (3.03) (4.43) (3.26) (3.08) (4.45) (3.35) 
Log income 1.21*** -0.22 3.69*** 1.21*** 0.32 3.20*** 
 (0.36) (0.59) (0.88) (0.36) (0.54) (0.97) 
_cons 144.20*** 161.37*** 124.10*** 144.48*** 156.01*** 126.71*** 
 (6.17) (7.89) (9.66) (6.24) (7.62) (10.36) 
R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 
No. of Obs. 7,110 5,288 3,868 6,958 5,394 3,362 
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Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to interpreted as 
percentage points). Program Impact = Treatment interacted with 2011 year dummy. Column (1) shows 
results using both the ‘High income’ control group and the ‘Low income’ control group using means-test 
thresholds for 2008. Column (2) shows results using the ‘Low income’ control group only; at means-test 
thresholds of 2008. ‘High income’ control group for columns (1) and (3) = Children from households 
whose income was greater than R 4 400; who were means-test ineligible and did not receive the Child 
Support Grant. Low income control group = Children from households whose income was less than R 2 
200. Treatment group for columns (1), (2) and (3) is comprised of children from households whose 
incomes were between     R 2 200 and R 4 400 and received the Child Support Grant. Column (4) 
shows DID results using the ‘High income’ and ‘Low income’ control groups at means-test threshold of 
2011. Column (5) shows DID results using the ‘Low income’ control group only at means-test threshold 
for 2011. The means-test threshold was R 2 200 for single caregivers and R 4 400 for double income 
caregivers in 2008 and   R 2 600 for single caregivers and R 5 200 for double caregivers in 2011. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
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Table 4.19: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Boys (using 2007 and 2011 GHS Data) 
 
(Data – General Household Survey 2011 and 2007.Sample: Male Children aged 13 – 18 years) 
          Based on 2008 means-test Threshold       Based on 2011 Means-test Threshold 
 Control group:  High & Low  Low Income   High Income  High & Low Low Income   High 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Program Impact 7.43* 6.59 8.18* 8.54 7.98 8.90 
 (4.18) (4.25) (4.26) (5.97) (6.03) (5.95) 
Treatment  -4.74 -2.82 -2.53 -6.79 -5.04 -5.24 
 (4.12) (4.20) (4.26) (5.92) (5.99) (5.95) 
Dummy 2012 -0.36 0.44 -1.95* -0.35 0.18 -1.28 
 (0.91) (1.20) (1.15) (0.91) (1.16) (1.18) 
Head’s Age 3.93** 2.91 6.20** 3.76** 2.88 5.13* 
 (1.76) (1.92) (2.57) (1.78) (1.91) (2.65) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.21 -0.11 -0.38* -0.19 -0.10 -0.30 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.22) (0.16) (0.17) (0.23) 
Head’s Education 4.37*** 4.72*** 2.89*** 4.43*** 4.98*** 2.41*** 
 (0.70) (0.99) (0.82) (0.70) (0.97) (0.82) 
Household Size -2.73 -2.47 -3.82 -2.73 -2.55 -4.01 
 (2.89) (3.55) (3.46) (2.93) (3.50) (3.66) 
Siblings  0.78 1.08 -1.46 1.06 1.04 -0.47 
 (4.13) (4.84) (5.39) (4.23) (4.87) (5.76) 
Child’s Age -4.29*** -4.50*** -3.81*** -4.34*** -4.61*** -3.85*** 
 (0.22) (0.26) (0.29) (0.22) (0.26) (0.31) 
Dual income 20.26* 22.77 8.99 20.53* 24.22 7.23 
 (11.34) (17.25) (12.33) (11.35) (16.65) (12.64) 
Father alive 2.80*** 3.13*** 1.26 2.77*** 2.96*** 1.45 
 (0.96) (1.08) (1.31) (0.98) (1.08) (1.39) 
Father resident -0.77 -6.27 7.51 0.41 -3.97 8.19 
 (9.15) (11.00) (11.48) (9.30) (11.02) (12.04) 
Mother resident  0.79 1.12 0.77 0.81 0.99 1.30 
 (0.86) (1.01) (1.14) (0.88) (1.02) (1.21) 
White  -9.19*** -14.09** -9.81*** -9.29*** -13.93** -9.59*** 
 (2.17) (6.89) (2.26) (2.17) (6.27) (2.28) 
Coloured  -14.64*** -16.84*** -11.75*** -14.87*** -16.83*** -11.70*** 
 (1.39) (1.79) (1.67) (1.41) (1.75) (1.72) 
Indian  -7.34*** -2.91 -9.47*** -7.41*** -5.20 -8.83*** 
 (2.84) (4.78) (3.19) (2.84) (4.50) (3.12) 
Log income 0.83** -0.72 4.07*** 0.84** -0.54 4.02*** 
 (0.37) (0.56) (0.80) (0.37) (0.53) (0.87) 
_cons 134.06*** 149.37*** 96.03*** 135.00*** 149.98*** 99.67*** 
 (5.93) (7.42) (9.86) (5.97) (7.28) (10.50) 
R2 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 
No. of Obs. 6,982 5,212 3,739 6,844 5,307 3,275 
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Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as 
percentage points). Program Impact = Treatment interacted with 2011 year dummy. Column (1) shows 
results using both the ‘High income’ control group and the ‘Low income’ control group using means-test 
thresholds for 2008. Column (2) shows results using the ‘Low income’ control group only; at means-test 
thresholds of 2008. ‘High income’ control group for columns (1) and (3) = Children from households 
whose income was greater than R 4 400; who were means-test ineligible and did not receive the Child 
Support Grant. Low income control group = Children from households whose income was less than R 2 
200. Treatment group for columns (1), (2) and (3) is comprised of children from households whose 
incomes were between R 2 200 and R 4 400. Column (4) shows DID results using the ‘High income’ 
and ‘Low income’ control groups at means-test threshold of 2011. Column (5) shows DID results using 
the ‘Low income’ control group only at means-test threshold for 2012. The means-test threshold was R 
2 200 for single caregivers and R 4 400 for double income caregivers in 2008 and R 2 600 for single 
caregivers and R 5 200 for double caregivers in 2011. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant 
at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4.20: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Children by Highest Grade Completed (using 2007 and 2011 GHS Data) 
 
(Data: General Household Survey 2011 and 2007 – Using the ‘High income’ Control group) 
                      Based on 2008 Means-test Threshold            
  GRADE 8 
(1) 
GRADE 9 
(2) 
GRADE 10 
(3) 
GRADE 12 
(4) 
Program Impact 1.77 4.54 9.09*** 65.99*** 
 (3.98) (2.76) (2.94) (7.85) 
Treatment  1.36 3.18 -4.86* -92.34*** 
 (3.79) (2.46) (2.64) (4.60) 
Dummy 2012 2.07 1.33 2.81 -65.45*** 
 (1.56) (1.94) (1.95) (4.51) 
Head’s Age 4.64 2.84 5.13 -11.61 
 (2.85) (4.21) (4.45) (12.99) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.34 -0.12 -0.32 0.93 
 (0.24) (0.36) (0.38) (1.19) 
Head’s Education 1.01 0.83 2.19* 13.40*** 
 (1.07) (1.31) (1.17) (3.79) 
Household Size -13.01*** -8.96 5.04 14.58 
 (4.93) (5.59) (5.56) (13.00) 
Siblings  9.90 6.29 -18.97* -21.01 
 (7.06) (8.37) (9.72) (17.74) 
Child’s Age -5.10*** -4.36*** -5.15*** -2.33* 
 (0.64) (0.71) (0.82) (1.32) 
Dual income 11.40 -2.46 -25.31 9.88 
 (15.42) (17.52) (20.68) (32.81) 
Father alive 0.92 -2.25 -1.54 -1.73 
 (1.77) (1.86) (2.07) (5.11) 
Father resident 11.40 -2.45 37.96** 111.56*** 
 (16.03) (17.27) (18.59) (41.42) 
Mother resident 0.12 1.81 1.35 -0.93 
 (1.60) (1.72) (1.67) (5.05) 
Male child 0.08 2.03 1.91 -3.79 
 (1.16) (1.35) (1.41) (2.91) 
White  -3.31* -4.91** -18.31*** -6.36 
 (1.83) (2.16) (4.85) (5.24) 
Coloured  -11.95*** -12.18*** -11.48*** -2.20 
 (2.44) (2.87) (2.61) (3.40) 
Indian  -1.84 -6.31 -9.15** -15.07*** 
 (1.61) (4.03) (3.74) (5.44) 
Log income 1.15 4.64*** 3.02** -0.03 
 (1.09) (1.27) (1.22) (1.74) 
_cons 149.95*** 114.31*** 135.48*** 149.51*** 
 (14.18) (17.83) (20.07) (42.61) 
R2 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.61 
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Number of Obs. 1,390 1,342 1,151 381 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as 
percentage points). Program Impact = Treatment interacted with 2011 year dummy. DID results in this 
table show estimations using the ‘High income’ control group on means-test thresholds of 2008. ‘High 
income’ control group = Children from households whose income was greater than R 4 400; who were 
means-test ineligible and did not receive the Child Support Grant. Low income control group = Children 
from households whose income was less than R 2 200. Treatment group is comprised of children from 
households whose income were between R 2 200 and R 4 400 and received the Child Support Grant. 
The means-test threshold was R 2 200 for single caregivers and R 4 400 for double income caregivers 
in 2008. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 4.21: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Children by Highest Grade Completed (using 2007 and 2011 GHS Data) 
 
(Data: General Household Survey 2011 and 2007 – Using the ‘Low income’ Control group) 
                       Based on 2008 Means-test Threshold            
  GRADE 8 
(1) 
GRADE 9 
(2) 
GRADE 10 
(3) 
GRADE 12 
(4) 
Program Impact 2.26 -0.40 8.50*** 62.32*** 
 (4.63) (4.50) (3.07) (6.97) 
Treatment  0.61 3.36 -4.19 -83.23*** 
 (4.37) (4.28) (2.85) (4.61) 
Dummy 2012 3.79** 8.57*** 2.62 -62.72*** 
 (1.86) (1.98) (1.88) (4.73) 
Head’s Age 8.81*** 5.41* -1.46 -5.50 
 (2.78) (3.08) (2.98) (8.66) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.65*** -0.33 0.16 0.36 
 (0.24) (0.27) (0.26) (0.74) 
Head’s Education 2.36* 2.97* 1.80 7.98** 
 (1.29) (1.79) (1.28) (4.05) 
Household Size -5.43 -4.93 4.46 5.29 
 (5.02) (5.23) (5.45) (12.93) 
Siblings  6.01 5.15 -16.38** -0.35 
 (6.71) (7.62) (8.24) (17.16) 
Child’s Age -7.10*** -6.80*** -4.97*** -4.94*** 
 (0.56) (0.61) (0.69) (1.71) 
Dual income -11.05 6.84 -26.68 1.58 
 (26.53) (28.48) (28.24) (59.42) 
Father alive 2.75* 1.48 1.17 7.75* 
 (1.58) (1.60) (1.76) (4.52) 
Father resident -17.42 -5.91 27.34 -0.17 
 (17.07) (16.61) (17.68) (38.55) 
Mother resident 0.92 1.90 2.85* 2.93 
 (1.56) (1.53) (1.62) (4.02) 
Male child 3.72*** 3.71*** 4.14*** 4.02 
 (1.27) (1.31) (1.36) (3.15) 
White  -17.42 -10.62 -30.47** -3.81 
 (12.50) (10.20) (14.28) (10.40) 
Coloured  -13.26*** -18.80*** -15.86*** -6.94 
 (2.51) (2.76) (2.94) (4.26) 
Indian  1.65 -10.38 -7.13* 16.31 
 (2.70) (7.07) (4.21) (10.28) 
Log income -1.01 -0.85 0.26 -2.98** 
 (0.82) (0.81) (0.80) (1.48) 
_cons 175.64*** 180.15*** 172.05*** 195.26*** 
 (12.15) (13.58) (14.67) (36.49) 
R2 0.16 0.13 0.08 0.48 
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No. of Observations 1,894 1,958 1,616 461 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as 
percentage points). DID results in this table show estimations using the ‘Low income’ control group on 
means-test thresholds of 2008. ‘High income’ control group = Children from households whose income 
was greater than R 4 400; who were mean-test ineligible and did not receive the Child Support Grant. 
Low income control group = Children from households whose income was less than R 2 200. 
Treatment group is comprised of children from households whose incomes were between R 2 200 and 
R 4 400 and received the Child Support Grant. The means-test threshold was R 2 200 for single 
caregivers and R 4 400 for double income caregivers in 2008. ***Significant at the 1 percent level 
**Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4.22: Instrumental Variables (IV) First Stage Results  
 
(Data: General Household Survey. Sample: Children aged 13 – 18 years) 
                 Based on 2007 and 2011 Data           Based on 2007 and 2012 Data       
  Full Sample 
(1) 
Girls 
(2) 
Boys 
(3) 
Full Sample 
(4) 
Girls 
(5) 
Boys 
(6) 
Eligible x year 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year dummy  0.16*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Head’s Age -0.02 -0.03* 0.00 -0.06*** -0.05** -0.06** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Head’s Age^2 0.00 0.00* -0.00 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Head’s Education -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household Size -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Siblings  0.10*** 0.08* 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.08* 0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Child’s Age -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dual income -0.15* -0.13 -0.17 -0.07 -0.03 -0.10 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) 
Father alive 0.02*** 0.01 0.04*** -0.01 -0.02* -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Father resident -0.39*** -0.32*** -0.47*** -0.42*** -0.32*** -0.52*** 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) 
Mother resident 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male child -0.00   -0.00   
 (0.01)   (0.01)   
White  -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.13*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Coloured  -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Indian  -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.08** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Log income -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
_cons 1.31*** 1.45*** 1.17*** 1.41*** 1.50*** 1.32*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
R2 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.43 0.43 0.43 
No. of Obs. 17,358 8,743 8,615 12,742 6,488 6,254 
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Notes: a. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Dependent Variable is Child Support Grant = 1 if 
the child received the grant and zero otherwise. Eligible x year = ‘having an age-eligible child’ interacted 
with year (i.e. 2011 and 2012 respectively). ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 
percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
b. Test of Endogeneity 
 
Tests of endogeneity           
Ho: variables are exogenous           
            
Robust score chi2(1) = 5.1574 (p = 0.0231)  
Robust regression F(1,12711) = 5.16091 (p = 0.0231)  
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the Child Support Grant is exogenous. In this case I reject the 
null and conclude that the Child Support Grant is endogenous. 
 
c. Test of Overidentifying Restrictions 
 
Since the number of my instruments is equal to the number of endogenous variables, my model is just-
identified. 
 
d. First-stage regression summary statistics 
 
First-stage regression summary statistics     
        
                              Adjusted    Partial      Robust   
Variable                 R-sq.    R-sq.      R-sq.    F(1,12712)   Prob > F 
Child Support Grant        0.4314   0.4306     0.0792     2060.1    0.0000 
Notes: The instruments are jointly significantly different from zero. The instrument is strong with an F 
statistic of 2060.1. Generally, an F statistic over 10 is required to suggest instruments are sufficiently 
strong. 
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Table 4.23: IV Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Children 
 
(Data: General Household Survey. Sample: Children aged 13 – 18 years) 
                 Based on 2007 and 2011 Data           Based on 2007 and 2012 Data       
  Full Sample 
(1) 
Girls 
(2) 
Boys 
(3) 
Full Sample 
(4) 
Girls 
(5) 
Boys 
(6) 
Program Impact 9.23*** 11.82*** 7.08* 12.13*** 11.55*** 12.93*** 
 (2.81) (4.32) (3.68) (2.40) (3.47) (3.32) 
Year dummy  -1.97* -2.89* -1.22 -4.43*** -4.38** -4.59*** 
 (1.06) (1.60) (1.40) (1.22) (1.75) (1.70) 
Head’s Age 4.09*** 4.24*** 3.93*** 8.65*** 9.31*** 7.93*** 
 (0.94) (1.34) (1.32) (1.33) (1.88) (1.89) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.24*** -0.26** -0.22* -0.68*** -0.76*** -0.59*** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.17) 
Head’s Education 4.47*** 4.54*** 4.36*** 4.83*** 4.72*** 4.90*** 
 (0.46) (0.66) (0.65) (0.52) (0.74) (0.73) 
Household Size -2.16 -1.03 -3.40 -1.79 -1.58 -2.22 
 (1.61) (2.35) (2.21) (1.93) (2.79) (2.67) 
Siblings  -3.36 -7.19** 0.85 -1.89 -5.06 1.15 
 (2.25) (3.26) (3.11) (2.65) (3.82) (3.68) 
Child’s Age -3.83*** -4.02*** -3.57*** -3.47*** -3.91*** -3.00*** 
 (0.30) (0.46) (0.39) (0.25) (0.37) (0.33) 
Dual income 11.15 3.64 18.90* 1.26 -4.74 8.12 
 (7.40) (10.71) (10.22) (7.62) (10.98) (10.57) 
Father alive 1.63*** 1.35* 1.92*** 2.10*** 1.82** 2.34** 
 (0.53) (0.75) (0.74) (0.65) (0.92) (0.92) 
Father resident 2.30 3.10 0.53 2.88 2.48 3.52 
 (5.61) (8.03) (7.82) (6.16) (8.75) (8.69) 
Mother resident 0.61 0.57 0.65 3.03*** 2.77** 3.33*** 
 (0.56) (0.83) (0.76) (0.79) (1.14) (1.11) 
Male child 0.97**   0.93*   
 (0.42)   (0.48)   
White  -5.31*** -2.71 -7.79*** -2.06 -2.21 -1.94 
 (1.43) (2.11) (1.95) (1.49) (2.21) (2.01) 
Coloured  -9.87*** -6.86*** -12.78*** -8.75*** -6.65*** -10.85*** 
 (0.68) (0.99) (0.94) (0.73) (1.06) (1.01) 
Indian  -6.87*** -7.02*** -6.74*** -6.40*** -6.12** -6.88** 
 (1.83) (2.64) (2.53) (1.99) (2.80) (2.84) 
Log income 1.07*** 1.47*** 0.77** 1.28*** 1.64*** 0.97*** 
 (0.24) (0.36) (0.32) (0.26) (0.37) (0.36) 
_cons 124.72*** 124.73*** 124.00*** 103.04*** 107.41*** 99.17*** 
 (6.24) (9.82) (7.97) (6.22) (9.15) (8.44) 
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.09 
No. of Obs. 17,335 8,728 8,607 12,730 6,483 6,247 
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Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Dependent Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is 
enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as percentage points). IV used in these 
regressions is ‘having an age-eligible child’ interacted with year (i.e. 2011 and 2012 respectively). 
***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
 
a. F Test of Excluded Instruments 
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments   
F(  1, 12712) =  2060.10     
Prob > F      =  0.0000     
 
b. Summary Results for First-Stage Regressions     
                                                                              
(Underid)        (Weak id)   
Variable          F(1, 12712)  P-value   AP Chi-sq( 1)  P-value  AP F(1, 12712) 
Child Support Grant   2060.10   0.0000    2063.01      0.0000    2060.10   
NB: first-stage test statistics heteroskedasticity-robust       
 
c. Under-Identification Test    
Ho: matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank=K1-1 (underidentified)   
Ha: matrix has rank=K1 (identified)   
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic          Chi-sq(1)=1025.47  P-value=0.0000   
 
d. Weak Instrument Robust Inference         
Tests of joint significance of endogenous regressors B1 in main equation     
Ho: B1=0 and orthogonality conditions are valid       
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F(1,12712)= 13.52 P-value=0.0002   
Anderson-Rubin Wald test Chi-sq(1)= 13.54 P-value=0.0002   
Stock-Wright LM S statistic Chi-sq(1)= 13.45 P-value=0.0002   
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e. Weak Identification Test     
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 1093.411   
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic): 2060.098   
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size 16.38   
15% maximal IV size 8.96   
20% maximal IV size 6.66   
25% maximal IV size 5.53   
NB: Critical values are for Cragg-Donald F statistic and i.i.d. errors. 
 
f. Overidentification Test of all Instruments               
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.000     
                                      (equation exactly identified)     
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Table 4.24: IV Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the Enrolment of Secondary-
School-Aged Children (using six yearly GHS Data from 2007 to 2012) 
 
 
(Data: General Household Survey 2007 to 2012.Sample Children aged 13 - 18) 
 Full Sample Girls Boys 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Program Impact 11.93*** 9.94** 13.94*** 
 (3.41) (4.87) (4.76) 
Dummy 2008 0.03 0.00 0.08 
 (0.52) (0.74) (0.71) 
Dummy 2009 -1.40** -1.47* -1.35 
 (0.59) (0.85) (0.83) 
Dummy 2010 -2.63*** -2.54** -2.72** 
 (0.89) (1.25) (1.25) 
Dummy 2011 -2.93** -2.42 -3.44** 
 (1.23) (1.74) (1.73) 
Dummy 2012 -3.50** -2.65 -4.34** 
 (1.57) (2.24) (2.20) 
Head’s Age 4.74*** 4.03*** 5.34*** 
 (0.56) (0.82) (0.77) 
Head’s Age^2 -0.32*** -0.27*** -0.37*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
Parent Education 4.10*** 3.77*** 4.41*** 
 (0.34) (0.47) (0.49) 
Household Size -3.29*** -2.37* -4.31*** 
 (0.97) (1.42) (1.32) 
Siblings  -0.72 -3.72* 2.47 
 (1.32) (1.90) (1.84) 
Child’s Age -3.50*** -4.22*** -2.78*** 
 (0.38) (0.55) (0.52) 
Dual income 6.85 6.01 7.85 
 (4.60) (6.67) (6.34) 
Father alive 1.01*** 0.74 1.23*** 
 (0.32) (0.45) (0.44) 
Father resident 4.00 1.23 7.15 
 (3.53) (4.98) (5.00) 
Mother resident 0.42 0.22 0.64 
 (0.41) (0.60) (0.57) 
Male child 1.18*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) 
White  -2.64*** -1.29 -3.93*** 
 (0.95) (1.37) (1.31) 
Coloured  -9.71*** -8.50*** -10.89*** 
 (0.47) (0.67) (0.64) 
Indian  -6.57*** -5.39*** -7.86*** 
 (1.08) (1.58) (1.49) 
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Log income 1.22*** 1.37*** 1.07*** 
 (0.18) (0.27) (0.25) 
_cons 117.80*** 131.10*** 105.95*** 
 (7.40) (10.94) (9.97) 
R2 0.09 0.10 0.08 
No. of Observations 50,296 25,078 25,218 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Dependent Variable is Enrolment = 1 if the child is 
enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as percentage points). IV used in these 
regressions is ‘having an age-eligible child’ interacted with year (i.e. 2011 and 2012 respectively). 
***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
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Table 4.25: Panel Fixed Effects Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the 
Enrolment of Secondary-School-Aged Children 
 
               (Data – NIDS Wave 2 and Wave 3. Sample: Children Aged 13 – 18)  
                 Full Sample     Girls       Boys 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Child Support Grant 4.14*** 0.93 8.09*** 
 (1.49) (2.04) (2.18) 
Dummy 2012 -5.62*** -6.38*** -4.73*** 
 (0.81) (1.18) (1.08) 
Log real income 1.32 2.61** 0.04 
 (0.90) (1.28) (1.23) 
Passed previous year 8.80*** 9.49*** 8.20*** 
 (1.92) (2.93) (2.50) 
Mother alive -3.33 -2.11 -3.66 
 (3.84) (4.83) (5.81) 
Father alive 2.46 3.89 0.66 
 (3.02) (3.80) (4.73) 
_cons 75.31*** 62.85*** 87.04*** 
 (8.10) (11.17) (11.63) 
R2 0.05 0.07 0.05 
No. of Observations 5,329 2,701 2,628 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable = 1 if a child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as percentage points). 
Child Support Grant status is binary, which is equal to 1 if the child receives the grant. Sample is 
comprised of children aged 13 – 18 years in 2010. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at 
the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4.26: Panel Fixed Effects Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on the 
Enrolment of Secondary-School-Aged Children by Geo-area 
 
              (Data – NIDS Wave 2 and Wave 3. Sample: Children Aged 13 – 18) 
                      Urban Areas             Rural Areas      
                    Formal    Informal     Tribal   Rural Formal 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Child Support Grant 7.54*** 4.70 2.28 -6.57 
 (2.67) (5.60) (1.96) (6.88) 
Dummy 2012 -6.04*** -9.07** -3.99*** -10.03*** 
 (1.31) (4.02) (1.10) (2.73) 
Log real income -0.77 5.07 1.89* -1.09 
 (1.68) (3.66) (1.13) (3.50) 
Passed previous year 16.53*** 18.57** 2.57 13.03** 
 (3.46) (7.92) (2.63) (5.65) 
Mother alive -4.53 10.58 -7.03 -3.04 
 (3.04) (20.33) (5.42) (4.15) 
Father alive 12.79* 27.77 -2.61 -5.71 
 (6.68) (17.67) (3.35) (8.49) 
_cons 77.10*** 7.43 84.22*** 99.21*** 
 (15.06) (32.54) (9.64) (24.20) 
R2 0.12 0.22 0.02 0.17 
No. of observations 1,776 322 2,850 381 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable = 1 if a child is enrolled in school (scaled up by 100; to be interpreted as percentage points). 
Child Support Grant status is binary, which is equal to 1 if the child receives the grant. Sample is 
comprised of children aged 13 – 18 years in 2010. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at 
the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4.27: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for the Child Support Grant 
 
PANEL I: AGGREGATING COSTS1             
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total  
A. Aggregating costs (in Rands)             
              
Cost of the Grant per Child per year2 2640 2658 2571 2526 2604 12999 
Administration costs3 14 12 10 9 8 53 
Opportunity cost of caregivers4 500 461 429 405 388 2182 
Cost of application5 25 23 21 20 19 109 
Inflation adjusted cost streams6           15344 
              
B. Present value of cost streams (in Rands)7 3179 2920 2599 2350 2219 13268 
              
C. Inflated (to 2012) costs (in Rands)8           13878 
              
D. Costs converted into US Dollars9           1692 
              
PANEL II: AGGREGATING IMPACTS             
E. Total impact (years of schooling)10           0.4995 
              
PANEL III: COST EFFECTIVENESS             
F. Additional school years gained per US$100 11           0.03 
       
Notes:  
1. Costs are aggregated per child per year. I first converted all costs in terms of base year 
followed by a calculation of present value of these cost streams in the base year and then I 
inflated these costs forward to year 2012 (which is my year of analysis).  
2. This figure was obtained by multiplying the grant amount per month by 12 then inflation-adjust 
it. 
3. For this figure, I used the cost to government of applying the means-test as a proxy for 
administration costs. The cost estimates for applying the means-test range in the region of    
R 113.2 million for standard cut-offs (see Children’s Institute and Centre for Actuarial Research; 
2005). I divided this by the number of eligible children in that year and then I inflation-adjust it. 
Administration costs related to this involve official proof of employment and income status of 
the applicant and spouse and marital status; among others. 
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4. Since most beneficiaries of the Child Support Grant are poor, I used farm workers’ earnings to 
calculate the opportunity cost of caregivers’ time. In Western Cape Province, workers earn 
between R 100/200 to R 400/500. I divided R 300 by 7 to get the daily wage which I multiplied 
by 12 and rounded it off to the nearest 100. Anecdotal reports suggest that they spent almost 8 
hours on business related to the Child Support Grant. 
5. Researches on costs (for example Budlender et al. (2005); Children’s Institute; Department of 
Social Development) put the cost of application at an average of R 25. This includes transport 
costs to social service offices, police stations and Home Affairs Offices and other ancillary 
costs such as photocopying of required documentation. I also inflation adjusted this cost. 
6. To account for the fact that inflated costs may make later costs appear larger even if they are 
identical in real terms (see Dhaliwal et al., 2012), I deflated them back to their real value in the 
base year. I used GDP deflators obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators. GDP 
deflators have an advantage of covering a wide range of goods and services of the kind used 
in most anti-poverty programs over Consumer Price Indices. 
7. To capture time preference and calculate present values of cost streams in the base year, I 
used a discount rate of 8 percent as my social opportunity cost of capital. I settled for 8 percent 
after taking the average of social cost of capital for different social projects in different sectors 
in South Africa, including education. 
8. I used the 2012 GDP deflator (annual inflation) figure of 4.5 percent obtained from World 
Development Indicators to inflate forward the cost streams to 2012. 
9. I used the average official exchange rate for 2012 of US$1: R8.2 obtained from World 
Development Indicators. 
10. To calculate total impact, I calculated the total years of schooling achieved in the treatment and 
netted (subtracted from it) total years of schooling achieved in the control group. I used a 
program impact of 11.06 percentage points (per year) as obtained in my results. In obtaining 
total years of schooling I multiplied enrolment rate by conditional attendance rate. Since I did 
not estimate the effect of the Child Support Grant on daily attendance due to limitation of data 
on daily attendance, I assumed an absenteeism rate of 10 percent. I multiplied the program 
impact per child by attendance rate (0.9) and then multiplied the product by the period (5 
years). 
11. To calculate Additional school years gained per US$100 spent, I divided the total impact over 
the period by the total cost and multiplied it by 100. 
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics – Full Sample and Children aged 10 – 14 years; NIDS Wave 1, 
Wave 2, and Wave 3 
 
 
PANEL A 
                 Full sample – below 15 years           Aged 10 – 14 years            
Year: 2008 2010 2012  2008 2010 2012 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Height for Age Z-score -0.913 -1.007 -1.003  -0.850 -1.142 -1.201 
 (1.439) (1.422) (1.364)  (1.107) (1.307) (1.265) 
Child Support Grant 0.724 0.766 0.777  0.670 0.736 0.748 
 (0.447) (0.423) (0.417)  (0.471) (0.441) (0.434) 
Household Size 6.783 7.060 6.776  6.395 6.825 6.675 
 (3.230) (3.520) (3.589)  (3.007) (3.363) (3.411) 
Household real income 2,394 2,880 3,174  2,480 3,106 3,257 
 (4,369) (6,142) (7,155)  (4,259) (6,788) (6,878) 
Real expenditure on food 863.6 884.7 840.2  835.9 905.3 865.5 
 (569.9) (574.1) (740.4)  (530.6) (616.8) (895.5) 
Rural formal areas 0.0883 0.0843 0.0846  0.0722 0.0862 0.0791 
 (0.284) (0.278) (0.278)  (0.259) (0.281) (0.270) 
Tribal Authority areas 0.551 0.536 0.509  0.505 0.521 0.514 
 (0.497) (0.499) (0.500)  (0.501) (0.500) (0.500) 
Urban informal areas 0.0617 0.0698 0.0673  0.0653 0.0592 0.0669 
 (0.241) (0.255) (0.251)  (0.247) (0.236) (0.250) 
Age  5.329 7.504 9.180  10.03 11.10 12.03 
 (2.921) (3.035) (3.087)  (0.182) (0.917) (1.407) 
Male child 0.511 0.510 0.513  0.460 0.518 0.512 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)  (0.499) (0.500) (0.500) 
        
Observations 3,794 3,121 4,383  291 963 2,047 
 
 PANEL B 
                 Full sample – below 15 years            Aged 10 – 14 years            
Year: 2008 2010 2012  2008 2010 2012 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Weight for Age Z-score -0.347 -0.252 -0.330  -0.342 -0.473  -0.328 
 (1.406) (1.455) (1.376)  (1.236) (1.029) (1.340) 
        
Observations 3,616 2,235 2,428  67 58 65 
                                                                                                  
Notes: Standard Deviations are in parenthesis 
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics – Children aged 5 – 9 and 1 – 4 Years; NIDS Wave 1, Wave 2 and 
Wave 3 
 
 
 PANEL A 
                     Aged 5 – 9 years                Aged 1 – 4 years            
Year: 2008 2010 2012  2008 2010 2012 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Height for Age Z-score -0.794 -0.845 -0.795  -1.216 -1.190 -1.091 
 (1.279) (1.443) (1.393)  (1.503) (1.495) (1.617) 
Child Support Grant 0.738 0.778 0.799  0.739 0.782 0.820 
 (0.440) (0.415) (0.401)  (0.439) (0.413) (0.385) 
Household Size 6.675 7.210 6.872  6.954 7.058 6.808 
 (3.144) (3.609) (3.696)  (3.355) (3.522) (4.057) 
Household real income 2,444 2,749 3,145  2,340 2,850 2,767 
 (4,587) (5,187) (7,696)  (4,113) (7,137) (4,407) 
Real expenditure on food 864.7 884.4 821.6  862.0 854.0 782.2 
 (574.1) (571.2) (581.8)  (573.3) (510.1) (468.0) 
Rural formal areas 0.0848 0.0855 0.0910  0.0933 0.0785 0.0752 
 (0.279) (0.280) (0.288)  (0.291) (0.269) (0.264) 
Tribal Authority areas 0.550 0.551 0.502  0.560 0.523 0.526 
 (0.498) (0.498) (0.500)  (0.497) (0.500) (0.500) 
Urban informal areas 0.0668 0.0697 0.0653  0.0524 0.0863 0.0827 
 (0.250) (0.255) (0.247)  (0.223) (0.281) (0.276) 
Age  7.013 7.017 7.013  2.625 3.231 3.992 
 (1.406) (1.436) (1.408)  (1.106) (0.743) (0.0865) 
Male child 0.513 0.495 0.515  0.522 0.532 0.496 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)  (0.500) (0.499) (0.501) 
        
Observations 1,945 1,521 2,066  1,394 637 266 
 
 PANEL B 
                    Aged 5 – 9 years                 Aged 1 – 4 years            
Year: 2008 2010 2012  2008 2010 2012 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
          
Weight for Age Z-score   -0.474 -0.290 -0.314   -0.263 -0.141 -0.453 
 (1.345) (1.459) (1.360)  (1.401) (1.474) (1.498) 
        
Observations 1,953 1,536 2,088  1,434 641 275 
                                                                                                    
Notes: Standard Deviations are in parenthesis 
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Table 5.3: Summary Statistics on Height and Weight; NIDS Wave1, Wave 2 and Wave 3 
 
Panel A: Children Aged 1 – 4 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Children Aged 5 – 9 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Children Aged 10 – 14 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
 
                 2008            2010             2012       
 Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs.  
 (sd)  (sd)  (sd)   
        
Height 89.73 1,500 94.60 681 101.1 274  
 (17.01)  (16.75)  (9.548)   
        
Weight 14.67 1,471 17.16 669 16.81 275  
 (7.220)  (11.09)  (3.394)   
        2008             2010             2012       
 Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs.  
 (sd)  (sd)  (sd)   
        
Height 118.7 2,033 117.5 1,598 119.1 2,093  
 (14.10)  (18.00)  (11.54)   
        
Weight 23.54 1,978 24.46 1,559 23.75 2,094  
 (7.747)  (9.166)  (6.428)   
             2008              2010             2012       
 Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs.  
 (sd)  (sd)  (sd)   
        
Height 133.5 302 136.8 1,017 144.1 2,060  
 (13.48)  (18.69)  (11.29)   
        
Weight 31.11 295 36.02 994 39.93 2,059  
 (7.120)  (11.22)  (11.25)   
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Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics of Take-up rates by Treatment and Control groups, NIDS Wave 1, 
Wave 2 and Wave 3 
 
Panel A: Treatment group based on 2008 means-test threshold 
  2008 2010 2012   
  mean mean mean   
VARIABLES  (sd) (sd) (sd)   
Child Support 
Grant 
 0.63 0.76 0.81   
  (0.48) (0.43) (0.40)   
       
No. of Obs.  582 941 1,319   
 
Panel B: High income Control group based on 2008 means-test threshold 
   2008 2010 2012   
  mean mean mean   
VARIABLES  (sd) (sd) (sd)   
Child Support 
Grant  
 0.58 0.57 0.59   
  (0.49) (0.50) (0.49)   
       
No. of Obs.  1,723 1,309 1,431   
 
Panel C: Treatment group based on 2012 means-test threshold 
  2008 2010 2012   
  mean mean mean   
VARIABLES  (sd) (sd) (sd)   
Child Support 
Grant 
 0.52 0.69 0.79   
  (0.50) (0.46) (0.41)   
       
No. of Obs.  440 728 1,109   
 
Panel D: High income control group based on 2012 means-test threshold 
   2008 2010 2012   
  mean mean mean   
VARIABLES  (sd) (sd) (sd)   
Child Support 
Grant  
 0.60 0.57 0.55   
  (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)   
       
No. of Obs.  1,611 1,148 1,133   
Notes: Standard Deviations are in parenthesis 
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Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics, NIDS (2008) – by Treatment and Control groups   
  
(Children aged below 15 years) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS IN THE BASE YEAR – 2008                
                  Control Group          Treatment Group     Difference in Means    
VARIABLES Mean(SD) Obs. Mean(SD) Obs. p-value  
       
Height-for-age -0.916 2325 -0.985 467 0.353  
 
Weight-for-age 
 
(1.483) 
-0.366 
(1.421) 
 
2190 
 
(1.405) 
-0.329 
(1.388) 
 
467 
 
 
0.614 
 
 
 
 
Boys 0.513 3074 0.554 603 0.064  
 (0.500)  (0.497)    
Girls 0.487 3074 0.446 603 0.064  
 (0.500)  (0.497)    
Age 4.955 3074 4.789 603 0.230  
 (3.102)  (3.131)    
Mother alive 0.944 3014 0.905 590 0.251  
 (0.229)  (0.205)    
Father alive 0.892 2970 0.905 579 0.361  
 (0.310)  (0.293)    
Good health 0.327 3011 0.313 591 0.493  
 (0.469)  (0.464)    
Fair health 0.267 3011 0.235 591 0.104  
 (0.443)  (0.424)    
Birthplace: Clinic 0.112 2995 0.092 584 0.162  
 (0.316)  (0.290)    
Birthplace: Home 0.084 2995 0.062 584 0.068  
 (0.278)  (0.241)    
Checkup: once 0.229 2941 0.232 577 0.873  
 (0.420)  (0.423)    
Checkup: more 1 0.338 2941 0.364 577 0.229  
 (0.473)  (0.482)    
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The Control group is comprised of both the ‘Low income’ 
and ‘High income’ control groups. The Low income control group is comprised of children from 
households with household income less than or equal to R 2 200. The High income control group is 
comprised of children from households with household income greater than R 4 400. Treatment group 
is comprised of children from households with household income greater than R 2 200 and less than or 
equal to R 4 400. 
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Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics, NIDS (2008) – Based on the ‘Low income’ Control Group  
  
(Children aged below 15 years) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS IN THE BASE YEAR – 2008                
                  Control Group          Treatment Group     Difference in Means    
VARIABLES Mean(SD) Obs. Mean(SD) Obs. p-value  
       
Height-for-age -0.963 452 -1.027 155 0.634  
 
Weight-for-age 
 
(1.502) 
-0.279 
(1.562) 
 
419 
 
(1.100) 
-0.324 
(1.318) 
 
148 
 
 
0.753 
 
 
 
 
Boys 0.513 704 0.504 236 0.820  
 (0.500)  (0.501)    
Girls 0.487 704 0.496 236 0.820  
 (0.189)  (0.501)    
Age 4.214 704 4.500 236 0.263  
 (3.397)  (3.364)    
Mother alive 0.885 671 0.924 223 0.105  
 (0.319)  (0.266)    
Father alive 0.878 664 0.914 220 0.149  
 (0.328)  (0.282)    
Good health 0.298 671 0.304 236 0.876  
 (0.458)  (0.461)    
Checkup: more 1 0.359 644 0.330 218 0.448  
 (0.480)  (0.471)    
Birth place: Clinic 0.112 660 0.095 221 0.479  
 (0.316)  (0.294)    
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The control group in this table is limited to the ‘Low 
income’ control group and who DID NOT receive the Child Support Grant. The Low income control 
group is comprised of children from households with household income less than or equal to R 2 200. 
Treatment group is comprised of children from households with household income greater than R 2 200 
and less than or equal to R 4 400. 
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Table 5.7: Descriptive Statistics, NIDS (2008) – Based on the ‘Low income’ Control Group  
  
(Children aged below 15 years) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS IN THE BASE YEAR – 2008                
                  Control Group          Treatment Group     Difference in Means    
VARIABLES Mean(SD) Obs. Mean(SD) Obs. p-value  
       
Height-for-age -0.953 2105 -0.985 467 0.669  
 
Weight-for-age 
 
(1.490) 
-0.414 
(1.403) 
 
2105 
 
(1.405) 
-0.329 
(1.388) 
 
436 
 
 
0.250 
 
 
 
 
Boys 0.510 2737 0.554 603 0.053  
 (0.500)  (0.497)    
Girls 0.490 2737 0.446 603 0.053  
 (0.500)  (0.497)    
Age 4.935 2737 4.789 603 0.296  
 (3.099)  (3.131)    
Mother alive 0.943 2702 0.956 590 0.223  
 (0.231)  (0.205)    
Father alive 0.886 2659 0.905 579 0.179  
 (0.318)  (0.293)    
Good health 0.333 2700 0.313 591 0.342  
 (0.471)  (0.464)    
Checkup: once 0.223 2632 0.232 577 0.613  
 (0.416)  (0.423)    
Checkup: more 1 0.330 2632 0.364 577 0.120  
 (0.470)  (0.482)    
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The control group in this table is limited to the ‘Low 
income’ control group both who RECEIVED and those who DID NOT RECEIVE the Child Support 
Grant. The Low income control group is comprised of children from households with household income 
less than or equal to R 2 200. Treatment group is comprised of children from households with 
household income greater than R 2 200 and less than or equal to R 4 400. 
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Table 5.8: Descriptive Statistics, NIDS (2008) – Based on the ‘High income’ Control Group  
  
(Children aged below 15 years) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS IN THE BASE YEAR – 2008                
                  Control Group          Treatment Group     Difference in Means    
VARIABLES Mean(SD) Obs. Mean(SD) Obs. p-value  
       
Height-for-age -0.826 1270 -0.985 467 0.03  
 
Weight-for-age 
 
Household Size 
 
Indian 
 
(1.349) 
-0.242 
(1.412) 
70.89 
(3.721) 
0.006 
(0.078) 
 
1192 
 
1871 
 
1817 
 
(1.405) 
-0.329 
(1.388) 
7.174 
(3.118) 
0.008 
(0.091) 
 
436 
 
603 
 
603 
 
 
0.273 
 
0.611 
 
0.557 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Boys 0.507 1817 0.554 603 0.048  
 (0.500)  (0.497)    
Girls 0.493 1817 0.446 603 0.048  
 (0.500)  (0.497)    
Age 4.844 1817 4.789 603 0.712  
 (3.125)  (3.131)    
Mother alive 0.946 1738 0.956 590 0.369  
 (0.225)  (0.205)    
Father alive 0.911 1738 0.905 579 0.653  
 (0.285)  (0.293)    
Good health 0.276 1741 0.313 591 0.088  
 (0.447)  (0.464)    
Fair health 0.223 1741 0.235 591 0.536  
 (0.416)  (0.424)    
Checkup: once 0.250 1669 0.232 577 0.381  
 (0.433)  (0.423)    
Checkup: more 1 0.349 1669 0.364 577 0.526  
 (0.477)  (0.481)    
Birth place: Clinic 0.084 1722 0.092 584 0.510  
 (0.277)  (0.290)    
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The control group in this table is limited to the ‘High 
income’ control group. The High income control group is comprised of children from households with 
household income greater than R 4 400. Treatment group is comprised of children from households 
with household income greater than R 2 200 and less than or equal to R 4 400. 
 
 
197 
 
Table 5.9: Descriptive Statistics, NIDS (2008) – by Control groups Based on 2008 Means-Test 
Threshold   
  
(Children aged below 15 years) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS IN THE BASE YEAR – 2008                
                  Control: Group 1         Control: Group 2     Difference in Means    
VARIABLES Mean(SD) Obs. Mean(SD) Obs. p-value  
       
Height-for-age -0.844 901 -0.924 2433 0.155  
 (1.47)  (1.43)    
Boys 0.520 1359 0.504 3036 0.309  
 (0.50)  (0.50)    
Girls 0.480 1359 0.496 3036 0.309  
 (0.50)  (0.50)    
Father alive 0.905 1341 0.891 2980 0.154  
 (0.293)  (0.312)    
Fair health 0.252 1355 0.25 3032 0.907  
 (0.43)  (0.43)    
Illness history 0.053 1346 0.052 2991 0.935  
 (0.224)  (0.222)    
Checkup: once 0.234 1304 0.234 2946 0.999  
 (0.423)  (0.423)    
Urban informal 0.079 1359 0.066 3036 0.133  
 (0.269)  (0.249)    
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Control group 1 is comprised of both the ‘Low income’ 
and ‘High income’ control groups who did not receive the grant. Group 2 is comprised of both the ‘Low 
income’ and ‘High Income’ control groups who received the grant. The Low income control group is 
comprised of children from households with household income less than or equal to R 2 200. The High 
income control group is comprised of children from households with household income greater than R 4 
400. Here I am interested in seeing whether the two groups were homogenous in 2008. 
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Table 5.10: Descriptive Statistics, NIDS (2008) – by Control groups Based on 2012 Means-Test 
Threshold   
  
(Children aged below 15 years) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS IN THE BASE YEAR – 2008                
                  Control: Group 1         Control: Group 2     Difference in Means    
VARIABLES Mean(SD) Obs. Mean(SD) Obs. p-value  
       
Height-for-age -0.987 481 -0.916 2991 0.316  
 (1.492)  (1.423)    
Weight-for-age -0.290 444 -0.370 2814 0.265  
 (1.553)  (1.378)    
Boys 0.509 717 0.510 3820 0.955  
 (0.50)  (0.50)    
Girls 0.491 717 0.490 3820 0.955  
 (0.50)  (0.50)    
Father alive 0.882 709 0.897 3749 0.223  
 (0.323)  (0.304)    
Head’s Education 5.822 701 5.892 3763 0.729  
 (4.429)  (5.00)    
Good health 0.299 715 0.317 3814 0.357  
 (0.458)  (0.465)    
Fair health 0.273 715 0.243 3814 0.1  
 (0.446)  (0.429)    
Birthplace: Clinic 0.110 706 0.103 3786 0.551  
 (0.314)  (0.304)    
Illness history 0.046 710 0.053 3769 0.452  
 (0.211)  (0.225)    
Checkup: once 0.220 690 0.237 3702 0.329  
 (0.415)  (0.426)    
Checkup: more 1 0.359 690 0.334 3702 0.203  
 (0.472)  (0.480)    
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Control group 1 is comprised of both the ‘Low income’ 
and ‘High income’ control groups who did not receive the grant. Group 2 is comprised of both the ‘Low 
income’ and ‘High Income’ control groups who received the grant. The Low income control group is 
comprised of children from households with household income less than or equal to R 2 800. The High 
income control group is comprised of children from households with household income greater than   
R 5 600. Here I am interested in seeing whether the two groups were homogenous in 2008. 
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Table 5.11: Summary Statistics on Type and Expenditure of Food Consumed 
 
Consuming Type of Food           Real Expenditure Amount   
 2008  2010  2008 2010 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Red meat 0.556 0.643  69.19 85.76 
 (0.497) (0.479)  (142.3) (124.4) 
Chicken  0.914 0.932  82.67 93.43 
 (0.281) (0.253)  (79.04) (163.9) 
Fish  0.189 0.238  10.09 10.13 
 (0.391) (0.426)  (36.75) (28.02) 
Tinned fish 0.471 0.599  15.36 20.12 
 (0.499) (0.490)  (34.05) (26.04) 
Dairy  0.608 0.678  24.37 28.33 
 (0.488) (0.467)  (46.93) (45.26) 
Eggs  0.683 0.770  23.82 28.50 
 (0.465) (0.421)  (22.98) (29.54) 
Soya food  0.350 0.371  6.555 9.162 
 (0.477) (0.483)  (14.44) (45.88) 
      
Observations 5,999 5,696  5,339 5,490 
Notes: Standard Deviations are in parenthesis. Figures not in parenthesis are means. Results are on a 
selected type of food. Columns (1) and (2) show proportion of households consuming type of food 
mentioned. Columns (3) and (4) show real expenditure amounts spend on each type of food. 
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Table 5.12: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-age 
  
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Dependent Variable = Height-for-age Z-score)   
                       Based on 2008 Means-Test Threshold                          
Age Cohort:                 Below 15   10 – 14 years     5 – 9 years   1 – 4 years   
         (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Program Impact 0.299* 0.107  0.253 0.337 
 (0.166) (0.239)  (0.271) (0.474) 
Treatment  -0.331** -0.148  -0.312 -0.536 
 (0.156) (0.228)  (0.253) (0.346) 
Dummy 2010 0.135 -0.424*  0.155 0.431 
 (0.134) (0.220)  (0.207) (0.312) 
Dummy 2012 0.106 -0.320*  0.100 0.280 
 (0.080) (0.169)  (0.108) (0.291) 
Log real income 0.049** 0.001  0.090** 0.056 
 (0.023) (0.033)  (0.036) (0.062) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.180*** 0.174**  0.165** 0.162 
 (0.049) (0.074)  (0.074) (0.150) 
Household size -0.013* 0.001  -0.012 -0.044* 
 (0.007) (0.010)  (0.011) (0.023) 
Rural formal -0.154 -0.175  -0.047 -0.384 
 (0.110) (0.171)  (0.163) (0.267) 
Tribal areas -0.082 -0.301***  -0.084 0.238 
 (0.071) (0.106)  (0.104) (0.204) 
Urban informal -0.111 -0.151  -0.175 0.000 
 (0.110) (0.138)  (0.181) (0.334) 
Father alive -0.032 0.011  -0.131 0.107 
 (0.078) (0.096)  (0.132) (0.291) 
Household Head’s education -0.001 0.014  -0.010 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.015) 
Coloured  -0.194** -0.201*  -0.208* -0.011 
 (0.075) (0.115)  (0.111) (0.201) 
Indian  0.155 -0.157  0.272 0.428* 
 (0.275) (0.569)  (0.348) (0.250) 
White  0.381* 0.594**  0.108 0.670 
 (0.207) (0.269)  (0.332) (0.611) 
Age  -0.043*** -0.137***  -0.033 0.053 
 (0.009) (0.030)  (0.029) (0.088) 
Male child -0.046 -0.107  0.033 -0.142 
 (0.053) (0.077)  (0.081) (0.154) 
Health status: Good -0.070 -0.182**  -0.032 -0.045 
 (0.061) (0.088)  (0.093) (0.177) 
Health status: Fair -0.156** -0.205*  -0.058 -0.157 
 (0.070) (0.106)  (0.103) (0.187) 
Place of Birth: Clinic -0.020 -0.086  0.108 0.006 
 (0.102) (0.143)  (0.161) (0.263) 
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Place of Birth: Home -0.415*** -0.463***  -0.376* -0.391 
 (0.120) (0.163)  (0.192) (0.335) 
Health checkup: once -0.119* -0.169*  -0.045 0.048 
 (0.067) (0.095)  (0.102) (0.212) 
Checkup: more than twice -0.198*** -0.160*  -0.078 -0.180 
 (0.064) (0.095)  (0.093) (0.197) 
_cons -1.810*** 0.002  -1.943*** -2.536*** 
 (0.342) (0.612)  (0.553) (0.979) 
R2 0.04 0.10  0.03 0.06 
Number of Observations 2,741 1,001  1,279 408 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Treatment group 
is comprised of children from households with incomes greater than R 2 200 and less than or equal to 
R 4 400 who received the grant. The control group is comprised of children who did not receive the 
grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible). Real income = Household income less government 
grants; in 2008 terms. Health status is binary with base = ‘excellent’. The classification was re-
categorized into: Very good = good, below very good = fair. Health checkup is binary with base = ‘never’  
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Table 5.13: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-age for Children 
in Urban Formal Areas 
  
(Data: NIDS Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Sample: Urban Formal Areas) 
                         Based on 2008 Means-Test Threshold                     
Age Cohort:                 Below 15   10 – 14 years        5 – 9 years  1 – 4 years         
(1)         (2)                    (3)          (4)        
Program Impact 0.601** -0.138  0.853** 0.165 
 (0.239) (0.370)  (0.377) (0.726) 
Treatment  -0.544** 0.213  -0.879** -0.770 
 (0.216) (0.349)  (0.344) (0.472) 
Dummy 2010 0.420** -0.086  0.534* 0.468 
 (0.178) (0.299)  (0.292) (0.392) 
Dummy 2012 0.104 -0.373  0.249* 0.328 
 (0.112) (0.231)  (0.147) (0.452) 
Log real income 0.101*** 0.100*  0.104* 0.196* 
 (0.038) (0.059)  (0.057) (0.100) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.043 -0.021  0.111 0.023 
 (0.075) (0.128)  (0.104) (0.242) 
Household size -0.048*** -0.036  -0.038* -0.093* 
 (0.016) (0.025)  (0.021) (0.054) 
Father alive 0.087 0.258  -0.151 -0.241 
 (0.126) (0.174)  (0.195) (0.299) 
Household Head’s education -0.002 -0.015  0.001 -0.028 
 (0.010) (0.016)  (0.015) (0.026) 
Coloured  -0.130 -0.178  -0.145 0.161 
 (0.083) (0.136)  (0.123) (0.228) 
Indian  0.130 1.705***  -0.283 0.423 
 (0.391) (0.236)  (0.409) (0.542) 
White  0.466** 0.712**  0.214 0.626 
 (0.215) (0.277)  (0.347) (0.732) 
Age  -0.016 -0.140***  0.037 0.117 
 (0.013) (0.051)  (0.041) (0.134) 
Male child -0.102 -0.210  -0.005 0.121 
 (0.080) (0.128)  (0.115) (0.232) 
Health status: Good -0.056 -0.069  -0.194 0.243 
 (0.092) (0.146)  (0.129) (0.294) 
Health status: Fair -0.185* -0.239  -0.270 0.035 
 (0.108) (0.169)  (0.164) (0.274) 
Place of Birth: Clinic -0.128 -0.068  -0.212 0.236 
 (0.213) (0.300)  (0.313) (0.748) 
Place of Birth: Home -0.866*** -0.794**  -0.939*** -0.905** 
 (0.189) (0.368)  (0.306) (0.389) 
Health checkup: once -0.142 -0.138  -0.035 -0.522 
 (0.096) (0.148)  (0.139) (0.344) 
Checkup: more than twice -0.255** -0.182  -0.118 -0.633* 
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 (0.101) (0.152)  (0.148) (0.358) 
_cons -1.407*** 0.816  -2.087*** -1.904 
 (0.502) (1.034)  (0.770) (1.414) 
R2 0.08 0.13  0.09 0.16 
Number of Observations 1,068 399  496 159 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable = Height-for-age Z-score. Treatment group is comprised of children from households with 
incomes greater than R 2 200 and less than or equal to R 4 400 who received the grant. The control 
group is comprised of children who did not receive the grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible). 
Real income = Household income - government grants; in 2008 dollar -terms. Health status is binary 
with base = ‘excellent’. The classification was re-categorized into: Very good = good, below very good = 
fair. Health checkup is binary with base = ‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 
5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.14: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-age for Children 
in Tribal Authority Areas  
  
 
 (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Sample: Children in Tribal Authority Areas) 
                           Based on 2008 Means-Test Threshold                        
 Age Cohort:             Below 15   10 – 14 years        5 – 9 years    1 – 4 years    
(1)    (2)                   (3)             (4)       
Program Impact 0.249 0.200  0.044 1.090 
 (0.251) (0.337)  (0.393) (0.683) 
Treatment  -0.234 -0.226  -0.020 -0.755 
 (0.235) (0.315)  (0.362) (0.545) 
Dummy 2010 -0.125 -0.701**  -0.065 0.777 
 (0.215) (0.330)  (0.307) (0.538) 
Dummy 2012 -0.065 -0.364  -0.103 0.312 
 (0.131) (0.252)  (0.181) (0.418) 
Log real income 0.027 -0.064  0.103** -0.005 
 (0.033) (0.047)  (0.051) (0.091) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.311*** 0.252**  0.325*** 0.252 
 (0.081) (0.115)  (0.124) (0.287) 
Household size -0.009 0.006  -0.017 -0.026 
 (0.009) (0.012)  (0.014) (0.028) 
Father alive -0.088 -0.106  -0.134 0.366 
 (0.109) (0.130)  (0.179) (0.511) 
Household Head’s education -0.007 0.037***  -0.026** -0.023 
 (0.009) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.022) 
Age  -0.071*** -0.127***  -0.037 -0.206 
 (0.014) (0.044)  (0.044) (0.153) 
Male child -0.007 -0.154  0.112 -0.278 
 (0.082) (0.113)  (0.125) (0.225) 
Health status: Good -0.103 -0.402***  0.086 -0.185 
 (0.096) (0.130)  (0.150) (0.260) 
Health status: Fair -0.089 -0.213  0.108 0.052 
 (0.101) (0.162)  (0.139) (0.322) 
Place of Birth: Clinic 0.117 -0.030  0.385* -0.101 
 (0.139) (0.188)  (0.209) (0.329) 
Place of Birth: Home -0.339** -0.418**  -0.219 -0.250 
 (0.160) (0.187)  (0.281) (0.523) 
Health checkup: once -0.080 -0.145  -0.011 0.197 
 (0.102) (0.142)  (0.158) (0.285) 
Checkup: more than twice -0.215** -0.061  -0.150 -0.319 
 (0.097) (0.140)  (0.143) (0.283) 
_cons -2.279*** -0.441  -3.055*** -1.986 
 (0.552) (0.889)  (0.918) (1.668) 
R2 0.05 0.11  0.04 0.08 
Number of Observations 1,245 450  590 175 
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Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable = Height-for-age Z-score. Treatment group is comprised of children from households with 
incomes greater than R 2 200 and less than or equal to R 4 400 who received the grant. The control 
group is comprised of children who did not receive the grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible). 
Program impact = Treatment interacted with 2012 year dummy. Real income = Household income less 
government grants; in 2008 dollar -terms. Health status is binary with base = ‘excellent’; the 
classification was re-categorized into: Very good = good, below very good = fair. Health checkup is 
binary with base = ‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.15: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Weight-for-age 
  
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Dependent Variable = Weight-for-age Z-score)                 
                       Based on 2008 Means-Test Threshold                          
Age Cohort:            Below 15 years  10 – 14  5 – 9 years  1 – 4 years                              
            (1)       (2)      (3)  (4)  
Program Impact 0.114  0.272 -0.491  
 (0.193)  (0.235) (0.416)  
Treatment  -0.292*  -0.342 -0.095  
 (0.170)  (0.215) (0.265)  
Dummy 2010 0.139  0.302 0.059  
 (0.147)  (0.186) (0.233)  
Dummy 2012 0.077  0.118 0.181  
 (0.099)  (0.112) (0.294)  
Log real income 0.054*  0.081** -0.086  
 (0.032)  (0.037) (0.068)  
Log real expenditure on food 0.167***  0.161** 0.176  
 (0.061)  (0.071) (0.147)  
Household size -0.034***  -0.031*** -0.068***  
 (0.010)  (0.011) (0.026)  
Rural formal 0.035  0.188 -0.178  
 (0.128)  (0.143) (0.270)  
Tribal areas 0.163*  0.024 0.616***  
 (0.088)  (0.102) (0.192)  
Urban informal 0.052  -0.105 0.481  
 (0.183)  (0.213) (0.389)  
Father alive 0.007  0.027 0.101  
 (0.101)  (0.115) (0.304)  
Household Head’s education 0.003  0.008 -0.000  
 (0.007)  (0.009) (0.016)  
Coloured  -0.503***  -0.680*** 0.095  
 (0.101)  (0.117) (0.203)  
Indian  -0.807***  -0.919*** -0.269  
 (0.221)  (0.253) (0.542)  
White  0.105  -0.119 0.406  
 (0.265)  (0.305) (0.558)  
Age  -0.039**  -0.019 -0.217**  
 (0.016)  (0.029) (0.086)  
Male child -0.144**  -0.073 -0.266*  
 (0.067)  (0.076) (0.149)  
Health status: Good -0.007  -0.090 0.030  
 (0.078)  (0.089) (0.175)  
Health status: Fair -0.084  -0.023 -0.090  
 (0.084)  (0.095) (0.189)  
Place of Birth: Clinic -0.284**  -0.214 -0.244  
 (0.115)  (0.130) (0.262)  
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Place of Birth: Home -0.175  -0.160 -0.382  
 (0.138)  (0.143) (0.369)  
Health checkup: once -0.111  -0.051 -0.273  
 (0.082)  (0.091) (0.197)  
Checkup: more than twice -0.156*  -0.171* -0.162  
 (0.082)  (0.093) (0.188)  
_cons -1.094**  -1.476*** 0.305  
 (0.441)  (0.557) (1.022)  
R2 0.05  0.06 0.12  
Number of Observations 1,801  1,277 417  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Treatment group 
is comprised of children from households with incomes greater than R 2 200 and less than or equal to 
R 4 400 who received the grant. The control group is comprised of children who did not receive the 
grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible). Real income = Household income less government 
grants; in 2008 terms. Health status is binary with base = ‘excellent’. The classification was re-
categorized into: Very good = good, below very good = fair. Health checkup is binary with base = 
‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 5.16: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Weight-for-age for Children 
in Urban Formal Areas 
  
(Data: NIDS Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Sample: Urban Formal Areas) 
                         Based on 2008 Means-Test Threshold                     
Age Cohort:                Below 15   10 – 14 years          5 – 9 years  1 – 4 years   
(1)           (2)                     (3)          (4)        
Program Impact 0.849***   1.281*** -0.392 
 (0.309)   (0.384) (0.605) 
Treatment  -0.967***   -1.234*** -0.171 
 (0.269)   (0.339) (0.416) 
Dummy 2010 0.433**   0.685** 0.306 
 (0.218)   (0.289) (0.322) 
Dummy 2012 0.148   0.058 0.836* 
 (0.150)   (0.169) (0.436) 
Log real income 0.153**   0.190*** 0.078 
 (0.061)   (0.073) (0.103) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.098   0.110 0.092 
 (0.097)   (0.112) (0.196) 
Household size -0.054***   -0.046** -0.134*** 
 (0.019)   (0.021) (0.043) 
Father alive 0.060   0.217 -0.411* 
 (0.165)   (0.185) (0.228) 
Household Head’s education 0.003   0.016 -0.033 
 (0.013)   (0.016) (0.025) 
Coloured  -0.482***   -0.674*** 0.112 
 (0.118)   (0.135) (0.235) 
Indian  -1.489***   -1.471*** -1.465*** 
 (0.228)   (0.289) (0.511) 
White  0.159   -0.090 0.458 
 (0.276)   (0.315) (0.634) 
Age  -0.012   0.032 -0.242* 
 (0.027)   (0.045) (0.139) 
Male child -0.232**   -0.179 -0.254 
 (0.107)   (0.120) (0.248) 
Health status: Good -0.061   -0.203 -0.015 
 (0.130)   (0.142) (0.273) 
Health status: Fair -0.238*   -0.200 -0.326 
 (0.130)   (0.152) (0.281) 
Place of Birth: Clinic -0.601**   -0.607** -0.541 
 (0.253)   (0.237) (0.728) 
Place of Birth: Home -0.969***   -0.719*** -1.286*** 
 (0.206)   (0.250) (0.378) 
Health checkup: once -0.052   0.038 -0.194 
 (0.127)   (0.139) (0.297) 
Checkup: more than twice -0.112   -0.052 -0.230 
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 (0.135)   (0.158) (0.280) 
_cons -1.457**   -2.419*** 0.786 
 (0.704)   (0.883) (1.322) 
R2 0.13   0.17 0.18 
Number of Observations 688   498 161 
Notes: Clustered Standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable = Weight-for-age Z-score. Treatment group is comprised of children from households with 
incomes greater than R 2 200 and less than or equal to R 4 400 who received the grant. The control 
group is comprised of children who did not receive the grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible). 
Real income = Household income - government grants; in 2008 dollar -terms. Health status is binary 
with base = ‘excellent’. The classification was re-categorized into: Very good = good, below very good = 
fair. Health checkup is binary with base = ‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 
5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.17: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Weight-for-age for Children 
in Tribal Authority Areas  
  
 
 (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Sample: Children in Tribal Authority Areas) 
                           Based on 2008 Means-Test Threshold                        
 Age Cohort:             Below 15   10 – 14 years     5 – 9 years   1 – 4 years    
(1)    (2)                (3)            (4)       
Program Impact -0.124   -0.267 0.615 
 (0.262)   (0.313) (0.623) 
Treatment  0.011   0.123 -0.243 
 (0.233)   (0.291) (0.376) 
Dummy 2010 -0.142   -0.178 0.228 
 (0.213)   (0.258) (0.377) 
Dummy 2012 -0.099   -0.048 -0.253 
 (0.145)   (0.159) (0.433) 
Log real income -0.028   -0.006 -0.133 
 (0.039)   (0.046) (0.096) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.308***   0.318*** 0.216 
 (0.089)   (0.097) (0.234) 
Household size -0.026**   -0.025* -0.037 
 (0.012)   (0.014) (0.031) 
Father alive 0.037   0.034 0.196 
 (0.137)   (0.149) (0.498) 
Household Head’s education 0.001   0.001 0.005 
 (0.010)   (0.012) (0.022) 
Age  -0.068***   -0.025 -0.355** 
 (0.023)   (0.040) (0.144) 
Male child -0.109   -0.038 -0.352* 
 (0.092)   (0.106) (0.212) 
Health status: Good 0.051   -0.003 -0.022 
 (0.108)   (0.129) (0.263) 
Health status: Fair 0.114   0.205* 0.053 
 (0.116)   (0.123) (0.313) 
Place of Birth: Clinic -0.154   0.033 -0.159 
 (0.149)   (0.168) (0.303) 
Place of Birth: Home 0.041   0.095 0.067 
 (0.188)   (0.189) (0.552) 
Health checkup: once -0.145   -0.099 -0.217 
 (0.110)   (0.127) (0.274) 
Checkup: more than twice -0.256**   -0.319** -0.231 
 (0.116)   (0.131) (0.287) 
_cons -1.191*   -1.791** 0.977 
 (0.625)   (0.767) (1.547) 
R2 0.05   0.04 0.11 
Number of Observations 827   587 182 
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Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variable = Weight-for-age Z-score. Treatment group is comprised of children from households with 
incomes greater than R 2 200 and less than or equal to R 4 400 who received the grant. The control 
group is comprised of children who did not receive the grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible). 
Program impact = Treatment interacted with 2012 year dummy. Real income = Household income less 
government grants; in 2008 dollar -terms. Health status is binary with base = ‘excellent’; the 
classification was re-categorized into: Very good = good, below very good = fair. Health checkup is 
binary with base = ‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.18: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-age and Weight-
for-age for Children below 15 Years Living in Formal Rural Areas and Informal Urban Areas 
  
(Data: NIDS – Waves 1, 2, 3. Children aged below 15 years Rural Formal and Urban Informal Areas) 
                           Based on 2008 Means-Test Threshold                      
Dependent Variables= Z-scores:       Height for Age           Weight for Age      
Rural Formal  Urban Informal   Rural Formal Urban Informal    
Program Impact -0.853 -0.458  -0.135 -0.300 
 (0.670) (0.701)  (0.712) (1.460) 
Treatment  0.913 -0.007  -0.101 0.129 
 (0.622) (0.650)  (0.641) (1.322) 
Dummy 2010 -0.810 0.225  0.217 0.594 
 (0.654) (0.473)  (0.701) (0.571) 
Dummy 2012 -0.143 1.185***  -0.013 0.932 
 (0.300) (0.325)  (0.315) (0.601) 
Log real income 0.027 0.039  0.243** 0.110 
 (0.098) (0.073)  (0.118) (0.149) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.059 0.219  -0.201 0.125 
 (0.235) (0.140)  (0.264) (0.274) 
Household size 0.035 -0.007  -0.051 -0.060 
 (0.041) (0.031)  (0.048) (0.084) 
Father alive -0.272 0.233  -0.469 0.255 
 (0.452) (0.191)  (0.513) (0.453) 
Household Head’s education 0.012 0.043  -0.017 0.006 
 (0.025) (0.026)  (0.030) (0.052) 
Coloured  0.080 -0.655*  -0.358 -0.511 
 (0.230) (0.335)  (0.287) (0.580) 
Indian  0.215   -0.139  
 (0.437)   (0.394)  
White  0.129   -1.664*  
 (1.054)   (0.844)  
Age  0.016 -0.093***  0.055 -0.194* 
 (0.039) (0.035)  (0.055) (0.103) 
Male child -0.131 0.111  -0.192 0.247 
 (0.219) (0.190)  (0.246) (0.394) 
Health status: Good 0.309 -0.564***  0.560** -0.974** 
 (0.237) (0.213)  (0.267) (0.461) 
Health status: Fair 0.161 -0.747***  0.252 -0.938** 
 (0.329) (0.258)  (0.324) (0.456) 
Place of Birth: Clinic -0.643 0.059  0.380 -0.576 
 (0.427) (0.258)  (0.579) (0.494) 
Place of Birth: Home -0.116 1.867***  0.312 1.319* 
 (0.339) (0.288)  (0.312) (0.682) 
Health checkup: once 0.026 -0.280  0.581* -0.742 
 (0.303) (0.230)  (0.334) (0.507) 
Checkup: more than twice 0.124 0.058  -0.033 0.087 
 (0.275) (0.246)  (0.328) (0.415) 
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_cons -1.861 -2.711**  -0.407 -0.463 
 (1.611) (1.061)  (1.850) (1.512) 
R2 0.04 0.23  0.15 0.20 
Number of Observations 254 174  179 107 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Treatment group 
is comprised of children from households with incomes greater than R 2 200 and less than or R 4 400 
who received the grant. The control group is comprised of children who did not receive the grant (both 
means-test eligible and ineligible). Program impact = Treatment interacted with 2012 year dummy. Real 
income = Household income less government grants; in 2008 dollar -terms. Health status is binary with 
base = ‘excellent’; the classification was re-categorized into: Very good = good, below very good = fair. 
Health checkup is binary with base = ‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 
percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.19: DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-age and Weight-
for-age by Gender 
  
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Dependent Variable = Z-scores)   
                       Based on 2008 Means-Test Threshold                          
Dependent Variable: Z-score=       Height-for-age             Weight-for-age     
         Girls Boys  Girls Boys 
Program Impact 0.372* 0.201  0.125 0.101 
 (0.219) (0.256)  (0.285) (0.262) 
Treatment  -0.317 -0.338  -0.172 -0.442** 
 (0.195) (0.246)  (0.258) (0.223) 
Dummy 2010 -0.037 0.302  -0.095 0.404** 
 (0.169) (0.209)  (0.211) (0.204) 
Dummy 2012 -0.052 0.278**  -0.019 0.211 
 (0.115) (0.111)  (0.136) (0.147) 
Log real income 0.094*** -0.002  0.121*** -0.012 
 (0.032) (0.034)  (0.046) (0.043) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.162** 0.203***  0.069 0.253*** 
 (0.072) (0.069)  (0.085) (0.088) 
Household size -0.018* -0.007  -0.051*** -0.015 
 (0.010) (0.011)  (0.015) (0.014) 
Rural formal -0.016 -0.281*  0.105 -0.105 
 (0.163) (0.150)  (0.186) (0.180) 
Tribal areas -0.037 -0.148  0.144 0.138 
 (0.101) (0.101)  (0.124) (0.126) 
Urban informal -0.129 -0.083  -0.203 0.215 
 (0.160) (0.153)  (0.301) (0.224) 
Father alive 0.002 -0.055  -0.051 0.021 
 (0.110) (0.110)  (0.153) (0.137) 
Household Head’s education -0.004 0.002  0.006 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.008)  (0.011) (0.010) 
Coloured  -0.170 -0.229**  -0.661*** -0.358** 
 (0.114) (0.102)  (0.144) (0.143) 
Indian  -0.168 0.472  -0.840** -0.689*** 
 (0.379) (0.318)  (0.375) (0.257) 
White  0.674* 0.220  -0.102 0.240 
 (0.352) (0.259)  (0.397) (0.347) 
Age  -0.030** -0.055***  -0.066*** -0.008 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.023) (0.023) 
Health status: Good -0.087 -0.047  0.100 -0.119 
 (0.088) (0.084)  (0.114) (0.106) 
Health status: Fair -0.226** -0.061  -0.217* 0.071 
 (0.098) (0.099)  (0.114) (0.126) 
Place of Birth: Clinic -0.095 0.057  -0.437*** -0.117 
 (0.136) (0.154)  (0.162) (0.164) 
Place of Birth: Home -0.582*** -0.190  -0.182 -0.182 
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 (0.162) (0.172)  (0.179) (0.212) 
Health checkup: once -0.064 -0.168*  -0.074 -0.137 
 (0.096) (0.093)  (0.120) (0.113) 
Checkup: more than twice -0.158* -0.227**  -0.326*** 0.033 
 (0.091) (0.091)  (0.115) (0.119) 
_cons -2.035*** -1.651***  -0.489 -1.731*** 
 (0.502) (0.466)  (0.627) (0.619) 
R2 0.06 0.04  0.09 0.05 
Number of Observations 1,361 1,380  895 906 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Treatment group 
is comprised of children from households with incomes greater than R 2 200 and less than or equal to 
R 4 400 who received the grant. The control group is comprised of children who did not receive the 
grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible). Real income = Household income less government 
grants; in 2008 terms. Health status is binary with base = ‘excellent’. The classification was re-
categorized into: Very good = good, below very good = fair. Health checkup is binary with base = 
‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level.  
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Table 5.20: Summary of DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-Age 
Weight-for-Age: Regressions Controlling for Household Income including Government Grants 
  
     (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3) 
                       Based on 2008 Means-Test Threshold                       
Dependent Variables:  Height for Age  Observations     Weight for Age  Observations  
(1)        (2)               (3)                 (4)      
      
Full Sample:      
      
Below 15 years  0.288* 2,765  0.150 1,815 
 (0.165)   (0.192)  
Female children 0.383* 1,374  0.171 902 
 (0.216)   (0.282)  
Male children 0.173 1,391  0.133 913 
 (0.254)   (0.262)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.048 1,010    
 (0.240)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.274 1,291  0.327 1,288 
 (0.267)   (0.233)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.352 410  -0.455 419 
 (0.473)   (0.415)  
      
Formal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years 0.587** 1,074  0.849*** 692 
 (0.239)   (0.310)  
Aged 10 – 14 years -0.179 401    
 (0.370)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.835** 500  1.239*** 502 
 
Aged 1 – 4 years 
(0.377) 
0.237 
 
159 
 (0.385) 
-0.366 
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(0.727)   (0.609)  
Informal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  -0.731 176  -0.236 107 
 (0.693)   (1.443)  
      
Formal Rural Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  -0.806 257  -0.286 181 
 (0.664)   (0.655)  
      
Tribal Authority Areas:       
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Below 15 years 0.264 1,258  -0.076 835 
 (0.246)   (0.260)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.204 455    
 (0.336)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.074 595  -0.192 592 
 (0.384)   (0.311)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 1.106 177  0.734 184 
 (0.670)   (0.616)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-scores. Treatment group = children from households whose income is greater than R 2 
200 and less than or equal to R 4 400 who received the grant. Control group = children from 
households whose income was less than or equal to R 2 200 and greater than R 4 400 who did not 
receive the grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible). Covariates used are: 2010 and 2012 year 
dummies, log of real income (real income is total household income INCLUDING government grants), 
log of real expenditure on food, household size, father alive, household head’s education, race 
dummies, gender dummy, child’s age, health status, place of birth, health check-up. ***Significant at the 
1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
218 
 
Table 5.21: Summary of DID Results of the Impact of the CSG on Height-for-Age and Weight-for-
Age: Regressions Controlling for another Measure of Self-Reported Household Income 
  
     (Data: NIDS Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3) 
                        Based on 2008 Means-Test Threshold                       
Dependent Variables:   Height for Age  Observations     Weight for Age  Observations  
(1)         (2)                    (3)           (4) 
      
Full Sample:      
      
Below 15 years  0.320* 2,757  0.157 1,813 
 (0.165)   (0.194)  
Female children 0.425* 1,369  0.207 900 
 (0.218)   (0.286)  
Male children 0.208 1,388  0.129 913 
 (0.253)   (0.261)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.094 1,004    
 (0.237)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.291 1,290  0.338 1,287 
 (0.267)   (0.235)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.400 409  -0.460 418 
 (0.482)   (0.418)  
      
Formal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years 0.588** 1,072  0.845*** 692 
 (0.239)   (0.311)  
Aged 10 – 14 years -0.169 399    
 (0.363)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.833** 500  1.230*** 502 
 
Aged 1 – 4 years 
(0.377) 
0.334 
 
159 
 (0.390) 
-0.318 
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(0.749)   (0.618)  
Informal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  -0.691 173  -0.505 106 
 (0.701)   (1.492)  
      
Formal Rural Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  -0.703 257  -0.562 181 
 (0.673)   (0.698)  
      
Tribal Authority Areas:       
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Below 15 years 0.323 1,255  -0.057 834 
 (0.247)   (0.262)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.283 453    
 (0.337)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.113 594  -0.178 591 
 (0.383)   (0.313)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 1.174* 177  0.791 184 
 (0.670)   (0.609)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-scores. Treatment group = children from households whose income is greater than R 2 
200 and less than or equal to R 4 400 both who received the grant. Control group = children from 
households whose income was less than or equal to R 2 200 and greater than R 4 400 did not receive 
the grant(both means-test eligible and ineligible).  Covariates used are: 2010 and 2012 year dummies, 
log of real income (real income is self-reported as household questionnaire), log of real expenditure on 
food, household size, father alive, household head’s education, race dummies, gender dummy, child’s 
age, health status, place of birth, health check-up. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at 
the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.22: Summary of DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-Age 
and Weight-for-Age Based on 2012 Means-Test Threshold 
 
 
     (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3) 
                       Based on 2012 Means-Test Threshold                       
Dependent Variables:   Height for Age  Observations     Weight for Age  Observations  
(1)         (2)                    (3)           (4) 
      
Full Sample:      
      
Below 15 years  0.384** 2,511  0.222 1,656 
 (0.184)   (0.213)  
Female children 0.440* 1,251  0.159 831 
 (0.244)   (0.299)  
Male children 0.260 1,260  0.271 825 
 (0.281)   (0.310)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.237 912    
 (0.270)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.366 1,168  0.353 1,169 
 (0.304)   (0.262)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.366 1,168  -0.417 388 
 (0.304)   (0.262)  
      
Formal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years 0.658** 1,014  0.674** 650 
 (0.265)   (0.332)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.039 383    
 (0.426)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 1.033** 462  1.278*** 466 
 
Aged 1 – 4 years 
(0.428) 
-0.417 
 
155 
 
 
(0.387) 
-0.750 
 
157 
 
 
(0.713) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.657) 
 
 
 
Informal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  -0.533 171  -0.782 107 
 (0.790)   (1.098)  
      
Formal Rural Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  -0.778 252  -0.441 183 
 (0.694)   (0.631)  
      
Tribal Authority Areas:       
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Below 15 years 0.369 1,074  0.085 716 
 (0.277)   (0.296)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.381 386    
 (0.381)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.122 505  -0.194 503 
 (0.449)   (0.363)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 1.339* 153  1.119 160 
 (0.731)   (0.684)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-scores. Treatment group = children from households whose income is greater than R 2 
800 and less than or equal to R 5 600 who received the grant. Control group = children from 
households whose income was less than or equal to R 2 800 and greater than R 5 600 who did not 
receive the grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible).  Covariates used are: 2010 and 2012 year 
dummies, log of real income (real income is LESS of government grants), log of real expenditure on 
food, household size, father alive, household head’s education, race dummies, gender dummy, child’s 
age, health status, place of birth, health check-up. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at 
the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.23: Summary of DID Results of the Impact of the CSG on Height-for-Age and Weight-for-
Age: Regressions Controlling for Household Income including Government Grants 
  
     (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3) 
                        Based on 2012 Means-Test Threshold                       
Dependent Variables:   Height for Age  Observations    Weight for Age  Observations  
(1)         (2)                    (3)           (4) 
      
Full Sample:      
      
Below 15 years  0.365** 2,531  0.238 1,668 
 (0.183)   (0.211)  
Female children 0.453* 1,263  0.203 838 
 (0.241)   (0.295)  
Male children 0.214 1,268  0.263 830 
 (0.281)   (0.309)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.185 919    
 (0.274)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.361 1,178  0.378 1,178 
 (0.302)   (0.259)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.284 380  -0.386 390 
 (0.507)   (0.459)  
      
Formal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years 0.635** 1,020  0.652** 654 
 (0.264)   (0.331)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.006 385    
 (0.425)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.997** 466  1.208*** 470 
 
Aged 1 – 4 years 
(0.424) 
-0.425 
 
155 
 (0.382) 
-0.748 
 
157 
 
 
(0.714)   (0.664)  
Informal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  -0.776 173  -0.694 107 
 (0.770)   (1.101)  
      
Formal Rural Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  -0.721 255  -0.414 185 
 (0.682)   (0.616)  
      
Tribal Authority Areas:       
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Below 15 years 0.367 1,083  0.113 722 
 (0.275)   (0.294)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.409 389    
 (0.384)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.085 508  -0.155 506 
 (0.444)   (0.361)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 1.313* 155  1.193* 162 
 (0.720)   (0.673)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-scores. Treatment group = children from households whose income is greater than R 2 
800 and less than or equal to R 5 600 who received the grant. Control group = children from 
households whose income was less than or equal to R 2 800 and greater than R 5 600 who did not 
receive the grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible).  Covariates used are: 2010 and 2012 year 
dummies, log of real income (real income includes government grants), log of real expenditure on food, 
household size, father alive, household head’s education, race dummies, gender dummy, child’s age, 
health status, place of birth, health check-up. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 
percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.24: Summary of DID Results of the Impact of the CSG on Height-for-Age and Weight-for-
Age: Regressions Controlling for another Measure of Self-Reported Household Income 
 
     (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3) 
                        Based on 2012 Means-Test Threshold                       
Dependent Variables:   Height for Age  Observations     Weight for Age  Observations  
(1)         (2)                     (3)          (4) 
      
Full Sample:      
      
Below 15 years  0.404** 2,523  0.254 1,666 
 (0.183)   (0.212)  
Female children 0.508** 1,258  0.262 836 
 (0.242)   (0.300)  
Male children 0.262 1,265  0.275 830 
 (0.280)   (0.306)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.233 913    
 (0.272)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.386 1,177  0.395 1,177 
 (0.301)   (0.260)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.333 379  -0.381 389 
 (0.511)   (0.460)  
      
Formal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years 0.635** 1,018  0.642* 654 
 (0.264)   (0.331)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.017 383    
 (0.422)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.984** 466  1.188*** 470 
 
Aged 1 – 4 years 
(0.424) 
-0.339 
 
155 
 (0.386) 
-0.691 
 
157 
 
 
(0.749)   (0.672)  
Informal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  -0.689 170  -0.804 106 
 (0.770)   (1.188)  
      
Formal Rural Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  -0.581 255  -0.597 185 
 (0.700)   (0.670)  
      
Tribal Authority Areas:       
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Below 15 years 0.441 1,080  0.149 721 
 (0.276)   (0.296)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.520 387    
 (0.382)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.139 507  -0.122 505 
 (0.443)   (0.363)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 1.386* 155  1.255* 162 
 (0.712)   (0.661)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-scores Treatment group = children from households whose income is greater than R 2 
800 and less than or equal to R 5 600 who received the grant. Control group = children from 
households whose income was less than or equal to R 2 800 and greater than R 5 600 who did not 
receive the grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible).  Covariates used are: 2010 and 2012 year 
dummies, log of real income (real income includes government grants), log of real expenditure on food, 
household size, father alive, household head’s education, race dummies, gender dummy, child’s age, 
health status, place of birth, health check-up. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 
percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.25: Summary of DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-Age 
and Weight-for-Age – Robustness Check  
  
 
     (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3) 
                        Based on 2008 Means-Test Threshold                       
Dependent Variables:  Height for Age  Observations     Weight for Age  Observations  
(1)         (2)                    (3)           (4) 
      
Full Sample:      
      
Below 15 years  0.215* 6,916  0.086 6,734 
 (0.122)   (0.139)  
Female children 0.231 3,370  0.171 2,370 
 (0.163)   (0.207)  
Male children 0.168 3,546  0.015 2,493 
 (0.181)   (0.183)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.047 2,176    
 (0.190)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.225 3,367  0.152 3,371 
 (0.195)   (0.168)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.257 1,274  -0.431 1,289 
 (0.323)   (0.313)  
      
Formal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years 0.373* 2,158  0.573** 1,463 
 (0.196)   (0.240)  
Aged 10 – 14 years -0.525 728    
 (0.330)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.689** 1,034  0.770*** 1,039 
 
Aged 1 – 4 years 
(0.292) 
0.269 
 
372 
 
 
(0.293) 
-0.287 
 
373 
 
 
(0.568)   (0.476)  
Informal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  0.105 436  -0.076 293 
 (0.618)   (1.343)  
      
Formal Rural Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  0.045 570  -0.178 409 
 (0.321)   (0.436)  
      
Tribal Authority Areas:       
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Below 15 years 0.154 3,752  -0.112 2,698 
 (0.165)   (0.176)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.218 1,128    
 (0.246)     
Aged 5 – 9 years -0.038 1,838  -0.210 1,841 
 (0.269)   (0.221)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.714* 725  0.149 733 
 (0.419)   (0.394)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-scores. Treatment group = children from households whose income is greater than R 2 
200 and less than or equal to R 4 400 who received the grant. Control group = children from 
households whose income was less than R 2 200 and greater than R 4 400 (both who received the 
grant and those who did not receive the grant).  Covariates used are: 2010 and 2012 year dummies, 
log of real income (real income is LESS of government grants), log of real expenditure on food, 
household size, father alive, household head’s education, race dummies, gender dummy, child’s age, 
health status, place of birth, health check-up. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 
percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.26: Summary of DID Results of the Impact of the CSG on Height-for-Age and Weight-for-
Age – Regressions Controlling for Household Income including Government Grants – 
Robustness Check 
 
     (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3) 
                         Based on 2008 Means-Test Threshold                       
Dependent Variables:   Height for Age  Observations     Weight for Age  Observations  
(1)        (2)               (3)         (4) 
      
Full Sample:      
      
Below 15 years  0.239** 7,006  0.113 4,928 
 (0.120)   (0.138)  
Female children 0.251 3,428  0.178 2,409 
 (0.162)   (0.205)  
Male children 0.196 3,578  0.058 2,519 
 (0.178)   (0.184)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.036 2,201  0.209 105 
 (0.186)   (0.971)  
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.275 3,415  0.205 3,417 
 (0.193)   (0.168)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.302 1,289  -0.438 1,305 
 (0.322)   (0.312)  
      
Formal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years 0.387** 2,192  0.551** 1,489 
 (0.196)   (0.238)  
Aged 10 – 14 years -0.539 738    
 (0.332)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.690** 1,052  0.725** 1,057 
 
Aged 1 – 4 years 
(0.289) 
0.408 
 
377 
 (0.291) 
-0.235 
 
379 
 
 
(0.561)   (0.473)  
Informal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  0.030 444  -0.134 298 
 (0.616)   (1.332)  
      
Formal Rural Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  0.127 576  -0.154 414 
 (0.323)   (0.429)  
      
Tribal Authority Areas:       
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Below 15 years 0.181 3,794  -0.071 2,727 
 (0.162)   (0.176)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.223 1,140    
 (0.241)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.015 1,860  -0.143 1,862 
 (0.264)   (0.221)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.739* 732  0.188 740 
 (0.418)   (0.393)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-scores. Treatment group = children from households whose income is greater than R 2 
200 and less than or equal to R 4 400 who received the grant. Control group = children from 
households whose income was less than or equal to R 2 200 and greater than R 4 400 (both who 
received the grant and those who did not receive the grant).  Covariates used are: 2010 and 2012 
year dummies, log of real income (real income INCLUDES government grants), log of real expenditure 
on food, household size, father alive, household head’s education, race dummies, gender dummy, 
child’s age, health status, place of birth, health check-up. ***Significant at the 1 percent level 
**Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.27: Summary of DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-Age 
and Weight-for-Age – Regressions Controlling for another Measure of Self-Reported Household 
Income – Robustness Check 
 
     (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3) 
                        Based on 2008 Means-Test Threshold                       
Dependent Variables:   Height for Age  Observations    Weight for Age  Observations  
(1)         (2)                    (3)           (4) 
      
Full Sample:      
      
Below 15 years  0.244** 6,974  0.111 4,914 
 (0.120)   (0.139)  
Female children 0.252 3,408  0.173 2,399 
 (0.163)   (0.206)  
Male children 0.207 3,566  0.063 2,515 
 (0.178)   (0.184)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.055 2,182  0.545 104 
 (0.185)   (0.822)  
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.282 3,405  0.207 3,407 
 (0.193)   (0.168)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.292 1,286  -0.427 1,302 
 (0.323)   (0.311)  
      
Formal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years 0.389** 2,176  0.526** 1,480 
 (0.196)   (0.239)  
Aged 10 – 14 years -0.547* 730  0.607 720 
 (0.327)   (0.371)  
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.682** 1,045  0.687** 1,050 
 
Aged 1 – 4 years 
(0.290) 
0.460 
 
376 
 (0.293) 
-0.183 
 
378 
 
 
(0.560)   (0.470)  
Informal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  0.029 439  -0.189 296 
 (0.617)   (1.370)  
      
Formal Rural Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  0.116 575  -0.159 414 
 (0.324)   (0.429)  
      
Tribal Authority Areas:       
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Below 15 years 0.184 3,784  -0.063 2,724 
 (0.162)   (0.177)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.246 1,133    
 (0.241)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.028 1,857  -0.128 1,859 
 (0.264)   (0.221)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.708* 732  0.185 740 
 (0.417)   (0.392)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-scores. Treatment group = children from households whose income is greater than R 2 
200 and less than or equal to R 4 400 who received the grant. Control group = children from 
households whose income was less than or equal to R 2 200 and greater than R 4 400 (both who 
received the grant and those who did not receive the grant).  Covariates used are: 2010 and 2012 
year dummies, log of real income (real income is SELF-REPORTED as per household questionnaire), 
log of real expenditure on food, household size, father alive, household head’s education, race 
dummies, gender dummy, child’s age, health status, place of birth, health check-up. ***Significant at the 
1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.28: Summary of DID Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-Age 
and Weight-for-Age – Results Based on 2012 Means-Test Threshold: Robustness Check 
 
 
     (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3) 
                                Based on 2012 Means-Test Threshold                       
Dependent Variables:    Height for Age  Observations   Weight for Age  Observations  
(1)         (2)                    (3)           (4) 
      
Full Sample:      
      
Below 15 years  0.308** 7,037  0.215 4,967 
 (0.142)   (0.162)  
Female children 0.341* 3,419  0.216 2,410 
 (0.189)   (0.223)  
Male children 0.237 3,618  0.206 2,557 
 (0.215)   (0.238)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.213 2,191    
 (0.225)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.351 3,420  0.235 3,421 
 (0.233)   (0.200)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.157 1,319  -0.274 1,333 
 (0.364)   (0.362)  
      
Formal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years 0.431* 2,200  0.403 1,498 
 (0.222)   (0.259)  
Aged 10 – 14 years -0.265 735    
 (0.382)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.844** 1,049  0.719** 1,051 
 
Aged 1 – 4 years 
(0.348) 
-0.429 
 
390 
 (0.298) 
-0.682 
 
393 
 
 
(0.554)   (0.518)  
Informal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  0.217 446  0.198 301 
 (0.740)   (1.276)  
      
Formal Rural Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  0.258 579  -0.229 417 
 (0.347)   (0.437)  
      
Tribal Authority Areas:       
233 
 
      
Below 15 years 0.299 3,812  0.160 2,751 
 (0.204)   (0.221)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.521* 1,133    
 (0.291)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.091 1,868  -0.077 1,870 
 (0.345)   (0.285)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.765 745  0.701 751 
 (0.470)   (0.441)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-scores. Treatment group = children from households whose income is greater than R 2 
800 and less than or equal to R 5 600 who received the grant. Control group = children from 
households whose income was less than or equal to R 2 800 and greater than R 5 600 who received 
and those who did not receive the grant.  Covariates used are: 2010 and 2012 year dummies, log of 
real income (real income is less government grants), log of real expenditure on food, household size, 
father alive, household head’s education, race dummies, gender dummy, child’s age, health status, 
place of birth, health check-up. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.29: Summary of DID Results of the Impact of the CSG on Height-for-Age and Weight-for-
Age – Regressions Controlling for Household Income including Government Grants – 
Robustness Check 
 
     (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3) 
                           Based on 2012 Means-Test Threshold                       
Dependent Variables:   Height for Age  Observations    Weight for Age  Observations  
(1)         (2)                    (3)           (4) 
      
Full Sample:      
      
Below 15 years  0.322** 7,127  0.219 5,032 
 (0.142)   (0.162)  
Female children 0.358* 3,477  0.222 2,449 
 (0.188)   (0.221)  
Male children 0.245 3,650  0.207 2,583 
 (0.215)   (0.238)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.215 2,216    
 (0.225)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.375 3,468  0.253 3,467 
 (0.232)   (0.198)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.195 1,334  -0.277 1,349 
 (0.363)   (0.361)  
      
Formal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years 0.433* 2,234  0.367 1,524 
 (0.221)   (0.258)  
Aged 10 – 14 years -0.281 745    
 (0.383)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.836** 1,067  0.662** 1,069 
 
Aged 1 – 4 years 
(0.346) 
-0.323 
 
395 
 (0.295) 
-0.643 
 
399 
 
 
(0.554)   (0.518)  
Informal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  0.146 454  0.074 306 
 (0.736)   (1.272)  
      
Formal Rural Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  0.386 585  -0.027 422 
 (0.352)   (0.471)  
      
Tribal Authority Areas:       
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Below 15 years 0.309 3,854  0.165 2,780 
 (0.204)   (0.221)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.553* 1,145    
 (0.295)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.093 1,890  -0.070 1,891 
 (0.345)   (0.284)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.786* 752  0.741* 758 
 (0.470)   (0.441)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-scores. Treatment group = children from households whose income is greater than R 2 
800 and less than or equal to R 5 600 who received the grant. Control group = children from 
households whose income was less than or equal to R 2 800 and greater than R 5 600 (both who 
received the grant and those who did not receive the grant).  Covariates used are: 2010 and 2012 
year dummies, log of real income (real income includes government grants), log of real expenditure on 
food, household size, father alive, household head’s education, race dummies, gender dummy, child’s 
age, health status, place of birth, health check-up. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at 
the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.30: Summary of DID Results of the Impact of the CSG on Height-for-Age and Weight-for-
Age – Regressions Controlling for another Measure of Self-Reported Household Income – 
Robustness Check 
 
     (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3) 
                       Based on 2012 Means-Test Threshold                       
Dependent Variables:   Height for Age  Observations    Weight for Age  Observations  
(1)          (2)                   (3)            (4) 
      
Full Sample:      
      
Below 15 years  0.322** 7,095  0.214 5,018 
 (0.142)   (0.162)  
Female children 0.360* 3,457  0.223 2,439 
 (0.188)   (0.223)  
Male children 0.245 3,638  0.206 2,579 
 (0.214)   (0.237)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.223 2,197    
 (0.224)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.380 3,458  0.253 3,457 
 (0.232)   (0.198)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.177 1,331  -0.271 1,346 
 (0.364)   (0.360)  
      
Formal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years 0.432* 2,218  0.336 1,515 
 (0.221)   (0.258)  
Aged 10 – 14 years -0.279 737    
 (0.380)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.825** 1,060  0.624** 1,062 
 
Aged 1 – 4 years 
(0.346) 
-0.324 
 
394 
 (0.296) 
-0.611 
 
398 
 
 
(0.549)   (0.511)  
Informal Urban Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  0.130 449  0.056 304 
 (0.736)   (1.312)  
      
Formal Rural Areas:      
      
Below 15 years  0.360 584  0.008 422 
 (0.349)   (0.476)  
      
Tribal Authority Areas:       
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Below 15 years 0.303 3,844  0.165 2,777 
 (0.204)   (0.221)  
Aged 10 – 14 years 0.561* 1,138    
 (0.294)     
Aged 5 – 9 years 0.099 1,887  -0.061 1,888 
 (0.346)   (0.285)  
Aged 1 – 4 years 0.762 752  0.738* 758 
 (0.468)   (0.439)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-scores. Treatment group = children from households whose income is greater than R 2 
800 and less than or equal to R 5 600 who received the grant. Control group = children from 
households whose income was less than or equal to R 2 800 and greater than R 5 600 (both who did 
not receive the grant and those who received the grant).  Covariates used are: 2010 and 2012 year 
dummies, log of real income (real income is self-reported income as per household questionnaire), log 
of real expenditure on food, household size, father alive, household head’s education, race dummies, 
gender dummy, child’s age, health status, place of birth, health check-up . ***Significant at the 1 
percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.31: Fixed Effects Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-Age 
 
 
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Dependent Variable = Height-for-Age Z-score) 
Age Cohort:              Below 15 years  10 – 14 years  5 – 9 years  1 – 4 years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Child Support Grant 0.118** 0.294** 0.129 0.159 
 (0.058) (0.131) (0.124) (0.295) 
Dummy 2010 -0.105*** -0.473*** -0.055 0.028 
 (0.033) (0.086) (0.059) (0.134) 
Dummy 2012 -0.091*** -0.628*** 0.069 0.226 
 (0.031) (0.086) (0.074) (0.231) 
Log real income -0.009 -0.020 0.030 -0.048 
 (0.016) (0.033) (0.031) (0.063) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.000 0.041 -0.015 -0.086 
 (0.032) (0.062) (0.067) (0.177) 
Household size -0.006 0.018 -0.003 -0.026 
 (0.009) (0.022) (0.020) (0.043) 
Father alive 0.092 -0.343* 0.143 -0.403 
 (0.088) (0.198)   (0.155)    (0.734)  
Health status: Good -0.051 0.009 -0.056 0.130 
 (0.036) (0.077) (0.074) (0.150) 
Health status: Fair 0.014 0.033 0.005 0.202 
 (0.044) (0.102) (0.088) (0.248) 
Health checkup: once -0.051 -0.012 0.051 0.042 
 (0.038) (0.082) (0.074) (0.199) 
Checkup: more than twice -0.135*** -0.158* -0.050 -0.125 
 (0.040) (0.091) (0.074) (0.176) 
_cons -0.912*** -0.795* -1.128** 0.067 
 (0.241) (0.478) (0.492) (1.344) 
R2 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 
Number of Observations 10,160 3,008 4,964 2,045 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-Scores. Health status is self-reported and binary with base = ‘excellent’. Health 
checkup is the number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months and the base = 
‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 5.32: Fixed Effects Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-Age for 
Children in Urban Formal Areas 
 
 
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Sample: Children in Urban Formal Areas) 
Age Cohort:            Below 15 years  10 – 14 years   5 – 9 years   1 – 4 years  
 (1)  (2)    (3)   (4) 
Child Support Grant 0.084 0.298** 0.135 0.128 
 (0.077) (0.142) (0.120) (0.403) 
Dummy 2010 0.048 -0.402*** 0.058 0.098 
 (0.053) (0.108) (0.097) (0.275) 
Dummy 2012 0.123** -0.410*** 0.269** 0.208 
 (0.050) (0.113) (0.106) (0.489) 
Log real income -0.079*** -0.100* -0.032 -0.046 
 (0.028) (0.052) (0.065) (0.143) 
Log real expenditure on food -0.008 -0.064 -0.131 0.343 
 (0.052) (0.082) (0.104) (0.332) 
Household size -0.014 0.041 0.002 -0.121 
 (0.017) (0.026) (0.028) (0.083) 
Father alive 0.404*** 0.488** 0.611*** 1.949 
 (0.135) (0.209)   (0.229)   (1.369) 
Health status: Good -0.065 -0.058 -0.082 -0.216 
 (0.058) (0.113) (0.117) (0.227) 
Health status: Fair 0.014 0.093 -0.018 -0.165 
 (0.070) (0.106) (0.141) (0.363) 
Health checkup: once -0.020 0.042 0.175 -0.060 
 (0.060) (0.110) (0.118) (0.302) 
Checkup: more than twice -0.172*** 0.035 -0.125 -0.268 
 (0.064) (0.118) (0.119) (0.307) 
_cons -0.576 -0.262 -0.373 -4.209 
 (0.389) (0.644) (0.727) (3.014) 
R2 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.09 
Number of Observations 3,240 1,040 1,552 614 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-Scores. Health status is self-reported and binary with base = ‘excellent’. Health 
checkup is the number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months and the base = 
‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 5.33: Fixed Effects Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-Age for 
Children in Urban Informal Areas 
 
 
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Sample: Children in Urban Informal Areas) 
Age Cohort:            Below 15 years  10 – 14 years   5 – 9 years   1 – 4 years  
 (1)  (2)    (3)   (4) 
Child Support Grant 0.089 0.174 -0.272 -1.587 
 (0.233) (0.466) (0.429) (1.271) 
Dummy 2010 -0.034 -0.187 -0.211 0.540 
 (0.123) (0.428) (0.244) (0.377) 
Dummy 2012 -0.024 -0.436 -0.257 0.836 
 (0.140) (0.419) (0.330) (0.706) 
Log real income 0.043 0.016 0.220 -0.444 
 (0.060) (0.114) (0.142) (0.292) 
Log real expenditure on food -0.035 0.264 0.260 -1.712*** 
 (0.130) (0.238) (0.263) (0.345) 
Household size 0.022 -0.113 0.016 0.725*** 
 (0.051) (0.129) (0.134) (0.231) 
Father alive -0.058 -0.780 0.076 -2.397*** 
 (0.325) (0.569)  (0.746)  (0.587) 
Health status: Good 0.082 0.121 -0.031 0.645 
 (0.161) (0.391) (0.338) (0.705) 
Health status: Fair 0.189 0.038 0.290 1.728*** 
 (0.180) (0.395) (0.371) (0.384) 
Health checkup: once 0.215 -0.006 0.498** 1.381** 
 (0.149) (0.254) (0.245) (0.652) 
Checkup: more than twice 0.012 -0.378 -0.004 0.860 
 (0.144) (0.334) (0.256) (0.576) 
_cons -1.293 -1.492 -4.056* 10.211*** 
 (1.043) (2.044) (2.225) (3.797) 
R2 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.86 
Number of Observations 676 200 335 130 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-Scores. Health status is self-reported and binary with base = ‘excellent’. Health 
checkup is the number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months and the base = 
‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 5.34: Fixed Effects Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-Age for 
Children in Rural Formal Areas 
 
 
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Sample: Children in Rural Formal Areas) 
Age Cohort:            Below 15 years  10 – 14 years   5 – 9 years   1 – 4 years  
 (1)  (2)    (3)   (4) 
Child Support Grant -0.176 0.528 -0.587 0.428 
 (0.211) (0.415) (0.528) (0.608) 
Dummy 2010 0.299*** -0.548 0.446** 1.101*** 
 (0.112) (0.396) (0.215) (0.380) 
Dummy 2012 -0.031 -1.142*** 0.438* 0.219 
 (0.117) (0.344) (0.251) (0.769) 
Log real income 0.042 0.122 0.127 0.173* 
 (0.069) (0.134) (0.128) (0.094) 
Log real expenditure on food -0.058 -0.213 0.002 -0.379 
 (0.125) (0.221) (0.280) (0.410) 
Household size 0.021 0.095 0.035 0.104 
 (0.025) (0.092) (0.046) (0.112) 
Father alive 0.187 0.181 0.300 -4.295*** 
 (0.447) (0.857)  (0.319)  (0.296) 
Health status: Good 0.040 0.188 -0.094 -0.952*** 
 (0.133) (0.286) (0.262) (0.279) 
Health status: Fair 0.012 0.754* -0.190 0.114 
 (0.162) (0.405) (0.275) (0.713) 
Health checkup: once -0.160 -0.441 -0.081 0.775 
 (0.175) (0.419) (0.362) (0.507) 
Checkup: more than twice -0.034 -0.440 0.072 1.926*** 
 (0.151) (0.402) (0.259) (0.700) 
_cons -1.158 -0.920 -2.104 1.971 
 (1.012) (1.854) (1.842) (3.591) 
R2 0.03 0.28 0.08 0.75 
Number of Observations 846 240 415 175 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-Scores. Health status is self-reported and binary with base = ‘excellent’. Health 
checkup is the number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months and the base = 
‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 5.35: Fixed Effects Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-Age for 
Children in Tribal Authority Areas 
 
 
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Sample: Children in Tribal Authority Areas) 
Age Cohort:            Below 15 years  10 – 14 years   5 – 9 years   1 – 4 years  
 (1)  (2)    (3)   (4) 
Child Support Grant 0.155* 0.375 0.341* 0.282 
 (0.090) (0.254) (0.192) (0.524) 
Dummy 2010 -0.251*** -0.649*** -0.168** -0.073 
 (0.048) (0.131) (0.083) (0.193) 
Dummy 2012 -0.228*** -0.833*** -0.041 0.184 
 (0.045) (0.132) (0.106) (0.325) 
Log real income 0.009 0.017 0.039 0.015 
 (0.021) (0.046) (0.040) (0.087) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.017 0.135 -0.022 -0.067 
 (0.047) (0.103) (0.097) (0.245) 
Household size -0.005 0.023 -0.031 0.034 
 (0.014) (0.034) (0.033) (0.051) 
Father alive -0.078 -0.989*** 0.047 -0.255 
 (0.119) (0.293)  (0.204)  (0.773) 
Health status: Good -0.089* -0.038 -0.123 0.346 
 (0.051) (0.113) (0.099) (0.227) 
Health status: Fair -0.011 -0.171 -0.042 0.426 
 (0.064) (0.169) (0.129) (0.368) 
Health checkup: once -0.085 0.019 -0.044 -0.052 
 (0.055) (0.129) (0.105) (0.297) 
Checkup: more than twice -0.120** -0.294** 0.036 -0.117 
 (0.058) (0.144) (0.111) (0.239) 
_cons -0.955*** -1.133 -0.946 -1.249 
 (0.353) (0.784) (0.760) (1.652) 
R2 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.03 
Number of Observations 5,398 1,528 2,662 1,126 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-Scores. Health status is self-reported and binary with base = ‘excellent’. Health 
checkup is the number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months and the base = 
‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 5.36: Fixed Effects Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Weight-for-Age  
 
 
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3.Dependent Variable = Weight-for-Age Z-score) 
Age Cohort:            Below 15 years  10 – 14 years   5 – 9 years   1 – 4 years  
 (1)  (2)    (3)   (4) 
Child Support Grant 0.051  0.102 0.256 
 (0.068)  (0.115) (0.238) 
Dummy 2010 0.016  0.046 -0.387*** 
 (0.042)  (0.063) (0.125) 
Dummy 2012 -0.073*  0.032 -0.641*** 
 (0.041)  (0.071) (0.211) 
Log real income 0.016  -0.004 -0.078 
 (0.021)  (0.030) (0.061) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.074  0.108 -0.210 
 (0.046)  (0.074) (0.153) 
Household size -0.023**  -0.013 0.003 
 (0.011)  (0.022) (0.035) 
Father alive 0.088  -0.039 0.296 
 (0.112)  (0.170) (0.446)  
Health status: Good 0.065  0.077 -0.013 
 (0.046)  (0.069) (0.139) 
Health status: Fair 0.004  0.008 -0.309 
 (0.054)  (0.082) (0.192) 
Health checkup: once 0.006  0.062 -0.075 
 (0.051)  (0.072) (0.184) 
Checkup: more than twice 0.027  0.071 -0.222 
 (0.048)  (0.069) (0.167) 
_cons -0.881***  -1.078** 1.551 
 (0.339)  (0.512) (1.151) 
R2 0.01  0.01 0.06 
Number of Observations 7,347  4,971 2,073 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-Scores. Health status is self-reported and binary with base = ‘excellent’. Health 
checkup is the number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months and the base = 
‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 5.37: Fixed Effects Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Weight-for-Age for 
Children in Urban Formal Areas 
 
 
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Sample: Children in Urban Formal Areas) 
Age Cohort:            Below 15 years  10 – 14 years   5 – 9 years   1 – 4 years  
 (1)  (2)    (3)   (4) 
Child Support Grant -0.021  -0.145 0.416* 
 (0.107)  (0.200) (0.243) 
Dummy 2010 0.054  0.075 -0.399* 
 (0.073)  (0.105) (0.242) 
Dummy 2012 -0.004  0.173 -0.423 
 (0.078)  (0.106) (0.353) 
Log real income -0.028  -0.062 0.138 
 (0.048)  (0.067) (0.101) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.083  0.126 -0.088 
 (0.072)  (0.092) (0.244) 
Household size -0.015  0.018 -0.029 
 (0.025)  (0.046) (0.060) 
Father alive -0.041  -0.239 0.476 
 (0.232)     (0.492) (0.323) 
Health status: Good 0.047  0.016 0.150 
 (0.074)  (0.114) (0.146) 
Health status: Fair -0.092  -0.255* -0.507* 
 (0.100)  (0.146) (0.264) 
Health checkup: once 0.123  0.131 0.114 
 (0.083)  (0.119) (0.234) 
Checkup: more than twice 0.183**  0.097 0.290 
 (0.086)  (0.107) (0.266) 
_cons -0.658  -0.631 -1.283 
 (0.629)  (0.746) (1.827) 
R2 0.01  0.04 0.13 
Number of Observations 2,253  1,552 619 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-Scores. Health status is self-reported and binary with base = ‘excellent’. Health 
checkup is the number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months and the base = 
‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 5.38: Fixed Effects Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Weight-for-Age for 
Children in Urban Informal Areas 
 
 
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Sample: Children in Urban Informal Areas) 
Age Cohort:            Below 15 years  10 – 14 years   5 – 9 years   1 – 4 years  
 (1)  (2)    (3)   (4) 
Child Support Grant 0.208  0.228 -1.621 
 (0.189)  (0.259) (0.988) 
Dummy 2010 -0.046  0.176 -0.652 
 (0.186)  (0.296) (0.477) 
Dummy 2012 -0.051  0.080 0.982 
 (0.189)  (0.324) (0.790) 
Log real income 0.043  0.059 -0.159 
 (0.088)  (0.133) (0.243) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.179  0.016 -0.192 
 (0.169)  (0.263) (0.452) 
Household size -0.020  -0.058 0.372** 
 (0.067)  (0.117) (0.185) 
Father alive -0.072  0.622 -0.864* 
 (0.371)  (0.731) (0.497) 
Health status: Good -0.184  -0.476 -0.077 
 (0.223)  (0.410) (0.535) 
Health status: Fair -0.149  -0.149 -1.381** 
 (0.256)  (0.371) (0.625) 
Health checkup: once 0.109  0.186 0.079 
 (0.229)  (0.286) (0.823) 
Checkup: more than twice 0.421**  0.563** -0.628 
 (0.196)  (0.252) (0.557) 
_cons -1.626  -1.244 2.543 
 (1.230)  (1.997) (3.369) 
R2 0.04  0.09 0.55 
Number of Observations 487  336 135 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-Scores. Health status is self-reported and binary with base = ‘excellent’. Health 
checkup is the number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months and the base = 
‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 5.39: Fixed Effects Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Weight-for-Age for 
Children in Rural Formal Areas 
 
 
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Sample: Children in Rural Formal Areas) 
Age Cohort:            Below 15 years  10 – 14 years   5 – 9 years   1 – 4 years  
 (1)  (2)    (3)   (4) 
Child Support Grant -0.480**  -0.291 -0.113 
 (0.215)  (0.484) (0.578) 
Dummy 2010 0.133  0.252 0.245 
 (0.146)  (0.214) (0.351) 
Dummy 2012 0.333***  0.468** -1.282** 
 (0.124)  (0.229) (0.642) 
Log real income -0.015  -0.102 0.264* 
 (0.072)  (0.115) (0.141) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.043  0.174 0.456 
 (0.139)  (0.210) (0.378) 
Household size 0.002  0.030 0.099 
 (0.021)  (0.038) (0.140) 
Father alive 0.546  -0.146 -1.717*** 
 (0.342)  (0.287) (0.372) 
Health status: Good 0.073  0.210 -0.655** 
 (0.145)  (0.226) (0.292) 
Health status: Fair 0.106  -0.290 2.082*** 
 (0.181)  (0.266) (0.506) 
Health checkup: once 0.150  0.323 1.818*** 
 (0.173)  (0.216) (0.581) 
Checkup: more than twice -0.073  0.126 3.021*** 
 (0.175)  (0.265) (0.837) 
_cons -1.055  -1.184 -6.210* 
 (1.039)  (1.157) (3.454) 
R2 0.06  0.13 0.68 
Number of Observations 620  412 178 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-Scores. Health status is self-reported and binary with base = ‘excellent’. Health 
checkup is the number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months and the base = 
‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 5.40: Fixed Effects Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Weight-for-Age for 
Children in Tribal Authority Areas 
 
 
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Sample: Children in Tribal Authority Areas) 
Age Cohort:            Below 15 years  10 – 14 years   5 – 9 years   1 – 4 years  
 (1)  (2)    (3)   (4) 
Child Support Grant 0.093  0.151 0.032 
 (0.106)  (0.180) (0.363) 
Dummy 2010 0.012  0.006 -0.300* 
 (0.058)  (0.088) (0.178) 
Dummy 2012 -0.154***  -0.025 -0.735** 
 (0.057)  (0.102) (0.315) 
Log real income 0.038  0.037 -0.094 
 (0.026)  (0.037) (0.082) 
Log real expenditure on food 0.035  0.062 -0.232 
 (0.069)  (0.120) (0.210) 
Household size -0.029*  -0.056* -0.017 
 (0.017)  (0.033) (0.052) 
Father alive 0.135  0.074 0.674 
 (0.145)  (0.195) (0.656) 
Health status: Good 0.108*  0.117 0.081 
 (0.065)  (0.096) (0.205) 
Health status: Fair 0.109  0.168 -0.318 
 (0.075)  (0.115) (0.289) 
Health checkup: once -0.068  -0.056 -0.148 
 (0.071)  (0.104) (0.246) 
Checkup: more than twice -0.072  -0.021 -0.417* 
 (0.065)  (0.103) (0.222) 
_cons -0.712  -0.816 1.868 
 (0.496)  (0.818) (1.523) 
R2 0.01  0.01 0.10 
Number of Observations 3,987  2,671 1,141 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-Scores. Health status is self-reported and binary with base = ‘excellent’. Health 
checkup is the number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months and the base = 
‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 5.41: Fixed Effects Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Height-for-Age and 
Weight-for-Age by Gender 
 
 
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Dependent Variables are Z-scores) 
Dependent Variables:             Height for Age        Weight for Age      
 Girls Boys Girls    Boys 
Child Support Grant 0.122 0.112 0.023 0.067 
 (0.085) (0.079) (0.101) (0.092) 
Dummy 2010 -0.175*** -0.035 -0.003 0.032 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.057) (0.061) 
Dummy 2012 -0.160*** -0.020 -0.088 -0.061 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.058) (0.059) 
Log real income -0.001 -0.016 0.029 0.004 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.029) 
Log real expenditure on food -0.010 0.013 0.075 0.073 
 (0.047) (0.043) (0.056) (0.072) 
Household size -0.020 0.008 -0.037** -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) 
Father alive 0.103 0.082 0.237 -0.060 
 (0.128) (0.121) (0.173) (0.142) 
Health status: Good -0.061 -0.042 0.064 0.070 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.064) (0.066) 
Health status: Fair -0.015 0.041 0.033 -0.020 
 (0.065) (0.060) (0.080) (0.075) 
Health checkup: once 0.009 -0.108** 0.065 -0.047 
 (0.057) (0.051) (0.072) (0.071) 
Checkup: more than twice -0.105* -0.158*** 0.037 0.017 
 (0.058) (0.055) (0.067) (0.068) 
_cons -0.759** -1.080*** -1.004** -0.759 
 (0.338) (0.340) (0.431) (0.522) 
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Number of Observations 4,939 5,221 3,560 3,787 
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Dependent 
Variables are Z-Scores. Health status is self-reported and binary with base = ‘excellent’. Health 
checkup is the number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months and the base = 
‘never’. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent level *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 5.42: Summary of Estimation Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on Obesity 
 
 
   (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Dependent Variable = 1 if BMI z-score > 2) 
                           Children Aged 5 – 14 years                       
Fixed Effects  Observations  Diff-in-Differences  Observations 
(1)         (2)                      (3)            (4) 
      
Full Sample -0.020 7,769  -0.013 2,243 
 (0.016)   (0.044)  
Urban Formal Areas -0.048* 2,523  0.060 881 
 (0.027)   (0.072)  
Urban Informal Areas 0.032 516  0.259 139 
 (0.069)   (0.159)  
Formal Rural Areas -0.040 640  0.165* 203 
 (0.041)   (0.098)  
Tribal Authority Areas -0.012 4,090  -0.082 1,020 
 (0.020)   (0.060)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Covariates used 
in Panel Fixed Effects are: 2010 and 2012 year dummies, log of real income, log of real expenditure on 
food, household size, father alive (which is binary), Health status; self-reported and binary with base = 
‘excellent’, Health checkup – number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months 
and the base = ‘never’. Covariates used in Difference-in-Differences are: 2010 and 2012 year dummies, 
log of real income, log of real expenditure on food, household size, father alive, household head’s 
education, race dummies, gender dummy, child’s age, health status, place of birth, health check-up. 
Treatment group is comprised of children from households with incomes greater than R 2 200 and less 
than or equal to R 4 400 who received the grant. The control group is comprised of children who did not 
receive the grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible). Real income = Household income less 
government grants; in 2008 terms. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent 
level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.43: Summary of Estimation Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on 
Underweight 
 
 
   (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Dependent Variable = 1 if BMI z-score <-2) 
                           Children Aged 5 – 14 years                       
Fixed Effects  Observations  Diff-in-Differences  Observations 
(1)         (2)                      (3)            (4) 
      
Full Sample -0.016 7,922  -0.028 5,584 
 (0.013)   (0.018)  
Urban Formal Areas -0.025 2,575  -0.071** 1,791 
 (0.025)   (0.036)  
Urban Informal Areas -0.060** 529  -0.032 362 
 (0.030)   (0.093)  
Formal Rural Areas -0.016 655  -0.051 465 
 (0.056)   (0.070)  
Tribal Authority Areas 0.011 4,153  0.000 2,963 
 (0.019)   (0.019)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Covariates used 
in Panel Fixed Effects are: 2010 and 2012 year dummies, log of real income, log of real expenditure on 
food, household size, father alive (which is binary), Health status; self-reported and binary with base = 
‘excellent’, Health checkup – number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months 
and the base = ‘never’. Covariates used in Difference-in-Differences are: 2010 and 2012 year dummies, 
log of real income, log of real expenditure on food, household size, father alive, household head’s 
education, race dummies, gender dummy, child’s age, health status, place of birth, health check-up. 
Treatment group is comprised of children from households with incomes greater than R 2 200 and less 
than or equal to R 4 400 who received the grant. The control group is comprised of children who did not 
receive the grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible). Real income = Household income less 
government grants; in 2008 terms. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent 
level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.44: Detailed Summary of Estimation Results of the Impact of the Child Support Grant on 
Obesity, Overweight, Normal weight and Underweight. 
 
 
       (Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Dependent Variable = 1 if BMI z-score > 2) 
                                  Obesity                       
Fixed Effects  Observations  Diff-in-Differences  Observations 
(1)         (2)                      (3)            (4) 
      
Full Sample 0.036 7,922  0.069** 5,584 
 (0.025)   (0.032)  
Aged 5 – 14 years -0.020 7,769  -0.013 2,243 
 (0.016)   (0.044)  
 
 
(NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Dependent Variable = 1 if BMI z-score is between +1 and <+2) 
                                  Overweight                    
Fixed Effects  Observations  Diff-in-Differences  Observations 
(1)         (2)                      (3)            (4) 
      
Full Sample -0.011 10,232  -0.041* 7,006 
 (0.017)   (0.023)  
Aged 5 – 14 years 0.002 7,922  -0.026 5,584 
 (0.021)   (0.025)  
 
 
(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Dependent Variable = 1 if BMI z-score is between -2 and 1) 
                                  Normal Weight                   
Fixed Effects  Observations  Diff-in-Differences  Observations 
(1)         (2)                      (3)            (4) 
      
Full Sample 0.042** 10,232  0.077*** 7,006 
 (0.020)   (0.029)  
Aged 5 – 14 years 0.036 7,922  0.069** 5,584 
 (0.025)   (0.032)  
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(Data: NIDS – Wave 1, Wave 2, Wave 3. Dependent Variable = 1 if BMI z-score <- 2) 
                                 Underweight                    
Fixed Effects  Observations  Diff-in-Differences  Observations 
(2)         (2)                      (3)            (4) 
      
Full Sample -0.020* 10,232  -0.01 7,006 
 (0.010)   (0.014)  
Aged 5 – 14 years -0.016 7,922  -0.028 5,584 
 (0.013)   (0.018)  
Notes: Clustered standard errors (clustered at the household level) are in parenthesis. Covariates used 
in Panel Fixed Effects are: 2010 and 2012 year dummies, log of real income, log of real expenditure on 
food, household size, father alive (which is binary), Health status; self-reported and binary with base = 
‘excellent’, Health checkup – number of times health professional was consulted in the last 12 months 
and the base = ‘never’. Covariates used in Difference-in-Differences are: 2010 and 2012 year dummies, 
log of real income, log of real expenditure on food, household size, father alive, household head’s 
education, race dummies, gender dummy, child’s age, health status, place of birth, health check-up. 
Treatment group is comprised of children from households with incomes greater than R 2 200 and less 
than or equal to R 4 400 who received the grant. The control group is comprised of children who did not 
receive the grant (both means-test eligible and ineligible). Real income = Household income less 
government grants; in 2008 terms. ***Significant at the 1 percent level **Significant at the 5 percent 
level *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
